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THESIS ABSTRACT 
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Title: The Model City: Civil Rights, the Black Panther Party, and the Revolution of 
Urban Politics in Portland, Oregon 
 
 In recent decades, scholars have praised Portland as a model for urban planning 
and citizen participation.  This thesis complicates Portland's rose-colored image by 
situating it within recent histories on the long civil rights movement in the West, the 
Black Panther Party, and civil rights and metropolitan space.  The history of Portland's 
Black Panthers represents an important moment for the black freedom struggle in 
Northeast Portland's Albina district and for the city's approach to urban planning.  
Excluded from politics, spatially confined, and subjected to destructive urban renewal 
projects by the 1960s, blacks in Albina experimented with innovative forms of political 
participation.  These approaches ranged from moderate demands for neighborhood 
involvement with urban planners to radical, separatist opposition.  Although the Panthers' 
vision of socioeconomic uplift and community control declined, a citywide revolution in 
politics co-opted their approach, responded to moderate voices, and dismantled much of 
the undemocratic planning structure in the 1970s. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
URBAN PLANNING AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE CITY OF ROSES . . . 
AND PANTHERS 
 
 The first time I set foot in the Albina district of Northeast Portland in September 
2010, I had no idea of the neighborhood's history.  In fact, I was there only to attend a 
concert at Memorial Coliseum in the southwest corner of the district along the Willamette 
River.  Arriving by train at Union Station downtown, I looked east across the river 
dividing the eastern and western portions of the city.  On the far side of the river, the 
immense complexes of Memorial Coliseum and Rose Garden Arena in the Rose Quarter, 
as well as the towering glass spires of the Lloyd Convention Center rose up from behind 
the seemingly chaotic junction of Interstates 5 and 84 slightly to the south. 
 After disembarking, I left Union Station on foot, walking north across the 
immense red steel structure of the Broadway Bridge leading into Northeast Portland.  
Reaching the eastern terminus of the bridge, I strolled along Broadway for a few blocks 
into Albina until I reached southbound Vancouver Avenue.  One block beyond 
Vancouver is Williams Avenue, which runs north past the small city parks of the planned 
but never completed Emanuel Hospital expansion, through the heart of Northeast 
Portland's modern African American community, and all the way to the Columbia River 
and the former predominately-black wartime housing project of Vanport.  Turning south, 
I walked along Vancouver for two blocks until I reached the Rose Quarter, where I broke 
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off from the road and continued along the pedestrian walkway between the immense, 
clear glass cube of Memorial Coliseum and the sleek, rounded, modernly designed 
concrete Rose Garden Arena.  Before the late 1950s, neither of these two buildings 
existed.  Instead, this area had housed the highest concentration of African American 
homes and businesses in the city.  That was before city planners labeled the 
neighborhood as "blighted" and decided to level it so that the land could be used for 
purposes that were more profitable.  Oblivious to this history, I marveled at these 
incredible feats of architecture. 
 At the southern end of the Rose Quarter, I turned towards my hotel and the twin 
glass spires of the nearby convention center as I crossed under the Interstate 5 overpass.  
A group of three homeless black men sleeping by the street next to one of I-5's immense 
concrete support columns served as the only indicator that this space had once been the 
center of a now-exiled community.  Before the arenas, the convention center, and the 
interstate highways, this had been the only part of Portland in which blacks had been 
allowed to live.  The only scrap of land that the city's whites had thought was good 
enough for them. 
 But no one walking around me on their way to the bustling shops and restaurants 
seemed to remember any of this. 
 Or maybe, like me, they just didn't know. 
 Or maybe, like the city's urban planners who leveled Albina, they just didn't care. 
 
 In recent decades, Portland, lauded by its moniker of the "City of Roses," has 
been the subject of numerous studies of city planning and urban history among scholars 
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in a diverse array of fields.  Although frequently held up as a model for regional and 
urban planning, specifically on issues of transportation, citizen involvement and activism, 
environmental protection, and land use policies, scholars have largely neglected the 
historical role of Portland's relatively small yet centralized black community in Northeast 
Portland's Albina district in their discussions.
1
  Likewise, with the exception of Karen 
Gibson's 2007 article, "Bleeding Albina," scholars who focus on the history of African 
Americans and the struggle for civil rights in Portland have only tacitly acknowledged 
the important connection between urban planning policies in Albina and their effects on 
the black community and localized civil rights efforts.
2
  Those who have recognized this 
connection, however, have still failed to explain the relationship's effect on the 
development and trajectory of radical social protest movements during the 1960s and 
1970s.  This thesis begins to address that oversight through a case study of the local 
chapter of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP), which operated in Portland 
from 1969 until the mid-1970s. 
 In framing the historical context of the Black Panther Party in Portland, this thesis 
works within the conceptual framework of the "long civil rights movement," also referred 
to as the "Long Movement," popularized by twentieth century African American 
                                                             
1 See the works of Carl Abbott, notably Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century 
City (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), and Greater Portland: Urban Life and Landscape in 
the Pacific Northwest (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); as well as other scholars' 
works, including Connie P. Ozawa, The Portland Edge: Challenges and Successes in Growing 
Communities (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2004); and Eliot H. Fackler, "Protesting Portland's 
Freeways: Highway Engineering and Citizen Activism in the Interstate Era" (MA thesis, University of 
Oregon, 2009). 
 
2 Karen J. Gibson, "Bleeding Albina: A History of Community Disinvestment, 1940-2000," Transforming 
Anthropology 15.1 (2007): 3-25.  For other literature on the black freedom struggle in Portland, see Stuart 
J. McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line: Civil Rights and Racial Ideology in Portland, Oregon, 1944-
1965" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1998); The History of Portland's African American Community, 
1805 to the Present (Portland: Bureau of Planning, 1993); Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of 
Portland's African American History (Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995). 
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historians, sociologists, and political scientists in recent decades.
3
  This approach, which 
expands the geographic and chronological boundaries of the struggle for civil rights 
beyond the South and the narrow postwar timeframe of the 1950s and 1960s, has pushed 
historians to understand and appreciate both the localized nature of the black freedom 
struggle as well as the diverse yet continuous nature of the movement.  While there are 
potential shortcomings to this approach, including blurring the generational, ideological, 
and regional differences among activists and organizations in the struggle, framing the 
history of the Portland Panthers within this larger context is the best approach to 
understanding the rise and fall of the Black Panther Party in the city.
4
  To view the 
growth of the Portland Panthers in the isolation of the late 1960s and early 1970s, or even 
only within the context of the postwar Civil Rights Movement, diminishes the group's 
importance and obscures the underlying reasons for its existence.  Furthermore, such a 
narrow perspective relegates the emergence of the Portland BPP to a nationally simplified 
expression of 1960s radicalism instead of the outgrowth of decades of socioeconomic and 
political civil rights struggles in the city. 
 Moreover, by adopting this broader chronological and geographical approach, this 
study contributes to a growing body of literature on civil rights in the urban West and 
Pacific Northwest.  Although scholars have produced numerous case studies in recent 
decades on western US cities ranging from Los Angeles and Phoenix in the Southwest to 
Seattle in the Pacific Northwest, Portland remains a major West Coast urban center that 
                                                             
3 See Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," Journal 
of American History 91.4 (March 2005): 1233-1263; Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The 
Radical Roots of Civil Rights (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008); Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of 
Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008). 
 
4 For critiques of the "Long Movement," see Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua and Clarence Lang, "The Long 
Movement as Vampire: Temporal and Spatial Fallacies in Recent Black Freedom Studies," The Journal of 
African American History 92.2 (Spring 2007): 265-288.  
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historians have largely neglected.
5
  This study seeks to fill in that gap in the 
historiography of the long civil rights movement in the western cities by examining one 
of the largest West Coast cities with comparatively the smallest black population.  On a 
related note, it is important to remember that West Coast cities like Portland, Seattle, Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, and Oakland, tend to be highly multiethnic and multiracial given 
their history in relation the United States' western expansion and their geographic 
proximity to Latin America as well as the Pacific Rim.  This diversity became even more 
pronounced in the period following the Hart-Cellar Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965, which coincides with the temporal focus of this study.  Consequently, in studying 
this period, recent historians and political scientists have increasingly tried to develop 
more racially and ethnically complex, inclusive, and dynamic approaches to their 
studies.
6
  Moreover, any study that presents race relations solely within a black-white 
dichotomous framework is inherently incomplete.  However, as Stuart McElderry noted 
in his 1998 dissertation on the Civil Rights Movement in Portland between 1945 and 
1966, throughout the postwar era and well into the late twentieth century, Portland 
remained unmistakably divided— demographically, rhetorically, and, as I suggest, 
spatially—along a black-white color line.  To ignore such a divide ignores the entire way 
                                                             
5 A few examples of recent urban West studies include Quintard Taylor, The Forging of a Black 
Community: Seattle's Central District from 1870 through the Civil Rights Era (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1994) and "The Civil Rights Movement in the American West: Black Protest in Seattle, 
1960-1970," Journal of Negro History 80.1 (Winter 1995): 1-14; Matthew C. Whitaker, Race Work: The 
Rise of Civil Rights in the Urban West (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007); Scott Kurashige, The 
Shifting Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in the Making of Multiethnic Los Angeles 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); and Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the 
Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
 
6 See Scott Kurashige, The Shifting Grounds of Race; Claire Jean Kim, "The Racial Triangulation of Asian 
Americans," Politics and Society 27.1 (March 1999): 105-138. 
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in which blacks and whites in Portland viewed racial dynamics at the time.
7
  As a result, 
this thesis utilizes the black-white dichotomy in order to present a more focused 
perspective at the expense of a broader and more inclusive approach.  Nevertheless, I 
encourage readers and other scholars to make further comparisons with other racial and 
ethnic groups in and around Portland during the same timeframe to create a more detailed 
and holistic understanding of the period.
8
 
 In addition to its contribution to the history of the long civil rights movement, this 
thesis also builds on an already rapidly growing and diverse array of localized case 
studies on the Black Panther Party that have emerged in the last decade.  Historians of the 
late twentieth century had a tendency to view the Black Panther Party through a very 
narrow lens, focusing predominately on the organization's main branch and headquarters 
in Oakland as well as larger branches in other major cities like Chicago and New York.  
In addition, these histories frequently emphasized well-known leaders like Huey P. 
Newton, Bobby Seale, Fred Hampton, David Hilliard, and others.  Over the last two 
decades, however, a fresh wave of historians, most of whom are not old enough to 
remember the Black Panther Party, have uncovered and explored the histories of many of 
the BPP's more than forty frequently noted yet rarely described branches.
9
  While these 
                                                             
7 McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line," 12-13. 
 
8 See, for example, Glenn Anthony May, Sonny Montes and Mexican American Activism in Oregon 
(Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2011). 
 
9 In 2007 and 2010, Judson L. Jefferies compiled two volumes of recent articles on Black Panther Party 
branches in cities across the United States from Cleveland, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Houston, and New 
Orleans, to Milwaukee, Des Moines, Los Angeles, and Seattle.  See Judson L. Jefferies, ed. Comrades: A 
Local History of the Black Panther Party (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), and On the 
Ground: The Black Panther Party in Communities across America (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2010).  For other recent literature on the Black Panther Party, see also Jama Lazerow and 
Yohuru Williams, In Search of the Black Panther Party: New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for 
Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
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studies have revealed a previously unappreciated diverse yet loosely unified coalition of 
semi-autonomous organizations, several branches have gone unexamined.  Most notable 
among these unexplored branches is the Portland chapter of the BPP.  With the exception 
of Jules Boykoff and Martha Gies' article on media portrayals of the Portland Panthers 
and Martha Gies' article on the history of the Portland Panthers' dental and medical 
clinics, the larger social and political history of the Portland branch has remained 
untouched and unexamined.
10
 
 Finally, drawing on the work of historians who have framed the history of civil 
rights and the Black Panther Party within the history of space and urban planning, this 
study builds, in part, on the work of Robert Self and his 2003 book, American Babylon: 
Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland, on urban development and the BPP in 
Oakland.  By linking the history of modernist urban planning and urban space with the 
history of civil rights and other political and social struggles, Self contends that historians 
can better develop a more meaningful understanding of the history of place and nation.  
Specifically, he perceptively states, "Civil rights, black power, and . . . [other] political 
movements did not call for rights in abstract terms and ill-defined places.  They called for 
very specific things in relation to very specific places.  Space is not the whole story, but it 
would be a strange and incoherent one without it."
11
  From this perspective, an intricate 
and nuanced history of the Portland Black Panther Party requires both the larger 
                                                             
10 Jules Boykoff and Martha Gies, "We're going to defend ourselves: The Portland Chapter of the Black 
Panther Party and the Local Media Response," Oregon Historical Quarterly 111.3 (Fall 2010): 278-311; 
Martha Gies, "Radical Treatment," Reed Magazine, Winter 2009, 
http://web.reed.edu/reed_magazine/winter2009/features/ 
radical_treatment/index.html (accessed June 22, 2011). 
 
11 Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 17. 
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historical context of Portland's localized black freedom struggle as well as the history of 
the physical and spatial urban environment of the black community in Albina. 
 By situating this study within these three arenas—the long civil rights movement, 
the history of the Black Panther Party, and the history of urban planning and metropolitan 
space—a larger story of political exclusion, spatial conflict, and social and political 
experimentation within the city of Portland emerges.  The relatively short rise and fall of 
the Portland Black Panther Party, this thesis contends, marks an important turning point 
in the civil rights struggle for the black residents of Albina as well as for the City's 
approach to urban planning and development.  After decades of systematic exclusion 
from the political arena, spatial confinements and relocations, and urban renewal projects 
that destroyed black homes and businesses, blacks in Northeast Portland fought back in a 
variety of ways.  Excluded from traditional political routes for determining the future of 
their own neighborhoods and communities, African Americans had to develop new and 
creative approaches for finding a voice within city politics and urban planning.  These 
alternative forms of political experimentation ranged from demanding greater input and 
consultation with urban planners to openly hostile opposition to city government and a 
demand for complete control over their own community.  The Portland Black Panther 
Party represented the latter.  Although their vision of community control and 
socioeconomic uplift ultimately lost out by the mid-1970s, the Panthers were 
instrumental in putting pressure on the city government to respond to moderate voices 
within the African American community, like the Model Cities Citizen Planning Board, 
and to dismantle the undemocratic and insular power of the city's urban planners. 
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 In tracing the chronology and narrative arc of this argument, this thesis consists of 
four parts.  The first part, Chapter II: "Building and Rebuilding Albina," examines the 
growth of Portland's African American community in the city's northeast Albina district 
and its struggle for civil rights between the early 1900s and the mid-1960s.  In addition, 
the chapter outlines the ways in which Portland's city government and urban planners 
excluded African Americans from political participation in the early 1900s, conceptually 
spatialized and constructed Albina as a black urban ghetto after World War II, and 
developed urban renewal projects that destroyed the center of the black community 
during the 1950s and 1960s. 
 Chapter III: "Defending Albina," reveals the various tactics that the black 
community used to fight back against the City of Portland's vision for the future of 
Albina in the late 1960s.  Specifically, in this chapter, I argue that the Portland Black 
Panther Party, officially chartered in 1969, emerged as a new form of black political 
experimentation and as one adversative response to the Portland Development 
Commission's (PDC) top-down Model Cities plan to revitalize the Albina district.  On the 
one hand, the PDC envisioned a reconstruction of Albina rooted in capitalizing on the 
location and commercial potential of the land, regardless of their plans effects on the 
black community's homes and businesses.  On the other hand, the Portland Panthers 
vision emphasized giving communities complete control over their neighborhoods and 
promoting social programs aimed at socioeconomic uplift rather than physical urban 
renewal projects.  These two views for the future of Albina represented two competing 
and diametrically opposed conceptions of Albina that necessitated a middle path, or 
political compromise, in order to ensure peace and stability in Northeast Portland.   
10 
 
 The rise of citizen activism and neighborhood control of the Model Cities 
program as well as the decline of the Portland Black Panther Party by the early 1970s, 
discussed in Chapter IV: "Losing the Battle," reflected the emergence of this 
compromise.  While the PDC lost control of the Model Cities program to local citizen 
boards and planning committees, their continuation with the Emanuel Hospital 
renovation and expansion project still leveled a large portion of the black community's 
homes and businesses.  Moreover, combined with the concentrated efforts of local police 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the PDC's hospital project reduced the Portland 
Black Panther Party to a small and nearly powerless organization by the mid-1970s.  In 
the end, however, the PDC's continued dominance in urban planning, much like the 
Portland Panthers, was short-lived. 
 Finally, Chapter V: "Winning the War?" explores the spread of citizen 
participation and neighborhood activism throughout Portland in the 1970s, the election of 
Mayor Neil Goldschmidt and his attempts to reorganize the city's power structure and 
urban planning apparatus, and the rise of African American political leadership in 
Portland and the state of Oregon more broadly.  In the end, the leadership of Mayor 
Goldschmidt, along with moderate activist voices within Albina's black community, 
stripped the PDC of its power and helped bring a small component of the Portland 
Panthers' antithetical vision of community control and socioeconomic uplift into 
mainstream politics by the mid-to-late 1970s.  Still, the legacies of more than one-
hundred years of social, political, economic, and spatial discrimination and exclusion left 
an indelible legacy of poverty that both the black community in Albina and the city 
11 
 
government could not easily eradicate over the course of a single decade of community-
led planning and development. 
 To begin this historical narrative with the decline of the postwar Civil Rights 
Movement and the rise of the Portland Black Panther Party in the late 1960s would not be 
sufficient to contextualize the organization's historical roots or purpose.  In order to tell 
this story properly, in order to appreciate the deeply rooted nature of the political, spatial, 
and socioeconomic exclusions of African Americans in Portland, and in order to 
understand exactly what the Portland Panthers fought for, we must begin at least two 
generations before the emergence of the organization.  Only by beginning with 
considering the dawn of the long civil rights movement in Portland during the early 
1900s can we start to understand the complex factors that led to the rise and decline of 
the Portland Panthers. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
BUILDING AND REBUILDING ALBINA: 
THE ORIGINS OF THE LONG CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN PORTLAND, 
1900-1966 
 
 For two days in the summer of 1967, young African Americans, most of them in 
their teens and twenties, rioted in and around the area of Irving Park in Northeast 
Portland.  Defying attempts by police as well as local black ministers and community 
leaders to quell the riots, Portland's black youth attacked, vandalized, and looted local 
businesses and threw rocks and bottles at passing whites.  Unlike many of the more than 
150 other race riots that spread across American cities during that long hot summer of 
1967, the Portland riots resulted in no deaths, though one man was shot and more than 50 
African Americans were arrested over the two days.
1
  Like their contemporaries in 
Oakland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, New York, and other cities, this 
generation had grown up in the cradle of the modern American urban crisis.  Many of 
these young African Americans were just infants and young children during the Vanport 
floods that washed away black homes after the Second World War, and they grew up 
witnessing the destruction of black neighborhoods to make way for highways, sports 
arenas, and hospital renovations.  At each turn, local white politicians and business 
leaders in Portland ignored the plight of the African American community and willingly 
destroyed poorer neighborhoods in the name of urban renewal. 
                                                             
1 The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present (Portland: Bureau of 
Planning, 1993), 124. 
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 Throughout the twentieth century, and especially in the years following the 
Second World War, African Americans gradually achieved legislative victories in their 
long struggle for civil rights in Oregon.  Despite these breakthroughs, Portland—like 
many other major metropolitans areas of the United States—experienced the worst race 
riots in the history of the city during the late 1960s.  As city officials and local African 
American community leaders searched for inventive ways to curb the disturbances, many 
of Portland's citizens were left to wonder why these riots were happening. 
 Historians of the struggle for civil rights in Portland have been similarly 
unsuccessful in constructing a complete and fully explanatory narrative of the roots of 
this rise in radicalism, violence, and discontent that emerged within the city's African 
American community by the late 1960s.  While a wide variety of secondary historical 
literature exists on civil rights in Oregon, historiography on the subject is fragmented, 
misleading, and incomplete.  Consequently, through a synthesis of research on Portland 
by urban historians as well as civil rights historians, this chapter combines works on early 
twentieth century, World War II, and postwar civil rights efforts as well as literature on 
urban development and renewal to present a brief articulation of the long civil rights 
movement in the city of Portland.  With the black freedom struggle placed into this larger 
historical narrative, our understanding of the major turn in civil rights during the late 
1960s becomes more understandable and less surprising.  Moreover, this approach further 
emphasizes the problem of presenting the black freedom struggle in the West and Pacific 
Northwest—as well as the broader United States in general—through traditional and 
limited postwar narrative.  Ultimately, this perspective suggests that the turn towards 
black power and radicalism was not a deterioration of the postwar Civil Rights 
14 
 
Movement; instead, such sentiments were the culmination of a century of racial 
discrimination, political neglect, and spatial isolation, as well as the unresolved 
socioeconomic problems that these policies produced. 
 Between 1900 and the late 1960s, blacks in Portland managed to achieve only the 
most basic civil rights victories, including the repeal of voting bans and exclusionary 
language in the state constitution as well as the passage of bills providing for public 
accommodations, fair employment practices, and open housing.  However, a century of 
discrimination, neglect, and community destruction in the name of urban development 
and renewal undermined the socioeconomic foundation of Portland's African American 
community.  Portland's inherently undemocratic city political system, which was 
ironically rooted in Progressive Era values and political thought, ultimately ignored the 
needs of African Americans and created an urban ghetto in the Albina district through the 
government's unwillingness to pass substantive civil rights legislation as well as 
misguided and destructive postwar urban renewal efforts.  From the early years of the 
twentieth century through the 1960s, Portland's African American community developed 
slowly in comparison to other major West Coast cities like Seattle, Oakland, and Los 
Angeles; nevertheless, this relatively small black population in Albina gave birth to one 
of the longest and most difficult struggles for civil rights in the urban West. 
 
The Growth and Development of Portland's Black Community and Civil Rights 
 As early as the 1850s, small numbers of African Americans had begun to settle in 
the city of Portland despite a constitutional exclusion clause banning blacks and many 
other minorities, particularly Chinese, from residing in the state.  As a result, prior to 
15 
 
1900, blacks composed less than one-quarter of one percent of the city's population.  
However, as the black community grew and changed in demographics in the years after 
the Civil War and the first four decades of the twentieth century, so too did a vigorous 
although protracted and often unsuccessful civil rights movement among blacks and 
white progressive political allies. 
 The restructuring of Portland's city government at the beginning of the twentieth 
century reshaped the trajectory of Portland politics for the subsequent decades and 
effectively eliminated, perhaps unintentionally, the potential for African American 
participation in the city's political process.  With the adoption of a new city charter in 
1903 and major reforms to the charter in 1913, Portland entered a period of substantial 
growth and urban development as well as rampant political corruption.  Based on 
progressive ideals and a widespread belief that the mayor needed more authority to 
improve the social environment of the city, the charter granted Portland's mayor more 
power than previous mayors had possessed by eliminating independent city boards and 
replacing them with a civic commission and executive board selected by the mayor.  
Moreover, the charter stipulated that while ten of the city's fifteen council members must 
be elected from wards, five members were to be selected through at-large elections.
2
 
 Increasing corruption under the new political system by the early 1910s, 
especially under the leadership of Mayor Joseph Simon, led Portlanders to revise the 
city's charter in 1913.
3
  Following a scathing report on corruption in Portland's city 
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government published by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research in April 1913, 
Portlanders revised their city's charter.  In an effort to eliminate corruption and 
inefficiency, the city placed new limitations on the power of the mayor, reduced the size 
of the city council, and eliminated the ward-based system of city council representation 
with an entirely at-large system, where all council members were selected by a citywide 
popular vote.
4
  Although a coalition of political progressives intended this new system of 
city governance to reduce competition between neighborhood interests, the new political 
structure also resulted in the elimination of the voice of minority neighborhoods and 
communities.  According to urban historian Carl Abbott, this change in Portland city 
politics "undermined the indigenous democratic socialism and put government firmly in 
the hand of the middle class."
5
  Despite underlying concerns with the new system, 
Portlanders defeated two measures to repeal and abolish the new system in 1917.
6
  
Without district- or ward-based representation, the new structure of Portland politics 
removed the city's small yet gradually growing black population from the political 
process and forced them to rely on the support of white progressive leaders in the city 
government and state legislature in order to advance civil rights efforts throughout much 
of the twentieth century. 
 Because of the nature of Portland politics, African Americans had little success in 
reforming civil rights issues in the first decades of the twentieth century.  According to 
Elizabeth McLagan, an historian of African American history in Portland, "Oregon, 
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progressive in many ways, resisted the necessary legislation which would correct 
historical inequalities in the treatment of blacks and other minorities.  In the absence of a 
significant black population before 1940 that could [affect] legislation, it remained a 
West Coast ecological paradise with a peculiar resistance to change."
7
  In addition to 
outdated constitutional restrictions on black settlement that were nullified after the Civil 
War, the Oregon State Supreme Court established a legal basis for segregation in Oregon 
movie theatres in the 1906 case of Taylor v. Cohn, which quickly carried over to 
restaurants and other private businesses.
8
  In addition, the revival of the Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK) across the United States by 1920 was particularly strong in Oregon, and the Klan 
quickly became the largest social and political organization in the state.  Unlike 
California and Washington, which passed laws barring KKK members from wearing 
hoods or engaging in some intimidating behavior, Oregon allowed the Klan to operate 
without interference.
9
  Consequently, the KKK became a powerful voice in Oregon 
electoral politics and served as a major obstacle towards the passage of civil rights 
legislation until the organization's decline from internal conflicts and political corruption 
during the mid-1920s.
10
 
 Nevertheless, African Americans were not passive victims of segregation and 
discrimination; instead, they actively pursued civil rights legislation despite their 
numbers and lack of representation under the at-large political system.  Early black 
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Oregonians—through organizations like the short-lived New Port Republican Club—
worked with white progressive allies in the state government for new legislation 
improving access to public accommodations and removing discriminatory language from 
the state constitution, including outdated exclusion clauses as well as bans on voting and 
interracial marriage.
11
  However, although the legislature eventually passed amendments 
to the state constitution regarding the exclusion and voting bans on numerous occasions 
by 1915, the public narrowly defeated each measure when brought to a popular vote for 
ratification.  As a result, prior to 1920 and the presence of a sizable black population, the 
Oregon legislature failed to enact even the most basic civil rights legislation. 
 The movement of African Americans out of the rural South and into major urban 
centers in the North and the West during the early decades of the twentieth century, 
commonly known as the Great Migration, dramatically altered the population and 
demographics of Portland's black community and laid the foundation for social, 
economic, and political changes.  Between 1900 and 1920, Portland's African American 
population grew slowly in comparison to other major West Coast cities.  During that 
twenty-year period, the African American population in Portland doubled from 775 to 
1,556, yet blacks remained the smallest of the three major minority communities, behind 
the Chinese and Japanese.  Even so, African Americans became the fastest growing non-
white community in the city while the Chinese population declined rapidly from 7,841 to 
1,846 and the Japanese population, which increasingly transitioned from wage-labor jobs 
in the city to business ownership and rural farming, grew from 1,189 to 1,715 during the 
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same period.
12
  Still, compared to other West Coast cities, the increase in Portland's 
African American community was relatively small.  Los Angeles and Oakland 
experienced a rapid increase in black population.  The number of African Americans in 
Oakland increased from 1,026 to 5,489 over the same two decades, while Los Angeles' 
black population exploded from 2,131 to 15,579.  Similarly, though not as extreme, 
Seattle's black population grew at a much faster rate than in Portland, expanding from 
405 in 1900 to 2,894 by 1920.  San Francisco is the only major West Coast city 
comparable to Portland, which experienced a comparatively mild growth of 1,654 to 
2,414; but this change seems less surprising in light of the dramatic expansion of the 
African American across the bay in Oakland (See Appendix B: Table 2.1).
13
 
 Despite this relatively slower growth of Portland's black community, the sudden 
increase of the African American population in the city resulted in distinct changes in the 
community's social, cultural, spatial, and economic demographics.  Prior to the Great 
Migration of the early twentieth century, Portland's black population was largely male, 
and most of the jobs in which they worked were in the menial service sector, including 
cooks, waiters, janitors, servants, chauffeurs, and—most importantly—railroad porters.  
According to census data from 1910, roughly 70 percent of all employed black males 
worked one of these service jobs, with 29.5% percent of the population working as 
porters in particular.  Similarly, the relatively small population of black women tended to 
have no occupation, and the few who did worked as domestic servants, cooks, or 
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waitresses.
14
  As a result, the majority of Portland's blacks resided in the northern part of 
downtown, located west of the Willamette River near Union Depot and the hotels and 
restaurants where they worked. 
 Given the black community's relatively small population compared to Asian 
communities in Portland in the early decades of the twentieth century, historian William 
Toll notes that the "general though subdued anti-Asian xenophobia" allowed for a gradual 
proletarianization of Portland blacks in service jobs without mass resistance from white 
Portlanders during the Great Migration.
15
  As the population of African Americans grew 
by 1920, blacks increasingly found jobs as laborers, skilled trade workers, and even 
business owners and managers, while the percentage of African Americans working as 
porters dropped to 17.5 percent.  Likewise, the percentage of black women without an 
occupation fell below 50 percent for the first time in the census record as more women 
moved to the city and found work as domestic servants, hairdressers, and various small 
business jobs within the black community.
16
  Regardless of these employment 
opportunities and the growth of black businesses, like W.D. Allen's Golden West Hotel 
near downtown, which became a major hub for the black community, Toll notes, "blacks 
nevertheless found themselves shunted into traditional service jobs on the fringe of the 
urban working class. . . . Portland's employers were not willing to admit blacks to higher 
paying jobs . . . and blacks lacked the numbers and power to start banks of their own or to 
challenge discrimination through the political system."
17
  Instead, major advances in 
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employment opportunities for Portland's African Americans did not improve until the 
latter half of the twentieth century. 
 The slow decline of the black community's strict dependence on railroad work 
and the gradual increase in wage-labor jobs in Portland also resulted in distinct 
resettlement patterns and increased spatial segregation among African Americans and 
whites.  While blacks had initially tended to settle in the northern part of downtown, 
many blacks, particularly those with families, could afford to relocate their families east 
across the Willamette River into houses in the Albina district (See Appendix C: Figures 
2.1 and 2.2).  However, the congregation of blacks in the Albina district was primarily 
the result of white popular opinion in favor of segregating communities, discriminatory 
real estate practices, and restrictive covenants rather than any premeditated intentions of 
African Americans to establish a black community in Northeast Portland.
18
  By 1920, 63 
percent of blacks living east of the river in Albina were couples, more than half of which 
had children.  In contrast, the "old" black neighborhood of northern downtown remained 
overwhelmingly single and male, with occasional relatives and boarders residing among 
the men.
19
  Similarly, in 1920, about 53 percent of black Albina residents owned their 
own homes, while an overwhelming 95 percent of blacks in the "old" downtown 
neighborhood were renters.
20
  As a result, as Albina's African American population grew 
over the course of the twentieth century, the social and cultural heart of the black 
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community, including churches and other social organizations, began to shift from 
northern downtown to east of the river. 
 Demographic and economic growth as well as changes in settlement patterns 
translated into the growth of new social institutions among Portland's blacks in Albina, 
including black newspapers, civil rights organizations, and churches.  Newspapers, 
perhaps more than any other early institution, sought to improve literacy and education 
among the black population in order to agitate for civil rights and encourage self-
determination.
21
  Until the 1930s, newspapers like New Age (est. 1896), The Advocate 
(est. 1903), and the Portland Times (est. 1918) continually emphasized civil rights 
agitation and activism among the black community.  In particular, The Advocate, which 
was founded by E.D. Cannady and his remarkably influential and politically active wife, 
Beatrice Morrow Cannady, became the leading black newspaper and advocate for civil 
rights in Portland following the closure of the New Age newspaper in 1907.  Beatrice, 
who served as the paper's assistant editor beginning in 1912, ultimately went on to 
become the first black female attorney in Oregon, helped found the Portland branch of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and 
launched an unsuccessful bid for state representative from Multnomah County in the 
early 1930s.
22
 
 While newspapers provided an early foundation for the long civil rights 
movement in Portland, social and political organizations like the NAACP, local churches, 
and the Oregon Association of Colored Women's Clubs translated calls for civil rights 
into action.  In 1914, a coalition of blacks and whites in Portland established a branch of 
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the NAACP, making it the oldest continuously chartered branch of the organization west 
of the Mississippi River.  Relying on the assistance of Portland's northeastern black 
churches, including the First African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Zion Church, Bethel 
AME Church, the First African Baptist Church, and Mt. Olivet Baptist Church, the 
NAACP quickly became the lead organizer in Oregon's civil rights struggle.  While the 
organization's focus on legislation and court cases achieved little success in the 1910s, its 
presence was instrumental for civil rights advancements in Oregon during the 1920s and 
after World War II.
23
  Similarly, other organizations—like the Oregon Association of 
Colored Women's Clubs, founded in 1917 following the merger of several women's civil 
rights, Christian temperance, and other progressive groups—worked to improve social 
conditions among Portland's blacks.  In particular, the Oregon Association of Colored 
Women's Clubs sought to improve women's education and the social, economic, and 
moral welfare of the community, as well as develop black leadership and secure civil 
rights.
24
  Together, these organizations formed the backbone of a rapidly emerging and 
socially active civil rights movement in Portland. 
 The growth of Portland's black population in Albina, the publication of black 
newspapers, and the establishment of the Portland branch of the NAACP and other 
organizations led to the first major breakthroughs in civil rights legislation in the state of 
Oregon during the 1920s.  In 1925, Republican William F. Woodward of Multnomah 
County proposed a bill to repeal the exclusion clause from the state constitution, which 
finally passed both the state legislature and a statewide ratification in 1926 by a margin of 
62.5 percent to 37.5 percent.  Likewise, in 1927, Salem Representative John Geisy 
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offered, and the legislature passed, an amendment to repeal the voting ban, which the 
public ratified later that year by a similar margin of 62.4 percent to 37.6 percent.
25
  
However, these measures lacked practical substance since neither constitutional clause 
had been enforced in more than two decades.  Other civil rights measures met with less 
success.  The removal of the ban on interracial marriage continued to meet fierce 
opposition from state representatives, who voted down the repeal in both 1893 and 1917.  
"Clearly," McLagan notes, "it was acceptable to modify the state constitution in order to 
affirm rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but the legislators of Oregon were 
not ready to grant additional rights to minorities, including the right to marry whom they 
pleased."
26
  Ultimately, the intermarriage ban remained law until 1951.  Similarly, 
although the Afro-American League of Portland led by McCants Stewart, Portland's first 
black attorney, originally presented a public accommodations bill to Oregon lawmakers 
in 1919, the legislature did not approve such legislation until 1953.
27
  California and 
Washington, on the other hand, passed similar public accommodations laws in 1905 and 
1909 respectively.
28
 
 With the collapse of the stock market in 1929 and the onset of the Great 
Depression by the early 1930s, economic opportunities and the growth of the black 
community in Portland stagnated.  Without the capital to maintain their community, 
many black-owned businesses failed during the early 1930s; moreover, unemployed 
blacks struggled to find service jobs as business owners preferred giving work to 
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25 
 
unemployed whites.  This employment discrimination, in turn, threatened the growth of 
Portland's small yet gradually emerging middle class of the 1920s.  Moreover, after the 
Golden West Hotel closed in 1931 and The Advocate folded in 1933, most of Portland's 
major businesses and all of the black newspapers had gone out of business, striking yet 
another blow to the civil rights struggle.  As a result, Portland's African American 
community grew very little and the population remained around 2,000 by 1940.
29
  
However, with the outbreak of war in the Pacific in 1941, this lost decade of political and 
socioeconomic civil rights advancements became little more than a harbinger to the 
largest historical expansion of Portland's African American population and the strongest 
push for civil rights in the city in the twentieth century. 
 
The Second World War and the Creation of the Albina Ghetto 
 By 1940, Portland had a small but stable African American community residing 
predominately in the northeastern Albina district of Portland.  Still, the community hardly 
constituted an overwhelmingly black neighborhood prior to World War II.  Although the 
district had quickly become home to the majority of Portland blacks' social and political 
institutions, the area was also home to many other people, mostly poorer whites.  
However, beginning with a major influx of African Americans into Portland during the 
Second World War, Albina rapidly transitioned from a multiracial community with an 
African American presence to a neighborhood that whites conceived of spatially as an 
urban ghetto.  By 1950, Portland's black population swelled from roughly 2,000 to nearly 
10,000, nearly half of which lived in Albina.  At the end of the next decade, the 
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population of African Americans stood at roughly 16,000, with 73 percent of those 
individuals residing in Albina (See Appendix B: Table 2.2).
30
  During this twenty-year 
period, Portlanders—mostly whites who were uncomfortable with the sudden and rapid 
growth of the city's black population and the prospect of integration—increasingly 
reconceived Albina spatially as a black neighborhood.  This new conception of Albina, in 
turn, created a self-fulfilling prophecy of economic and racial inequality and triggered a 
new phase in the civil rights struggle by the early 1950s. 
 The bombing of Pearl Harbor and the United States' entry into the Second World 
War dramatically increased the presence of wartime industries in Portland as well as 
along the Willamette and Columbia rivers.  In Portland, Henry J. Kaiser founded the 
Oregon Shipbuilding Company, also known as the Kaiser Company, in early 1941 in 
order to supply ships to the British, but the entry of the United States into the war led to a 
rapid expansion in facilities and production.  Since Portland was unable to provide a large 
enough workforce to fuel Kaiser's ship industry, workers from across the country poured 
into Portland by early 1942.
31
  Moreover, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive 
Order 8802 in June 1941 prohibited racial discrimination in the national defense industry 
and enabled a large number of African Africans to move to the city and work in wartime 
industries.  As a result, for the first time in Portland's history, African Americans found 
themselves with the opportunity to work in large numbers as industrial laborers rather 
than service workers.
32
  However, because this major migration occurred after the 1940 
                                                             
30 Diane Pancoast, "Blacks in Oregon (1940-1950)," Blacks in Oregon: An Historical and Statistical 
Report, ed. William A. Little and James E. Weiss (Portland: Portland State University Black Studies Center 
and the Center for Population Research and Census, 1978), 37. 
 
31 The History of Portland's African American Community, 57-58. 
 
32 Cornerstones of Community, 58; The History of Portland's African American Community, 59. 
27 
 
census, and a large number of African American workers left the city before the 1950 
census, it is difficult to know with exact certainty how many blacks migrated to Portland 
over the decade.  Still, most historical scholars estimate that between 20,000 and 25,000 
blacks travelled to Portland for employment in wartime industries, and their numbers 
constituted roughly 25 percent of the total number of new workers.
33
 
 The first significant obstacle that African American migrants encountered after 
arriving in Portland was a shortage in housing as well as conflicts over how much 
housing whites wanted to make available to black migrants.  Initially, many blacks 
continued to move into the Albina district where Japanese Americans had vacated 
housing following their deportation and internment in 1942.
34
  But such housing quickly 
reached its limits, and local whites grew increasingly vocal in their opposition to allowing 
large number of blacks to settle in the city.  By September 1942, the Oregonian reported, 
"several thousand Negroes have moved into Portland, taxing the housing facilities of the 
Albina district, center of the city's colored population. . . . Previous population of the 
eastside Negro colony ranged from 1500 to 2000 . . . but in recent months it has increased 
to about 5,000."
35
  Many of Portland's whites, who had long been ambivalent to the 
relatively small presence of blacks in the city, spoke out forcefully against the permanent 
integration of new African American migrants into the city and opposed the proposed 
construction of housing projects in Albina.  In particular, white civic leaders and 
neighborhood organizations relied on racial stereotypes to prevent the construction of 
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new housing projects, suggesting that African Americans were primarily responsible for 
increasing crime rates in U.S. cities.
36
  Even J.E. Bennett, a former city commissioner, 
publicly stated that the city should "actively discourage" large numbers of black workers 
from migrating into the city.
37
  Fearing a massive public backlash, city officials quickly 
abandoned their plans to construct housing for blacks and other migrants within the 
city.
38
 
 As housing for new workers became scarce in the city, the Kaiser Company and 
the Housing Authority of Portland (HAP), which the City created in December 1941 with 
the sole purpose of resolving the foreseen housing crisis, were forced to construct 
housing projects on the outskirts of Portland and across the Columbia River near the city 
of Vancouver.  The largest and most historically significant of these housing projects was 
Vanport City, more commonly known as Vanport.  Following HAP's failures to build 
new housing within the city of Portland by late 1942, Kaiser and HAP worked quickly, 
quietly, and without the consent of the City Council or Planning Commission to establish 
the temporary wartime city, which was located on the northern outskirts of Portland near 
the heart of the shipbuilding industry along the Columbia River.
39
  By June 1943, 
Vanport already had 25,088 residents, of which 2,156—or roughly 8.6 percent—were 
black.  In June of the next year, the African American population of Vanport had 
increased to 3,818 and represented 14 percent of the total population.  Moreover, by the 
time of Vanport's last census in May 1945, the number of blacks in Vanport totaled 6,317 
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and constituted more than 20 percent of residents (See Appendix B: Table 2.3).
40
  At the 
end of the war, nearly three times as many African Americans lived in Vanport than had 
lived in the entire city of Portland just five years earlier.  Based on population data 
collected from Vanport, most of the city's black population migrated from states on the 
western fringe of the South, including Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, and 
Louisiana, as well as from larger northern and western cities in states such as Illinois, 
California, and New York.
41
  As a result, by the end of the war, the black population in 
Portland and the state of Oregon was different in size and demographics than it had been 
the 1920s and 1930s (See Appendix C: Figure 2.3). 
 Although HAP regularly, although unofficially, practiced spatial segregation in 
their assignment of Vanport homes and other temporary housing projects, these new 
communities provided some blacks with employment opportunities that were unheard of 
prior to 1940.  For example, before 1945, there were no black teachers in any Portland 
schools; however, by 1945, the Vanport school system employed seven African 
American teachers, and two of those teachers, Leota E. Stone and Robert G. Ford, went 
on to become the first black teachers in Portland.  Similarly, Vanport hired two black 
sheriffs, Bill Travis and Matt Dishman, both of whom later became Multnomah County 
Sheriffs.  In addition, several African Americans owned and operated small businesses, 
most of which catered predominately to Vanport's black community.
42
  While these types 
of jobs were rare, such opportunities undoubtedly represented a breakthrough in the lives 
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of many African Americans who, for the first time, found jobs outside of the service 
sector. 
 Despite the new social and economic opportunities that wartime industries 
seemed to provide, African Americans in and around Portland faced another civil rights 
struggle with their ability to gain access to local unions.  The Boilermakers Union, which 
dominated the shipbuilding industry, limited their membership to whites only and refused 
to allow African Americans to join.
43
  As a result, in late 1942, a group of African 
Americans workers, most of who had been recruited from New York to work for Kaiser 
in Portland, formed the Shipyard Negro Organization for Victory.
44
  Outraged over 
unfulfilled promises of equal rights and fair treatment, the organization threatened to go 
on strike and issued a public statement that received widespread attention in the media:  
We, the Negro people employed by the Kaiser Company, maintain that under 
false pretense we were brought from east to west to work for defense, and we 
demand, with due process of law, the following rights: 1) to work at our trades on 
equal rights with whites; 2) to go to vocational school or take vocational training 
on equal rights with whites.
45
 
 
In response, the federal government launched an inquiry into the Boilermakers Union as 
well as the Kaiser Company's practices and demanded substantial reforms.  Ultimately, 
the Boilermakers created a secondary union for black members that collected dues but 
lacked the benefits and job security afforded to white union members.
46
  Consequently, 
by the end of the war in 1945, African Americans were struggling to both keep their jobs 
as industrial workers and find permanent housing within the city.   
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 As the war ended, African Americans found themselves in a precarious and 
fragile social situation.  The lack of job security and the evaporation of wartime jobs 
compelled most blacks to return to service work, but the overall growth of Portland's 
population in the 1940s offered blacks greater access to these jobs than they had had 
during the 1920s and 1930s.  Likewise, housing projects like Vanport, which were never 
meant to be more than temporary wartime housing, persisted well after the end of the war 
due to the continuing housing shortage in Portland.  Although roughly half of the African 
Americans that had migrated to Vanport and Portland left after the war for opportunities 
in booming postwar industries in West Coast cities like Seattle and Los Angeles, a large 
percentage of blacks stayed in their temporary Vanport homes while searching for 
housing in the city (See Appendix B: Table 2.4).
47
 
 However, on May 30, 1948, one of the dikes holding back the Columbia River 
along the western edge of Vanport broke and, in little more than thirty minutes, a flood 
wiped out the city of Vanport.  Estimates vary, but the flood displaced roughly 5,000 
African Americans, who had come to represent more than one-third of Vanport's 
population, and forced them to crowd into Albina's neighborhoods where the 
community's black churches and social organizations struggled to provide jobs and 
housing for the sudden influx of refugees from the flood.
48
 
 In response to the mounting housing crisis in Portland, a coalition of whites and 
blacks—similar to the progressive coalition that had helped found the NAACP decades 
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earlier—founded a branch of the Urban League in Portland in 1945.  While historians 
have noted that the original purpose of the Portland Urban League was to find ways for 
blacks to emigrate from the city, black leadership within the organization redirected their 
efforts towards finding ways to integrate blacks into the city.
49
  In particular, Chicago-
born Edwin C. "Bill" Berry, the Portland Urban League's first executive director, worked 
to open new job and housing opportunities for Portland blacks for more than a decade 
until his departure in 1956.
50
  Likewise, other leaders within the African American 
community campaigned to increase public support for settling and integrating new 
African American migrants into Portland.  In particular, black leaders believed that 
housing limitations and the increasing ghettoization of Albina were the primary obstacles 
to African American social and economic success.  In a 1945 report by the Portland City 
Club, one of the city's most prominent black physicians, civil rights advocates, and co-
founder of the Portland Urban League, Dr. DeNorval Unthank, stated, "For the safety 
factor in Portland, we should avoid a definitely segregated area which in the long run 
would prove a bad thing for the city."
51
  Unfortunately, the flood of Vanport in 1948 
combined with white spatialized conceptions of Albina as a black neighborhood to create 
a postwar urban ghetto by the late 1940s.  According to the 1950 census, half of 
Portland's black population resided within two census tracts of Albina.  However, in this 
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supposedly black neighborhood, whites still outnumbered nonwhites by a ratio of two to 
one (See Appendix C: Figure 2.4; Appendix B: Table 2.4).
52
 
 By 1950, Albina had transformed into a neighborhood that the broader white 
community conceptualized spatially as a black urban ghetto, but—like many other cities 
in the United States—this transformation was never inevitable.  In the conclusion to her 
1978 report for Portland State University on African Americans in Portland during and 
after the war, Diane Pancoast placed the onus for the creation of a black ghetto on 
Portland's white population.  "From my interviews and other sources of information," she 
contended, "whites considered Albina to be a black neighborhood much earlier than 
blacks did."
53
  Moreover, she suggested, "it seems clear that whites rather than blacks 
created Albina and the blacks have suffered as a result while whites have profited. . . . 
The recent development of black pride, whatever its merits, has tended to obscure, to 
some extent, the origins of our ghettos, at least to whites who are looking for an escape 
from responsibility."
54
  As a result, regardless of the successes of half a century of the 
civil rights struggle, Portland's African American community found itself facing 
devastating socioeconomic conditions that were just as bad, if not worse than they were 
in the past. 
 Despite the problems caused by the ghettoization of Albina, Portland's African 
American population had reached a critical mass to the point that community leaders 
believed they could launch an effective social and political assault on the underpinnings 
of racism and prejudice at the core of Portland's social, political, and economic climate.  
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Through organizations like the NAACP and the Urban League, blacks felt they had the 
tools to improve their social and economic standing in the city, regardless of their lack of 
representation within the political process.  Unfortunately, over the course of the next two 
decades, city government and urban planners attempted to rebuild the Albina district 
through costly and destructive urban renewal efforts rather than address the underlying 
social causes of the economic and racial inequalities that built the Albina ghetto.  Once 
again, African Americans met these misguided policies with resistance.  Ultimately, the 
resulting postwar Civil Rights Movement marked the most important turning point in the 
century long struggle.  That movement's successes and failures laid the foundation for the 
next phase of the black freedom struggle and shaped the course of Portland's history for 
the remainder of the twentieth century. 
 
Postwar Civil Rights and Urban Renewal in Albina 
 
 Between the early 1950s and the mid 1960s, Portland, along with the rest of the 
nation, entered a period of rapid civil rights reforms that historians commonly describe as 
the postwar Civil Rights Movement.  By 1960, the black population of Portland exceeded 
15,000 and comprised 4 percent of the city's permanent population, and for the first time 
civil rights became a prominent issue in the city's political discourse.  According to 
historian Stuart McElderry, whose dissertation constitutes the most detailed analysis of 
this postwar moment in Portland's civil rights, the movement's success in the areas of 
public accommodations, employment, housing, and public education rested on the 
formation of a strong and effective coalition of black organizations, specifically the 
NAACP and the Urban League, and white progressives.  But, as McElderry notes, by 
35 
 
1965 the ideological grounds of racial liberalism on which this coalition had formed 
began to fall apart.
55
  While McElderry correctly attributes a distinct shift in racial 
ideology as part of the basis for the coalition's collapse, his analysis neglects to identify 
one of the most fundamental reasons for the shift: urban renewal.  Frustration among 
African Americans in response to destructive urban renewal policies within the Albina 
district, including the destruction and displacement of hundreds of African American 
homes and businesses for events centers, highways, and other large public works 
projects, bred resentment towards public officials and shifted the trajectory of the 
classical period of postwar civil rights by the late 1960s.  Consequently, the city's 
negligent assault on the physical and spatial constructs of the African American 
community in Albina eventually undermined the legislative successes of the postwar 
coalition and culminated in the abrupt and violent end to the postwar Civil Rights 
Movement in the summer of 1967. 
 In 1953, proponents of civil rights in Portland and the state of Oregon achieved 
their first major legislative breakthrough since the 1920s with the passage of the Public 
Accommodations Bill.  In 1950, the Portland City Council passed an ordinance 
concerning public accommodations that, in effect, made discrimination based on race, 
religion, or national origin illegal in all public places and temporarily overturned the 
state's ruling in Taylor v. Cohn more than forty years earlier.  Following a petition 
campaign to place the ordinance on the ballot, the public resoundingly repealed the 
measure in November 1950.  Nevertheless, under the leadership of NAACP President 
Otto Rutherford, Representative Mark Hatfield of Salem, as well as a coalition of other 
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civil rights organizations that included the Urban League, the Portland League of Women 
Voters, and local churches, the state legislature finally passed the Public 
Accommodations Bill in 1953.  Despite efforts by groups like the Civic Freedom 
Committee, which sought to delay the enactment of the bill until the passage of a public 
referendum in 1954, Representative Hatfield was successful in garnering support for the 
bill and defeating opposition movements through a closely coordinated public campaign 
with the NAACP.
56
  Although public discrimination continued in parts of the city for 
decades after the bill's passage, blacks in Portland now had a solid political and legal 
defense for combating discrimination as well as a strong, albeit temporary, political 
coalition for advancing civil rights legislation.
57
 
 Following the passage of the Public Accommodations Bill, organizations like the 
NAACP and the Urban League turned their attention to three major civil rights issues that 
continued to plague Portland's African American population: housing, employment, and 
education.  The most pressing issue of the postwar Civil Rights Movement centered on 
resolving the housing crisis.  For the first time, civil rights groups believed that they had 
the numbers and political support to challenge the unwritten though well-known practices 
of spatial discrimination that had been in place since African Americans first began 
arriving in Oregon during the mid-1800s.  In particular, the NAACP and the Urban 
League targeted discriminatory real estate practices like redlining, which sought to limit 
African American homebuyers to specific neighborhoods.  Until the early 1950s, the 
Portland Realty Board publicly maintained that the presence of African Americans in a 
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neighborhood resulted in depreciated property values, an idea that many increasingly saw 
as nothing more than a self-fulfilling prophecy.
58
  Eventually, the Oregon legislature 
passed the Fair Housing Law in 1957 that allowed many blacks to relocate outside the 
Albina district into formerly all-white neighborhoods.  Like the Public Accommodations 
Bill, the effects of the law were not always immediate and many white neighborhoods 
resisted the relocation of black families into their communities with threats and 
destruction of property.  In addition, with the gradual opening of the suburbs to Portland's 
black middle class, many African Americans left behind an increasingly impoverished 
black inner city population that lacked the social and economic resources to improve their 
community.
59
 
 By the early 1950s, jobs became another major concern of the postwar Civil 
Rights Movement.  Although service jobs were plentiful in Portland after the war, blacks 
continued to struggle to open new avenues for skilled, non-service employment outside 
of the growing business center of the black community along N Williams Avenue.  
Moreover, unlike Los Angeles and Seattle, where new aircraft industries continued to 
produce jobs well after the end of the war, the loss of shipbuilding and the lack of 
postwar industries limited new job opportunities for African American workers who had 
migrated to the city in the 1940s.
60
  Nevertheless, civil rights organizations, most 
prominently the Urban League, worked tirelessly to break down the color line in 
employment after the war.  After an initial defeat in 1947, the state legislature passed the 
                                                             
58 Millner, On the Road to Equality, 20; Cornerstones of Community, 70-73; The History of Portland's 
African American Community, 86-88. 
 
59 Cornerstones of Community, 74.  For more detailed information on housing and civil rights, see Chapters 
VI and IX of Stuart McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line." 
 
60 Abbott, Greater Portland, 139. 
 
38 
 
Fair Employment Practices Act in 1949, which made discrimination in job hiring illegal.  
Moreover, Portland's Urban League, under the leadership of Edwin "Bill" Berry (1945-
1955), William Boone (1955-1959), and E. Shelton Hill (1959-1973), made employment 
its highest priority during the 1950s.
61
  Some success stories during the 1950s included 
the first African American Deputy Commissioner for the Oregon Bureau of Labor, a 
member of the Portland Fire Department, a faculty member at Reed College, a sports 
writer for the Oregonian newspaper, non-custodial employees for Sears and Montgomery 
Ward, and many others.
62
  However, the NAACP and Urban League developed an 
increasingly confrontational approach towards the gradualism and tokenism of 
employment integration by the early 1960s, including the adoption of public protests and 
picketing.  Such confrontations marked the first major signs of erosion within the black-
white postwar Civil Rights Movement's coalition.
63
  Ultimately, while civil rights groups 
were quick to emphasize their successes in breaking through discriminatory hiring 
practices, changes had not come quickly enough to improve the economic livelihood of 
the black community in Albina. 
 The third concentrated effort of the postwar Civil Rights Movement came in the 
realm of public education and the integration of Portland schools.  Unlike southern states, 
where segregation was the result of legal or de jure segregation, the division between 
whites and people of color in Portland schools was the result of the preexisting spatial 
settlement patterns, or de facto segregation, which were the product of housing 
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inequalities.  Therefore, the Supreme Court's 1954 landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of 
Education had little effect on the composition of the city's school system.  For example, 
even as late as the 1964-1965 school year, three elementary schools in northeastern 
Portland—Boise Elementary, Eliot Elementary, and Humboldt Elementary—all had more 
than 90 percent black enrollment.
64
  As a result, challenging segregation in Portland 
required breaking down spatial arrangements more than legal blockades.  Having made 
progress with housing by the early 1960s, the NAACP began pressuring the local city 
council to address school segregation.  After the emergence of a strong public opposition 
to busing among Portlanders, the city developed a small "pilot relocation assistance 
project" in 1964, which provided financial assistance to twenty-five African American 
families in order to relocate and switch schools.
65
  However, a special commission 
appointed by the city council ultimately decided on a policy whereby the city would close 
schools within the African American community in Northeast Portland and evenly 
redistribute black students throughout neighboring school districts.  In addition, schools 
that had previously been nearly all white sought to hire more African American teachers 
as black student enrollment increased.  Ultimately, though well intentioned and 
successful in some ways, many blacks families in Albina increasingly came to resent this 
approach to integrationist policies by the late 1960s, and they began to push for new 
methods that would not, as many perceived it, divide and weaken their own social and 
cultural community.
66
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 While housing, employment, and education have comprised the three areas of 
focus for studies of the postwar Civil Rights Movement, historians of civil rights in 
Portland have neglected the importance of a fourth overarching element of the 
movement: urban renewal.  Like many cities in the United States during the 1950s and 
1960s, Portland began to adopt urban development and renewal policies that focused on 
tearing down older, supposedly unsalvageable neighborhoods in order to improve urban 
infrastructure and downtown attractions.  Moreover, the City Planning Commission took 
little or no interest in the voices and opinions of local citizens or neighborhood 
organizations in the construction of their renewal policies.
67
  As a result, the City's efforts 
to remake and thereby revitalize the Albina district through demolition, rezoning, and the 
construction of new buildings in many ways limited the overall success of all three of the 
postwar Civil Rights Movement's goals.  These policies forced members of the black 
community to relocate once again while helping feed a new generation of resentment and 
disillusionment within the movement.  In particular, the construction of Memorial 
Coliseum and Interstate 5, the city's proposed Central Albina Plan, and the Emanuel 
Hospital renovations all had devastating effects on the black community in Northeast 
Portland. 
 The first phase of urban renewal in Albina moved quickly during the late 1950s 
and focused primarily on the construction of Memorial Coliseum and I-5, both of which 
the City carved out of the highly concentrated black neighborhoods of Albina.  After 
receiving public support to build a war memorial events center and sports venue in 
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November 1956, Portland's Planning Commission selected the east bank of the 
Willamette River across from downtown for the building's location.  The clearance of the 
area selected for Memorial Coliseum, which comprised the densest concentration of 
African Americans in the Albina district, contained 476 homes, the majority of which 
were non-white residences.  The renewal project effectively wiped out large portions of 
African American homes south of Broadway Street and required the destruction and 
relocation of many of the black community's most important landmarks and institutions, 
including the medical office of Dr. DeNorval Unthank, the Bethel AME Church, as well 
as many other black owned shops and businesses.
68
  Similarly, even before the 
completion of Memorial Coliseum in 1960, Portland's Planning Commission approved 
and began additional urban renewal projects in the Albina district, including the 
construction of I-5 in the late 1950s.  Like the construction of Memorial Coliseum, the 
expansion of Highway 99 into I-5 required the demolition and relocation of 125 homes 
and businesses, including—once again—the recently opened new medical offices of Dr. 
Unthank.
69
  In both instances, the displaced black population, which received no 
assistance from the city government, was forced to relocate into already overcrowded 
neighborhoods or further northeast to the area around Irving Park, where white flight and 
new housing opportunities gradually expanded the boundaries of the "black 
neighborhood" east of Williams Avenue.
70
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 By the early 1960s, urban renewal projects in Albina had produced devastating 
social and economic results, but no project appeared more threatening to African 
Americans than the city's Central Albina Study in 1962.  In 1958, an approved 
amendment to the city charter created the Portland Development Commission (PDC) 
under the leadership of Mayor Terry Schrunk (1957-1973).  The amendment gave the 
new commission almost limitless and unchecked urban renewal powers to "promote 
industrial expansion and location and acquire such property, real or personal . . . inside or 
outside the city, as the Commission . . . may find appropriate or convenient in accordance 
with comprehensive zoning and development plans."
71
  In November 1962, the PDC 
published its Central Albina Study, a report that defined an urban renewal plan for a 3.4 
square mile area in Central Albina, known as the Eliot Neighborhood (See Appendix C: 
Figure 2.5).  Ultimately, the area, which contained 12,844 African Americans, or roughly 
80 percent of the city's total black population, was designated as a region in "an advanced 
stage of urban blight" that could not be revitalized.
72
  In particular, the report concluded, 
"urban renewal, largely clearance, appears to be the only solution to, not only blight that 
presently exists in central Albina, but also to avoid the spread of that blight to other 
surrounding areas."
73
  Moreover, the report further emphasized the usefulness of the 
neighborhood's location for city infrastructure and noted that the area was "unusually 
well suited to transportation, distribution, and service industries."
74
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 If the Central Albina Plan had been fully implemented, at least one-third of the 
entire city's black population would have had to relocate.  However, following 
widespread public resistance spearheaded by NAACP President Mayfield K. Webb and 
the Albina Neighborhood Improvement Project (ANIP), the PDC retreated from some, 
but not all, of its proposed renewal plans in Albina.  In 1961, one year prior to the Central 
Albina Study, the PDC had set aside a small 35-block ANIP area just north of Fremont 
for its first urban renewal project in the area focused on revitalization rather than 
demolition (See Appendix C: Figure 2.6).
75
  Over the course of twelve years, the ANIP 
successfully rebuilt dilapidated homes, repaired streets, established a tree-planting 
program, and created a five-acre park named after Dr. DeNorval Unthank.  During the 
mid-1960s, Albina was also selected to receive federal funds from President Lyndon B. 
Johnson's War on Poverty program.  These funds created the Albina Citizen's War on 
Poverty Committee in 1964, which led to the creation of a local Head Start program and 
the Low Income Family Emergency (LIFE) Center.
76
  However, despite these early 
successes and petitions by more than one thousand Albina residents to expand the project 
in 1967, the local leaders of the ANIP were unsuccessful in their attempts to push the 
boundaries of the project south of Fremont Avenue.  The PDC's rejection of these efforts 
resulted in the continuation of the Central Albina Plan and further clearances and 
displacements throughout the 1960s.  As a result, by the mid-to-late 1960s, large portions 
of Portland's black population had been driven out of the lower southeast Albina district 
to the north of Fremont and west towards Irving Park (See Appendix C: Figure 2.7). 
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 After two decades of frustrating and often devastating relocation and urban 
renewal efforts by the city of Portland, the decision to expand Emanuel Hospital in the 
mid-1960s marked a turning point in the minds of many African Americans living in 
northeastern Portland.  In order to expand its facilities to meet the increasing needs of 
Portland's growing population, the City and the PDC granted the hospital, located on the 
western edge of N Williams Avenue, ten blocks surrounding the complex under the 
Central Albina Plan.  The hospital then proceeded to demolish another 188 businesses 
and residences, forcing its residents to relocate.  Once again, the majority of these shops 
and homes had belonged to African American residents.  To make matters worse, federal 
budget cuts eventually forced an abrupt end to the hospital's expansion and temporarily 
left the land vacant.
77
  For many African Americans living in Albina, especially younger 
individuals who had grown up in the crucible of Vanport, Memorial Coliseum, I-5, and 
the Central Albina Plan, the Emanuel Hospital renovations marked the last straw in a 
long chain of civil rights and urban renewal abuses.  By the end of the 1960s, the hospital 
expansion displaced more than half of the population of the Albina district's Eliot 
neighborhood over the previous two decades.
78
 
 
 Despite the passage of state legislation as well as the federal Civil Rights Act in 
1964 and Voting Rights Act in 1965, the history of the long civil rights movement in 
Portland was far from over.  By 1967, African Americans had made important, although 
sometimes minimal, improvements in their long struggle for civil rights.  Still, even after 
the Great Migration of the early twentieth century, the rapid influx of African Americans 
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into Portland during WWII, and the postwar Civil Rights Movement, blacks in Portland 
lacked district representation in city politics and were forced to rely on a fragile and often 
ineffective coalition of black civil rights advocates and white progressives to enact 
reforms.  By the end of the postwar era, African Americans achieved their greatest 
legislative victories, but concrete solutions to visible socioeconomic problems in Albina 
remained elusive.  The passage of the Public Accommodations Bill, Fair Housing Law, 
and Fair Employment Practices Act, as well as attempts to reform the segregation in 
public education that had resulted from settlement patterns all met with mixed results of 
successes and setbacks in the 1950s and 1960s.  Furthermore, urban renewal policies, the 
flight of wealthier blacks from the Albina district to the suburbs and other parts of 
Portland, and the integration of blacks into Portland schools through the dissolution of 
black majority schools in Albina combined to limit the perceived successes of the 
postwar Civil Rights Movement.  Indeed, by the summer of 1967, the struggle for civil 
rights and black empowerment in Portland and other major cities across the United States 
would take a disturbingly chaotic turn.  With this new phase of black activism and 
radicalism came a search for new solutions to the old problems of urban neglect and 
social indifference.  The face of this new generation of young leaders and radical activists 
in search of solutions would ultimately help re-imagine and redefine Portland politics and 
urban development, as well as our modern social and political landscape in the United 
States since the late 1960s. 
46 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
DEFENDING ALBINA: 
MODEL CITIES AND PANTHERS IN NORTHEAST PORTLAND, 1966-1970 
 
 In October 1966, two events, which at first glance appear completely 
disconnected, set in motion a series of events that ultimately converged on Portland in the 
late 1960s, radically redefined the city's political power structure and urban planning 
policies, and altered the trajectory of the local black community's long struggle for civil 
rights.  On October 20, in the halls of congress in Washington, D.C., the United States 
Senate narrowly passed the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act.  
The act, which had been championed by President Lyndon B. Johnson and his Democrat 
allies in congress as a necessary component for reviving American cities, provided 
federal grants through the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to 
assist cities with comprehensive and locally planned urban renewal and infrastructure 
improvement projects.
1
 
 Just four days earlier, on the other side of the country in Oakland, California, 
Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale officially founded the Black Panther Party for Self-
Defense (BPP).  Rooted in Maoist and Black Power political ideologies with an emphasis 
on armed defense and rebuilding black inner city communities, the Panthers became a 
household name by 1967 when members of the organization appeared outside of the 
California State Legislature brandishing guns and wearing their iconic black jackets, 
berets, and sunglasses.  In their highly publicized Ten-Point Platform and Program, the 
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BPP's founding declaration, the Panthers demanded the right to self-determination, 
employment, housing, education, an end to police brutality and black economic 
exploitation by whites, exemption from military service in Vietnam, and the immediate 
release of all blacks from federal, state, county, and city prisons.
2
  Relying on a 
nationwide yet frequently weak and semi-autonomous network of BPP chapters, the 
organization quickly sprung up in nearly every major city across the United States, 
including Portland, Oregon, throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
 Although these two events were a nation apart and seemed, at best, only loosely 
related, their interconnectedness became apparent in Portland by 1970.  Under the 
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, the leadership of Mayor Terry 
Schrunk and PDC Chairman Ira D. Keller, the City of Portland developed its Model 
Cities program.  Approached by the PDC as another urban renewal project, this new 
program once again targeted the Albina district.  While the leaders of the Model Cities 
program made a more concentrated effort than the city government had in the past to 
engage with the needs and opinions of Portland's African American community, the PDC 
initially continued to offer blacks nothing more than token representation in minor 
planning positions as well as forums for expressing their opinions.  As a result, Portland's 
black community became openly hostile towards the emergence of the Model Cities 
program in Northeast Portland during the late 1960s, as it was immediately perceived of 
as a continuation of the city's destructive urban renewal policies in the region.  As 
African Americans experimented with new and diverse methods of resisting the city 
government and the PDC's urban renewal plans, the PDC lost control of the Model Cities 
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program.  In this increasingly radical atmosphere, the Portland BPP emerged in 1969 as a 
new form of black political experimentation in a city that had effectively stymied their 
community's political voice throughout the twentieth century. 
 The Model Cities program, as originally envisioned by the PDC, and the Portland 
Black Panther Party represented two polarizing, competing, and extreme visions of space 
in Northeast Portland.  For the city government and leadership of the PDC, Albina was a 
potentially valuable part of the city plagued by urban blight, lacking the ability to cure 
itself, and requiring further renewal and revitalization efforts by city planners to reach its 
full potential.  For the Panthers, Albina was their community, their land, and they were 
going to defend it, by any means necessary. 
 
Model Cities and Rebellion in Albina 
When the citizens of Portland elected Terry Schrunk to the first of his four four-
year terms as Mayor of Portland in 1956, they did so under campaign promises that he 
would govern as a self-described "moderate progressive" with a policy platform of 
citywide urban renewal.  Defeating the one-term incumbent mayor, Fred Peterson, in 
both a nine-candidate primary and a run-off election later that fall, Schrunk came into 
office with a strong mandate to consolidate Portland's previously existing disparate urban 
planning agencies.  In a sweeping overhaul of the system in early 1958, he replaced the 
frequently conservative and ineffective leadership of HAP, the Planning Commission, 
and the Planning Bureau with political allies like John Kenward and Lloyd Keefe.  He 
then gained permission from the state legislature to place each of these semi-autonomous 
agencies under the authority of a single new agency that had almost total control over all 
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urban renewal and redevelopment policies—the Portland Development Commission.  
After gaining public approval for the PDC by a narrow margin of 52 percent to 48 
percent in the summer of 1958, Schrunk quickly appointed Ira Keller, a powerful 
Portland business executive who originally hailed from Chicago, as the PDC's chair.  
Throughout the late 1950s, Mayor Schrunk and Chairman Keller oversaw several major 
urban renewal projects, including the construction of Memorial Coliseum in the Albina 
district and the South Auditorium renewal project south of downtown.
3
 
During Terry Schrunk's tenure as mayor from 1957 to 1973, Portland's urban 
planners, under the control of the PDC, embraced an ideology of urban renewal that 
favored the clearance of blighted neighborhoods throughout the city, but especially in the 
predominately-black Albina district of Northeast Portland.  Guided by the city's 1958 
Comprehensive Development Plan and later the 1966 Community Renewal Program, the 
PDC operated under the assumption that the decline of inner-city neighborhoods was 
inevitable and that city planners offered the best vision for revitalizing these regions.  
Consequently, Keller and the PDC took a top-down approach to urban renewal that 
neglected to engage with the voices of the very neighborhoods and communities they 
sought to change.
4
  But the Model Cities program, initiated by the PDC in late 1966 and 
early 1967, changed everything.  Though initially proposed by the PDC as a way to 
receive federal funds to continue the city's approach to urban renewal in Northeast 
Portland, a backlash against the program by the African American community in Albina 
between 1967 and 1970 derailed the PDC's strategy.  Through a combination of radical 
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resistance and an effort to wrestle some control of urban planning away from the PDC 
through the creation of the Citizens' Planning Board, Portland's black community helped 
force a distinct shift in postwar urban planning that set the stage for significant social and 
political changes in the 1970s. 
 The passage of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act in 
October 1966 ushered in yet another phase of urban renewal in Northeast Portland.  More 
commonly known as the Demonstration Cities Act, congress designed this piece of 
legislation with the intent to support "locally prepared programs for rebuilding or 
restoring entire sections and neighborhoods of slums and blighted areas by the 
concentrated and coordinated use of all available Federal aids together with local, private, 
and governmental resources."  The act consisted of federal assistance in two stages.  First, 
HUD would provide assistance in the development of demonstration plans during the 
early half of 1967.  Then, after July 1, 1967, HUD would offer $400 million in federal 
funds to selected programs in 1967, and another $500 million the following year.  The act 
also stipulated several specific standards that any city applying for funding had to meet.  
In particular, it stated that "programs must be designed to . . . renew entire slum 
neighborhoods by combined use of physical and social development programs, . . . make 
marked progress in reducing social and educational disadvantages, ill health, 
underemployment and forced idleness, and contribute toward a well-balanced city."  In 
other words, the Demonstration Cities Act required cities to address the social—not just 
the physical—problems of urban decay.5 
 In late November 1966, only a month after the passage of the Demonstration 
Cities Act, the PDC drafted its Report and Recommendations on Demonstration Cities 
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Program for the City of Portland.  The report, which highlighted most of Northeast 
Portland as the region of the city in the most advanced stages of blight, proposed a 
project that would establish "a model community for urban living" by "upgrad[ing] badly 
run-down sections in declining areas . . . as part of creating an overall model 
neighborhood" in Albina.  "Without a doubt," the PDC's proposal claimed, "the area 
extending north from Memorial Coliseum and Lloyd Center to the City limits . . . fulfills 
[the Demonstration Cities Act conditions] and many more criteria."
6
  This area included 
the Eliot, Boise-Humboldt, Irvington, King-Vernon-Sabin, and Woodlawn 
neighborhoods of the Albina district, which stretched from east-to-west from I-5 to NE 
22nd Avenue and south-to-north from Broadway Street to the boundaries of the city (See 
Appendix C: Figure 3.1).  After fine-tuning their proposal, the City of Portland submitted 
their official planning grant application to HUD in late April 1967.  Over the next few 
months, the City of Portland and the PDC promoted this new urban planning project, 
which they increasingly described as "Model Cities."  Shortly thereafter, the Oregonian 
newspaper began publishing a series of articles touting the commercial benefits of the 
project for Northeast Portland.
7
 
 After submitting their request to HUD, Portland's Model Cities program was 
among a select few projects that the federal government began to consider for funds.  
However, even as the city and the PDC moved forward with urban development plans 
and the selection of a head for the Model Cities program, the PDC's project was met with 
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resistance from the African American community in Albina.  Sensing the possibility of a 
backlash to another urban renewal project, HUD's regional office in San Francisco 
responded to Portland's Model Cities program in early July 1967 with concerns over the 
City's potentially haphazard and precarious implementation of its urban renewal project 
in Northeast Portland.  Specifically, HUD questioned the PDC's administrative 
machinery for carrying out the program, its ill-defined neighborhood area, and the lack of 
citizen input and participation in the planning process.  Of these three issues, the report 
expressed its greatest concern with regard to citizen participation, noting, "Although 
Portland has established a coordinating, planning, and policy-making body, there is no 
explanation of how the neighborhoods will have any influence over its decisions . . . 
Portland's citizen participation proposal is mostly at the level of informing residents 
rather than involving them."
8
  In other words, HUD had finally called out the City of 
Portland and the PDC on their decade-long approach to urban development whereby the 
city made urban renewal plans and required citizens to go along with them without the 
local community's input. 
 Drawing on the lessons from recent riots in cities across the United States, HUD's 
response to the City of Portland and the PDC's proposed Model Cities plan in many ways 
both echoed and foreshadowed further African American resistance to the proposed plan 
in Albina.  Two years after the devastating Watts Riots in Los Angeles during August 
1965, large violent clashes had broken out between African Americans and city police in 
several U.S. cities in June in 1967, including Atlanta, Boston, and Cincinnati.  The 
following month, New York City, Birmingham, Chicago, Detroit, Newark, and many 
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other cities erupted in violence in what has come to be known as the long hot summer of 
1967.  Despite these warning signs, however, the City of Portland careened towards a 
similar fate. 
 After decades of social and political neglect as well as devastating urban renewal 
projects, the simmering tensions between the Portland city government and the black 
community in Albina exploded in Irving Park on the evening of July 30, 1967.  Earlier 
that day, a large "Sunday in the Park" rally had been held under the pretense of building 
unity among the community and voicing opposition to racist employment, housing, and 
urban renewal practices.  During the week leading up to the demonstration, rumors had 
even circulated throughout the black community that radical political activist Eldridge 
Cleaver, author of Soul on Ice and one of the leading figures of the Black Panther Party in 
Oakland, would give a speech.
9
  However, as the day progressed, the rally in the park 
turned violent.  Blacks began throwing rocks and glass bottles at whites walking on the 
sidewalks or driving by in cars, and a few individuals started attacking and vandalizing 
businesses.  According to the Oregonian, within a matter of hours, "Roving bands of 
Negroes, most of them teen-agers, surged through the streets," and Portland police 
arrived shortly thereafter to put down the rioters.  In an attempt to regain control as night 
fell, police imposed a curfew and sealed off a thirty-block area around Irving Park.  That 
night, more than twenty fire alarms were reported throughout the area as rioters looted 
and firebombed several buildings and businesses.  Police arrested nineteen individuals 
who they suspected of throwing rocks and bottles, but were hesitant to move directly 
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against the crowd in the park.
10
  By morning, a brief but temporary calm had fallen over 
Northeast Portland, but more than two-hundred African Americans continued to occupy 
Irving Park and surrounding areas. 
 The next night, things turned ugly again.  Targeting the very machines of urban 
renewal and city government, the Morris Yards northwest of the park, which housed 
various types of city equipment, burst into flames after unknown culprits set fire to fuel 
trucks and firebombed the building.  While firefighters raced to contain the massive 
blaze, Mayor Schrunk ordered police to move past the barricades that they had assembled 
the previous day around Irving Park, clear the park, and arrest anyone they suspected of 
being a rioter.
11
  After two nights of vandalism, fires, and confrontations with law 
enforcement, police had shot one man and arrested almost one-hundred people, the 
overwhelming majority of whom were black.  More than a quarter of those who the 
police arrested were juveniles.
12
  As the sun rose the next day over the smoke-filled air, 
looted shops with broken windows, burned-out buildings, and glass-strewn streets of 
Northeast Portland, people awoke to the realization that the city had just experienced its 
worst race riot to date. 
 Preferring to portray the riot as an abnormal occurrence or fluke, city leadership 
and the local media framed the riots as the product of "outside" agitators and emphasized 
local blacks' firm opposition to violence and the Black Power political ideology.  
Selecting specific interviews with African Americans who had not participated in the riot, 
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the Oregonian confidently reported, "Negroes in the Albina area have failed to buy the 
Black Power revolution theory," and they emphasized unsupported rumors that blacks 
from outside of the state had come to Portland with the intent to cause a disturbance and 
were responsible for the chaos.
13
  Portland police, however, were never able to offer any 
substantial evidence to confirm such rumors.
14
  Similarly, Governor Tom McCall and 
Mayor Schrunk were at a loss to explain the violent outburst in Albina, suggesting a 
possible but unlikely connection between the riots and the failed passage of a school levy 
for Northeast Portland in a local election.
15
  Ultimately, both the media and elected 
officials refused to recognize the underlying persistent social problems that caused the 
riot. 
 Nevertheless, the Oregonian did tacitly acknowledge the neglect of 
socioeconomic problems in Albina and noted the growing anger among African 
American teenagers in response to these conditions; however, these articles were buried 
deep within the newspaper and were hesitant to suggest the riots were the direct product 
of these legitimate issues.  The morning after the second day of the riot, which received 
the main headline on the cover page of the Oregonian, page sixteen of the paper 
contained a small article on E. Shelton Hill and the Urban League's call to create more 
employment opportunities for black youth in Albina, but the public largely ignored these 
comments.
16
  Likewise, statements by black teenagers in Albina in the days after the riot, 
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which expressed concerns that the older black leadership in the city "won't listen to what 
we have to say and have lost all contact with people on the street," were relegated to page 
fifteen and ignored by the broader community as well.
17
  Despite the persistent existence 
of social concerns among young African Americans in Northeast Portland, the city 
simply decided to move on from the riots and sweep the problems stemming from the 
legacy of racism and urban renewal under the proverbial rug. 
 As the summer turned to autumn, tensions cooled a little in Albina during late 
1967, but black leadership within the community kept pressure on the PDC to include the 
black community's voice in the Model Cities planning process prior to the federal 
government's approval of the project in December.  During public meetings with 
members of the PDC at various locations throughout Albina in late 1967, hundreds of 
residents from the local neighborhoods in the district turned out to discuss, often 
heatedly, the need for citizen participation on all levels of the planning process.
18
  In 
particular, African Americans demanded representation in the form of a black director to 
the entire Model Cities program, offering E. Shelton Hill of the Urban League and Tom 
Vickers of the NAACP as possible candidates for the position.
19
  However, the PDC once 
again chose to ignore the black community's voice and, on December 21, selected 
Reverend Paul Schulze, a white Albina minster and head of the Church-Community 
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Action Program (C-CAP), to head the program.
20
  Immediately following the decision, 
Vickers, Hill, and other black leaders publicly lashed out against the choice of a white 
man to head the program in interviews with the Oregonian and Oregon Journal.  
Moreover, at the citizens meeting the following evening, the meeting's secretary 
recorded, "This was indeed a chaotic meeting with much shouting," as the approximately 
seventy residents in attendance expressed their exacerbation with the PDC's apparent 
stubbornness and intransigence.
21
 
In the days following the selection of Reverend Schulze, members of the black 
community in Albina hit the streets with newsletters and flyers attacking Model Cities 
and the PDC under the leadership of Ira Keller.  One widely circulated newsletter titled 
The Spirithouse Rap, which appears to have only consisted of one issue in late December 
1967, called upon the residents of Albina and Portland: 
To recognize that the Model Cities Program is one of those rare historic moments 
where the problems confronting a people comes into sharp focus. . . . The MCP, 
unless it is halted NOW—will follow other Urban Renewal (Negro Removal) 
programs in this city . . . like the Memorial Coliseum, where black people were 
forced out to build a 'palace' for them (whites) and an Emanuel Hospital addition 
for them (Emanuel Hospital is a place for black people to die, not to be cured).
22
 
 
Likening Model Cities to other previous urban renewal projects of the postwar era, the 
publishers of the newsletter viewed the selection of a white program director as another 
instance of neglect and indifference towards the will of the black community in Albina, 
even though Schulze was a resident of Albina.  In addition, the writers encouraged 
members of the black community to support local black-owned businesses and attend 
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upcoming public Model Cities meetings.  Similarly, an anonymous flyer posted around 
the Portland State College (PSC) campus targeted the PDC as "a small group of self-
selected volunteers from the rich friends of City Hall," and they described Chairman Ira 
Keller as a millionaire "outsider" who "came west from Chicago."  Moreover, it claimed, 
"students, workers and community people must join together, fight back and win honest 
POWER TO THE PEOPLE."
23
  In light of this sudden and intense backlash to Model 
Cities and the PDC, Portland's political leadership found itself in the middle of a quickly 
escalating conflict in Albina. 
 Despite blacks' disapproval of the choice of Reverend Schulze and their intense 
vitriol directed towards the PDC and Model Cities, Schulze focused the majority of his 
efforts on making Model Cities work for the people of Albina by bringing the black 
community's voice into the program.
24
  At a meeting with Albina residents on January 4, 
1968, Schulze attempted to placate angry citizens by constructing a temporary, 
handpicked advisory committee consisting of local black leadership and involved 
citizens, which included individuals ranging from Tom Vickers of the NAACP to local 
activists like Tom Wilson, a former member of the Albina Citizen's War on Poverty 
Committee.  In addition, Schulze proposed that in March each neighborhood would have 
the opportunity to elect representatives to the Citizens' Planning Board (CPB), which 
would replace his original committee and assist him with the creation of Model Cities 
programs and policies.
25
  On March 2, nearly 1,800 citizens from Albina turned out to 
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elect two individuals from each of the eight Albina neighborhoods to the sixteen-person 
CPB.
26
  Then, between April and October of 1968, the CPB sent out weekly mailers 
across Albina to announce public working committees on topics ranging from housing 
and physical planning to health, education, and public safety.
27
  On the one-year 
anniversary of the 1967 riots, the CPB even held a Model Cities rally in Irving Park to 
encourage citizen participation in the construction of education and neighborhood 
development plans.
28
  As the residents of Albina increasingly found a voice in the CPB 
and working committees, Schulze happily reported to the Oregonian that the Model 
Cities program was finally engaging with the needs of Portland's black community and 
creating a new generation of black leadership within the city's government and urban 
planning apparatus.
29
 
 Regardless of his increasing success with the Model Cities program within the 
black community, Reverend Schulze announced his resignation as director of the 
program in an interview with the Oregonian on October 29, 1968.  In his departing 
interview, Schulze asserted that no one asked him to resign, but he stated, "I had the 
technical skills to do what has been done up to now.  I don't feel I have the technical 
skills to put the thing together from here on out."  While Schulze also expressed 
confidence that Mayor Schrunk would eventually appoint an African American as 
director of Model Cities, he said that Albina residents "still feel that City Hall has been 
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unresponsive to their needs," but that Mayor Schrunk was now "willing to deal" with 
these problems.  Ultimately, Schulze noted, somewhat ominously, "Never again will key 
appointments be made without sufficient community advice.  Important bridges have 
been built between the 'power structure' and the community, and I take pride in having 
been a part of that process."
30
  While his ideas seemed reasonable at the time of his 
resignation, Schulze did not foresee the power struggle over Model Cities that would 
ensue over the next two years. 
 Following Schulze's resignation, the Model Cities program entered a period of 
uncertainty and instability as Mayor Schrunk and the PDC struggled to maintain the 
program's funding and find a permanent director of the program.  On December 1, 
Kenneth Gervais, Assistant Director of the Urban Studies Center at PSC, became the 
temporary head of the program.  Shortly thereafter, the program entered a period of crisis.  
When submitted to the city council on December 16, 1968, the Comprehensive City 
Demonstration Plan drafted by the Model Cities' CPB and the residents of Northeast 
Portland shocked and outraged the council members.  The report specifically outlined the 
history of racial discrimination in Albina and targeted entities like the PDC for their 
destructive approach to urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s.  Commissioner Francis 
Ivancie, who served Mayor Schrunk on the Planning Commission, was particularly 
appalled with the proposal, and he carefully edited the document to remove any reference 
to the word "ghetto" with regard to Albina.
31
  However, with the election of President 
Richard Nixon in November 1968, the City of Portland only had until January 20, 1969, 
to submit its final program proposal and gain federal approval before running out of 
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funding under the Johnson administration.  Consequently, the city council and the PDC 
found themselves pressed for time in resolving their differences with the Model Cities 
CPB and the PSC's Urban Studies Center. 
 Due to disagreements over Model Cities' data between city council members and 
the new leadership of the program at PSC's Urban Studies Center, Ira Keller delayed the 
vote on the proposal, and the city council announced it could not meet the deadline before 
the end of January.
32
  In the midst of the proposal and funding crisis, a rift developed 
between Keller and Professor Lyndon Musolf, head of the PSC's Urban Studies Center 
and Gervais' boss, after Keller accused Musolf and Gervais of "promoting dissidence and 
regional, local and racial jealousies" in the city to undermine the power of the PDC.  
Keller even went as far as to make a public demand for PSC Urban Studies Center 
President Gregory Wolfe to review the performance and necessity of Musolf and Gervais' 
"function" at the institute.
33
  Ultimately, despite delays and concerns that the federal 
government under the Nixon administration might not continue to fund the project, HUD 
approved the Model Cities program proposal in February 1969 under the new direction of 
Chalmers Jones.
34
  Still, the PDC and PSC had begun a two-year struggle to share control 
over the Model Cities program throughout much of 1969 and 1970.  Despite the 
continued existence of the CPB, which the PDC now viewed as a threat to their control 
over planning in Northeast Portland, the voice of the citizens of Albina once again 
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became lost in the bureaucracy and power structure of the city as the district lacked a 
representative from the region to head the program. 
 
The Early Years of Portland's Black Panther Party 
 The PDC's inability to steer the Model Cities program through a difficult 
transition or engage with the participation of Albina's black population on the meaningful 
level, like Reverend Paul Schulze had encouraged, resulted in yet another boiling point in 
the Albina district during the summer of 1969.  In the early hours of June 14, violence 
once again erupted throughout the district after Portland police engaged and arrested 
large groups of black teenagers.  What began as large groups of black youth congregating 
in isolated areas of Northeast Portland quickly escalated as police attempted to disperse 
the crowd.  Exactly what caused things to get out of hand is unclear, but as police 
commanded loiterers to go home, blacks began attacking predominately white-owned 
businesses in the neighborhood, and within a few hours, the firebombing of businesses 
and clashes with police spread rapidly throughout the area.
35
  For five days, scattered 
pockets of violence and structure fires engulfed parts of Northeast Portland as police 
struggled to put down rioters.  Ultimately, on June 18, Portland police decided to 
withdraw their heavy patrol presence in the neighborhood to see if tempers would cool.  
As the police backed down, calm slowly returned in the area around the smoldering and 
wrecked shops and homes of the Albina district.
36
 
 In the midst of the riots, the trajectory of urban planning and African American 
resistance to the PDC and the Model Cities program took an unexpected turn with the 
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seemingly innocuous arrest of one man on the final night of the riots in June 1969.  In the 
dark, early morning hours of June 18, Kent Ford, a twenty-six-year-old bearded black 
man with an afro, was driving south down NE Union Avenue when a confrontation 
between police officers and a group of African American teenagers caught his attention.  
Curious, Ford stopped his car, walked over to see what was happening, and noticed one 
of the men sitting in the back of a police car while the police confronted the group of 
teens.  From what he could see, the young men had been throwing dice in an empty 
restaurant parking lot.  At that point, Ford made a quick and bold decision.  He threw 
open the back door of the squad car and told the man inside to run.  As the young man 
bolted, two officers, Stanley Harmon and Larry Kanzler, whirled around, tackled Ford, 
and arrested him as the group of young men cheered Ford's shocking action and shouted 
angrily at the police.  As the police moved to handcuff Ford and force him into the back 
seat of the car, he quickly consumed some marijuana joints that he had in his possession, 
knowing that they would only give the police another criminal count with which to 
charge him.  Outraged by his defiance, one of the officers threw the handcuffed Ford to 
the ground and proceeded to beat him mercilessly.  Once thoroughly bloodied and 
subdued, Ford was taken to the police station downtown where he was charged with an 
attempt to "incite a riot."
37
 
 This was not Ford's first arrest or confrontation with Portland police.  Born in 
Louisiana in 1943, Ford's family moved to Richmond, California near Oakland in the 
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mid-1950s, where he went to high school and had few run-ins with the police.  However, 
after graduating high school in 1961, Ford received a speeding ticket and spent three days 
in jail, which prompted him to leave the Bay Area and move north.
38
  After moving to 
Portland, Ford kept a relatively clean police record, but starting around May 1968, Ford 
had been harassed, arrested, or cited by the police on numerous occasions for jaywalking, 
minor traffic violations including driving without license plate light, and possession of an 
unnamed illegal substance.
39
  Prior to these series of arrests, Ford had founded the 
Portland branch of the National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF), which later 
began to operate as the city's unofficial Black Panther Party before the organization 
gained full chapter status in 1969.
40
  Clearly, Ford's growing role as a radical leader 
within the black community had earned him a reputation among the Portland Police 
Department, but these minor charges were just the beginning. 
 Following his release from Rocky Butte Jail a few days later on an $80,000 bail, 
which was paid through large donations by local anti-Vietnam War activists and radical 
leftists, Ford emerged from the city police station to meet a small crowd of black and 
white supporters who had gathered to greet him upon his release.  Standing on the steps 
of the city police station, Ford gave a brief yet eloquent declaration to a crowd.  "If they 
keep coming in with these fascist tactics," Ford proclaimed, "we're going to defend 
ourselves."
41
  With these words, Ford renewed his mission to challenge the city's white 
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power structure through radical resistance.  By the end of the year, Ford's organization 
expanded quickly and received official charter membership from the BPP leadership in 
Oakland, giving birth to the Portland Black Panther Party. 
 In framing their vision for the future of the black community in Albina, the Black 
Panther Party of Portland operated in response to local issues as well as within the 
framework of the national Ten-Point Platform and Program.  In particular, the Portland 
Panthers focused on the establishment of neighborhood social programs, such as medical 
clinics and a free children's breakfast program, as well as radical and often 
confrontational resistance to police brutality.  However, due to the peculiar timing of the 
chapter's foundation, the Portland Panthers also operated with a distinct level of 
autonomy.  Following the arrest and imprisonment of Huey Newton in 1967, the national 
BPP became somewhat fragmented as the leadership struggled to create a coherent 
national vision for the organization.
42
  During this period, new chapters continued to 
work with BPP headquarters in Oakland, but their goals often focused on local issues 
rather than a national platform.  As a result, while the objectives of the Portland BPP, 
including social programs and opposition to police brutality, were similar to the national 
party, the tactics used to carry out these goals were distinctly local to Portland and shaped 
by the city's unique racial demographics.  In particular, the Portland Panthers' localized 
vision for urban planning, while unspecific in its bureaucratic approach, was one that 
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started with community control in Albina and the improvement of socioeconomic 
conditions among black neighborhoods rather than capitalizing off the commercial 
potential of the land. 
Despite the Panthers' popular reputation as being a radical, violent, and separatist 
organization, the group's primary objective in Portland was the establishment of 
community social programs that met the needs of the city's poor and neglected black 
population in Albina.  This strategy was instrumental to the first point of the BPP's 
platform, which states, "We want freedom.  We want power to determine the destiny of 
our Black Community.  We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to 
determine our destiny."
43
  To this end, the Panther's first significant achievements 
between 1969 and 1970 centered on the formation of a free health clinic, dental clinic, 
and breakfast program for children.  These programs, all of which were centered within 
the Albina district, carved out spaces of sanctuary for poor blacks against what the 
Panthers perceived as an unjust social and economic system by providing basic social 
necessities for breaking the cycle of poverty.  During a visit with Panther leadership in 
Oakland in 1969, members of the BPP were particularly impressed with Ford's leadership 
and desire to expand the party in a city where the racial demographics did not initially 
favor the growth of a BPP chapter.  Consequently, Ford's efforts aimed at improving the 
health and welfare of the black community in Albina ultimately earned his organization 
official chapter status.
44
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For their first community program in Albina, Ford and the other early leadership 
of the Portland Panthers, including Tommy Mills, Sandra Ford, Percy and Patty 
Hampton, Floyd Cruze, Oscar Johnson, and Linda Thornton, focused their attention on 
the establishment of a children's free breakfast program.  Beginning in the fall of 1969, 
the Panthers obtained the use of the dining room at the Highland United Church of Christ 
on NE Glisan Street and, shortly thereafter, began serving between 75 and 125 children 
every weekday from 7 am to 9 am.
45
  For the Panthers, the breakfast program was an 
important element in breaking the cycle of poverty, unemployment, and lack of education 
among the black community in Albina.  According to early brochures distributed by the 
NCCF:  
They TELL US, you're hungry because you're poor . . . You're poor because you 
haven't got the best jobs . . . You can't get the best jobs because you're 
uneducated, and you're uneducated because you didn't learn in school because you 
weren't interested.  And every time the teacher mentioned 5 apples or 6 bananas, 
your stomach growled.  How can a person learn about remainders and quotients 
when his mind is concentrating on a very real and concrete problem?
46
 
 
From the perspective of the Panthers and many blacks in Albina, children whose parents 
could not afford basic food items were stuck in a self-fulfilling, perpetual, and vicious 
chain of poverty.  Consequently, this cycle was one of the greatest obstacles facing their 
community and prevented any meaningful social and economic progress.  Therefore, 
breaking this chain of poverty was central to any other significant neighborhood 
improvements.  As the success and popularity of the program demonstrates, their efforts 
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were remarkably beneficial to hundreds of young African Americans throughout the late 
1960s and 1970s. 
The second program that the Portland Panthers established was the health clinic.  
Technically, their health clinic began in a small building off N Union Avenue and Fargo 
Street in early 1968, well before the Portland Panthers had achieved chapter status, but 
the facility was entirely inadequate and lacked the necessary funds and volunteers to 
operate.  However, following Ford's release from jail in 1969, Don Hamerquist, a white 
man who was a former member of the local Communist Party and had organized the 
fundraising for Ford's bail, approached the Panther leader with the name of an individual 
who could help: Jon Moscow.  A former student at Reed College and also a writer for 
Portland's underground leftist newspaper—the Willamette Bridge—during the late 1960s, 
Moscow specialized in research on the Portland healthcare system and was well aware of 
the shortage of community clinics.  By early 1970, Moscow, who like Hamerquist was 
white, had located an old doctor's office at 109 N Russell Street that would be perfect for 
the Panthers' clinic and filed the necessary permit paperwork to operate and solicit funds 
for the clinic.
47
  Once the Panthers had the building, Jon Moscow, Kent Ford, and his 
wife, Sandra Ford, began looking for doctors who were willing to volunteer.  They found, 
somewhat to their surprise, a number of white doctors, particularly those associated with 
the Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU) in Portland, willing to both volunteer 
and help fund the clinic.
48
  As a result, the Panthers were able to open their health clinic 
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in early 1970, which they decided to name after Fred Hampton, the 21-year-old head of 
the Chicago chapter of the BPP who police had shot and killed while he slept in his bed 
during a raid on December 4, 1969. 
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, the Fred Hampton Memorial Clinic became 
an integral part of the black community in Albina, especially among those who needed 
medical treatment but lacked health insurance.  Once opened, the clinic operated with 27 
volunteer doctors from across Portland—all of whom, with the exception of pathologist 
Bill Davis, were white—as well as a team of volunteer nurses and medical students.  
Open from 7 pm to 10 pm on weeknights, the clinic served roughly 25 to 50 patients 
every night and was willing to help any individual, regardless of skin color, who came to 
them for medical assistance.
49
  In addition, the Portland Panthers, like many other Panther 
health clinics across the United States, distributed health brochures targeting African 
Americans and used the clinic as a way to raise awareness of specific medical conditions, 
notably high blood pressure, lead poisoning, and sickle-cell anemia, an illness that 
disproportionately affects people of Sub-Saharan African descent.
50
 
With the help of Moscow and his connections within OHSU and the Portland 
medical community, the Panthers also opened a dental clinic in 1970 located about a 
block away from their health clinic near the corner Vancouver Avenue and Russell 
Street.
51
  Like the health clinic, the Portland BPP named the dental clinic after another 
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fallen hero of the Black Power movement: Malcolm X.  Once again, Moscow was able to 
convince Gerry Morrell, a white dentist and head of community outreach for the 
Multnomah Dental Society, to volunteer his time, expertise, and equipment in 
establishing the clinic.  Moreover, Morrell successfully found other dentists who were 
willing to work in the clinic.  Still, the short supply of funding and need for volunteers 
required that the Panthers themselves operate much of the day-to-day work in both 
clinics.  Sandra Ford was particularly important in this effort, as she took on the role of 
receptionist and did all of the appointment scheduling for both the health and dental 
clinic.
52
  Ultimately, with the establishment of the Malcolm X Memorial Dental Clinic, 
numerous African Americans in Albina now had access to basic health and dental care 
who would otherwise have had none. 
 Although these programs clearly helped meet the previously neglected needs of 
the black population in Albina by providing spaces of social relief and community 
empowerment, the costs of these programs necessitated support from the people and 
businesses of Northeast Portland.  According to Percy Hampton, the Portland circulation 
manager of the national Black Panther Party newspaper and a member on the board in 
charge of the clinics and breakfast programs, the Panthers were able to use to the surplus 
funds from selling newspapers to help pay for their social programs.  However, even at 
their peak distribution of 500-700 newspapers per week, these funds were nowhere near 
enough to cover operating costs.
53
  As a result, the Panthers relied on donations from 
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businesses and local residents.  In addition to receiving support from the volunteer 
doctors and dentists who worked in the clinics, Panther representatives, most frequently 
Linda Thornton, visited nearly every business in Albina with the hopes of raising funds 
and materials.  According to police records, however, the tactics that Portland Panthers 
often used to elicit this funding and support walked a fine line between solicitation and 
extortion.  In some cases, business owners gave willingly.  For example, in February 
1970, Kienow's grocery store proudly began providing the BPP with weekly food 
donations for their breakfast program.
54
  However, according to police records, the 
Panthers also engaged in a typical pattern of veiled extortion against businesses that 
refused assistance: 
A group of black subject approach a particular business with a female being the 
spokesman for the group.  This group numbers four to six persons.  While the 
female is engaged in conversation with the management of the business, the males 
mill around in a generally disruptive manner.  If the demand for funds for the 
Program are not met, or if the persons soliciting the funds are put off or asked to 
come back at a later date, they attempt to set a firm time as a deadline for 
contributions.  No direct threats are ever made, and as few names as possible with 
no introductions apparent other than the female solicitor, who usually identifies 
herself as one LINDA THORNTON. 
 
Later that day, or the next day, an anonymous threatening phone call is then 
received with words used during the threat being generally to the same effect.  
'You tell the man, or the manager, you're going to get bombed.'
55
 
 
The Panthers, however, were not the only ones who engaged in harassment.  The police 
kept close records on which businesses were and were not willing to provide support to 
the Panthers.
56
  In the case of those who offered money or food, the police verified that 
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the businesses were not being forcibly coerced, and, if the businesses were not, the police 
pressed them to withdraw their support.  Moreover, the police also worked with the 
Public Solicitation Commission in late 1970 to take away the Panthers' solicitation permit 
over small technicalities involving the address of the Panthers' headquarters and their 
submission of paperwork.
57
 
 In the Portland Panthers' most prominent clash with local businesses that refused 
to support them the Panthers launched a boycott of a McDonald's fast food restaurant 
located at the corner of NE Union Avenue and Fremont Avenue during the summer of 
1970.  According to Al Laviske, the general manager of six McDonald's in Portland, Ford 
and Thornton approached him in late June at the Union Avenue McDonald's and 
demanded three $100 contributions to each of the BPP clinics and the children's breakfast 
program.  Following Laviske's persistent refusals, the Portland Panthers began a boycott 
of the McDonald's in early August over the company's lack of support for social 
programs in the black community as well as national accusations against the company for 
racially discriminatory hiring practices.
58
  Ultimately, on August 14, Judge Phillip J. Roth 
issued an injunction against the Panthers to halt the picketing after reports of damage to 
personal property and anonymous threats of violence against the business.  The next day, 
however, Judge Robert E. Jones decided that the Panthers would be allowed to continue 
their boycott as long as they only engaged in "informational picketing."
59
  As a result, in 
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addition to carrying boycott signs in the parking lot, the Panthers distributed flyers that 
attacked McDonald's for their unwillingness to support the breakfast program and clinics.  
Moreover, the flyer also questioned the police's frequent use of the building's parking lot 
as a meeting point for transferring arrestees, noting, "McDonald's is used as a base area 
for PIG attacks on the BLACK COMMUNITY!"
60
  Consequently, although the Panthers 
complied with the court's orders, their rhetoric remained distinctly antagonistic. 
 Then, around two o'clock in the morning on August 22, a bomb exploded in front 
of the McDonald's building and shattered the glass window at the front of the store.  
Although no Black Panther was ever charged in the incident, both the Oregonian and the 
Oregon Journal immediately connected the incident to the Panthers' picketing.
61
  The 
next day, Laviske announced the temporary closure of the restaurant until the damage 
could be repaired, and the court eventually issued another injunction against the Panthers 
and their boycott.  However, the court found insufficient evidence to charge the Portland 
BPP with the bombing or a lesser charge of extortion against Laviske.  Ultimately, 
Laviske also backed down and came to an agreement with Ford to provide the Panthers' 
breakfast program with 50 pounds of meat and 500 cups every week.
62
  As a result, the 
most widely publicized conflict between the Portland Panthers and local businesses over 
the funding of their community programs came to a somewhat amicable conclusion. 
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The Portland BPP's campaign against police brutality and their opposition to 
police presence in Northeast Portland exemplify the organization's second major effort to 
defend Albina against the intrusions of what they viewed as a racist and undemocratic 
system of city governance.  Like their social programs, this campaign was a nationwide 
element of the Black Panther Party and drew on "Point Seven" of their platform, which 
states, "We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUATILITY and MURDER of black 
people.  We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing 
black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from 
racist police oppression and brutality."
63
  In pursuit of this point, the Portland Panthers 
worked to raise awareness of episodes of police brutality against blacks, and they pushed 
for the removal of police officers whom they considered racist as well as for laws that 
would allow them to patrol their own neighborhoods.  By responding to both national 
instances of injustice, such as the imprisonment of Huey P. Newton, and local cases of 
police brutality, including the trials of Kent Ford and Albert Williams, the Portland BPP 
undertook a massive public relations campaign to defend Albina's black community and 
expand their political network. 
The Portland Black Panther Party's first efforts to raise awareness of the abuse of 
power by the police centered on the national movement to free Huey P. Newton from 
prison.  On October 28, 1967, Newton shot and killed Officer John Frey of the Oakland 
Police Department after Frey attempted to arrest Newton.  During the arrest, the two men 
wrestled with each other, shots were fired, and both men were shot.  Frey died shortly 
thereafter, but Newton escaped to a hospital where police later arrested him.  Following a 
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trial filled with contradictory testimonies, a jury convicted Newton of voluntary 
manslaughter in September 1968 and sent him to prison.  In addition to the questionable 
circumstances surrounding Newton's imprisonment, the eighth point of the Black Panther 
Party's platform explicitly demands, "freedom for all black men held in federal, state, 
county and city prisons and jails . . . because they have not received a fair and impartial 
trial."
64
  As a result, across the country, supporters of the Black Panthers began the Free 
Huey Movement with the aim of releasing Newton from prison. 
During their work as the NCCF and the early months of official Black Panther 
membership, Kent Ford, the Portland BPP, and other leftist Portlanders made the Free 
Huey Movement the first element of their campaign against police oppression.  
Throughout 1969 and 1970, the Portland BPP held rallies and distributed flyers about 
Newton throughout Portland, especially in the area on and around PSC—which, in order 
to reflect its full university status, was renamed Portland State University (PSU) later in 
1969.  In particular, on May 1, 1969 the NCCF, PSU Black Student Union, Portland 
branch of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and other groups held a rally in 
Portland as a part of a nationwide "Free Huey" day in cities across the United States.  
Flyers distributed at the demonstration contained a full list of the BPP's platform and 
described Newton as "a political prisoner of the racist power structure of this country . . . 
[and] the symbol of the movement for liberation."
65
  One year later, in May 1970, the 
California Appellate Court released Newton from prison due to problems with the initial 
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trial, and, following two more mistrials, the state abandoned efforts to convict him.  
While the newly created Portland BPP celebrated the victory, their efforts quickly turned 
to more localized concerns of police brutality in their own community. 
While the Free Huey Movement increased the Panthers' notoriety in Portland, the 
trial and acquittal of Kent Ford on the charge of "inciting a riot" from the June 1969, as 
well as his successful lawsuit against the Portland police, put the Panthers and their anti-
police brutality campaign in the city's spotlight.  Prior to the trial, Hamerquist put Ford in 
contact with Attorney Nick Chaivoe, who successfully challenged the police's narrative 
that Ford had encouraged violence against police officers on the morning of June 18.  
Following Ford's nine-day trial in early February 1970, a jury ultimately acquitted Ford 
of the trumped up charge of "inciting a riot."  In addition, because the police had beaten 
Ford after they arrested and handcuffed him, Chaivoe also filed a civil suit against the 
Portland Police Department.
66
  In the months following Ford's acquittal, police stepped 
up their confrontations with the Panthers, including a second arrest of Ford in June 1970, 
when police charged him with "disorderly conduct by abusive language" after he yelled at 
two police officers, one of whom was an African American and was allegedly called a 
"nigger pig" by Ford.
67
  This time, the court handed Ford his first ever-criminal 
conviction and sentenced him to six months of probation.
68
  Still, the ruling did not affect 
Ford's lawsuit against the police.  That September, a federal district court judge awarded 
Ford $6,000 for "the indignity that [Ford] suffered," and offered a warning that "it is time 
that the community realizes that the police are not authorized to inflict punishment at 
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their own discretion."
69
  With the acquittal of Ford in February and the successful lawsuit 
by September, the Portland Panthers had struck their first blow against the brutal 
behavior and tactics of the Portland police. 
The Panthers used Ford's acquittal and lawsuit as another opportunity to further 
their campaign against the Portland police and to create new devices of community 
control over Albina.  As was the case with the foundation of their social programs, the 
Portland BPP was willing to work with local whites to spread their message.  On 
February 14, the day after Ford's acquittal, a large group of demonstrators headed by the 
Portland BPP leadership marched north from the Southwest Park Blocks near the PSU 
campus to the U.S. Courthouse downtown in support of a ballot initiative that would 
grant "community control" over the policing of neighborhoods.  A photograph of that 
demonstration, which appeared in the following day's Oregonian above an article titled 
"Black Panther Claims It's Ballots or Bullets," illustrates the Portland BPP's efforts to 
assert black leadership while simultaneously engaging white supporters in the city, 
particularly leftist activists from PSU.  Taken as the procession moved north past SW 
Columbia Street, the image emphasizes both the primacy of black leadership among the 
Portland Panthers as well as their willingness to enlist whites as secondary supporters.  
Prominently out front in the photograph are roughly a dozen African Americans, many of 
whom were in the leadership of the Portland BPP, including Sandra Ford and Percy 
Hampton.  More interesting, however, beyond the first three rows of demonstrators, the 
crowd consists entirely of white college-aged men and women.  One white man, just off-
center and a few rows behind the Panthers, even holds his clenched fist high in the air, a 
symbol widely recognized as the Black Power salute, as a sign of solidarity with BPP 
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leadership.  Likewise, both blacks and whites carry signs with slogans like, "Free the 
Panthers—Jail the Pigs" and "Community Control of Police NOW."  But the sharp racial 
divide in the image clearly reveals an underlying sentiment of the importance of 
maintaining black leadership in a city where blacks lacked substantial numbers compared 
to other West Coast cities.
70
 
Rallying on the steps of the courthouse, Kent Ford called on the mixed audience 
of whites and blacks to intensify their efforts against the police, proclaiming, "the people 
are running out of energy for picketing and marching. . . . We've got to attack on other 
levels . . . time is running out.  It's got to be power to the people."  Likewise, 19 year-old 
Freddy Whitlow, another Panther and one of the petition's sponsors, informed the crowd 
that they needed 26,000 signatures to get on the ballot.  "If we don't get the ballot," the 
Oregonian reported Whitlow saying, "it has to be the bullet."
71
  In other words, without 
community control of police, the Panthers believed, violent shootings between blacks and 
white police would undoubtedly continue.  Although their ballot initiative fell well short 
of the necessary number of signatures, the demonstration ultimately helped increase the 
Portland BPP's visibility in early 1970 and brought public awareness to the issue of 
police violence in Albina.  Moreover, it provided members of the African American 
community in Albina with the knowledge that there was an organization willing to meet 
force with force and that blacks did not have to suffer silently from the actions of racist 
police officers. 
 While the national protests against Newton's imprisonment as well as Ford's 
acquittal and subsequent lawsuit against the Portland Police Department both received 
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attention within the city of Portland, the shooting, arrest, and trial of Albert Williams, a 
19 year-old black teen from Albina, became the focal point for the Portland Panthers' 
campaign against police brutality by late 1970.  On February 18, 1970, Williams, who 
was not a member of the BPP, was visiting the BPP headquarters at 3619 NE Union 
Avenue with Freddy Whitlow when a police car driven by Sgt. Stanley Harmon, the 
arresting officer in the Kent Ford case, pulled up next to the two young men and claimed 
they had a warrant for Williams' arrest.  Williams ran into the Panthers headquarters, and 
the police pursued him.  After grabbing a rifle, a brief but tense standoff ensued.
72
  
Eyewitnesses, who were primarily Panther members, stated that Williams' gun accidently 
discharged after the Panthers inside the headquarters convinced him to put his weapon 
down.  The shot, however, prompted Harmon to fire two shots, which hit Williams in his 
right arm and liver and left him in critical condition.
73
  Less than two weeks later, a grand 
jury acquitted Harmon of any wrongdoing, but following a slight delay due to an initial 
mistrial, a jury ultimately convicted Williams of assault on October 20, 1970.
74
 
 A comparison of the literature distributed by the Portland Panthers and the local 
newspaper coverage of the Williams trial reveals the stark contrast between differing 
perceptions of the trial and the Portland BPP.  The flyers and pamphlets that the Panthers 
published and handed out in Albina, on the PSU campus, and at rallies in front of the 
courthouse during the trial were unsurprisingly one-sided in favor of acquitting Williams 
and bringing charges against Stanley Harmon.  On one early flyer, which was distributed 
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in late June prior to the start of Williams' trial, the Panthers led with an crudely drawn 
image of a chubby white police officer, adorned with a swastika badge while clutching a 
riot baton in one hand and pointing a revolver in the face of the reader with his other 
hand.  Underneath his boot lay Lady Justice, struggling to hold up the scales of justice as 
the police officer weighs her down.  In addition, the flyer provided a brief summary of 
the suspicious shooting and arrest of Williams.  Specifically, they noted the delay in the 
police's decision to take Williams to the hospital in addition to witness reports that 
Harmon joyously shouted, "I got him! I finally got him!" after he shot Williams.  The 
flyer also offered a short description of the BPP and their campaign against police 
brutality, particularly efforts to have Officer Harmon transferred to another precinct, as 
well as a sharp criticism of the lack of African Americans serving in the police force.
75
 
 As the trial gained more attention, the Panthers' flyers and pamphlets became 
more elaborate.  Throughout the trial in early-to-mid October, the Panthers held rallies 
and distributed similar literature in support of Albert Williams and the Portland BPP, and 
they encouraged supporters to attend the trial.  In a four-page pamphlet from early 
October, the Panthers continued their criticisms of the police's handling of Williams' 
wounds, the behavior of Harmon in the incident, and the persistence of police violence 
towards the African American community in general.  Moreover, the pamphlet also 
provided a page of accusations of a systematic attack on the Black Panther Party in 
Portland and throughout the United States, while another page outlined their social 
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programs, clinic addresses, hours of operation, and where to send donations.
76
  As a 
result, the distribution of these flyers and pamphlets served multiple purposes for the 
Portland Panthers.  On the one hand, the Portland BPP was able to continue raising public 
awareness of police behavior in Albina.  On another, more practical, hand, this literature 
also helped increase the Panthers' public visibility, particularly their community social 
programs and the city, state, and federal governments' efforts to subvert those programs. 
 Media portrayals of the Williams trial tended to be far less favorable towards both 
Williams and the Black Panther Party.  Both in their depictions of Williams and their 
descriptions of events, newspapers tended to favor the narrative put forward by the police 
while subtly attacking the aims of the Portland BPP and the character of its members.  
The Oregonian, which provided the most extensive media coverage of the trial, 
consistently reiterated that the shooting took place at the BPP headquarters but neglected 
to mention that Williams was not actually a Panther.  Moreover, especially towards the 
end of the trial, the Oregonian emphasized Williams' use of Seconal, a barbiturate, and 
his history as a drug user.
77
  Likewise, in their coverage of the trial, the newspaper tended 
to lead with police accounts of events as fact while portraying the Panther narrative as 
unsubstantiated claims.  For example, when Harmon testified on October 15, Steve 
Erickson of the Oregonian opened with: "Albert Williams yelled, 'Harmon, I'm gonna to 
kill you' before firing a shot at a Portland police patrolman in Black Panther headquarters 
last February."
78
  In contrast, when Williams took the stand the next day, the Erickson 
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began, "A teen-aged youth charged with trying to kill a Portland patrolman last February 
testified Thursday that the officer had often threatened him."
79
  In both of these articles, 
Erickson began by labeling Williams as the aggressor who attempted to kill Harmon, and 
he frontloaded the articles with a clear anti-Williams narrative.  While this is only one 
example, popular media coverage of the trial, particularly in the Oregonian, was 
overwhelmingly one-sided and tended to favor an anti-Panther narrative that labeled 
Williams, who the paper conveniently neglected to mention in every article was not a 
Black Panther, as a cop killer and drug user.
80
 
 In the first year and a half of their existence, the Portland Black Panther Party's 
establishment of community social programs and their anti-police brutality campaign, 
both of which sought to reclaim spaces for blacks in Albina, provided a more radical 
vision for Albina than any black civil rights organization in Portland had previously 
imagined.  Rooted in the national BPP's Ten-Point Program and Platform, the Portland 
Panthers localized the national party's goals to fit the needs and issues surrounding 
neighborhood development in Northeast Portland.  Through the children's free breakfast 
program, the Fred Hampton Memorial Health Clinic, and the Malcolm X Memorial 
Dental Clinic, the Panthers' offered the poor members of Albina's black community 
places where they could begin to break the cycle of poverty that had been an historical 
legacy of the city's discrimination and neglect.  Similarly, their campaign to stop police 
violence against and gain local control over neighborhoods in Albina through highly 
publicized trials was successful in increasing the Panthers' public visibility and support.  
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Despite negative attention from the popular media, the existence of the Portland BPP was 
widely known throughout Portland by the end of 1970, and the organization had 
established a defensive position against what they viewed to be an evil and corrupt power 
structure within the city's government.  
 
 During the latter half of the 1960s through 1970, Northeast Portland was divided 
into two increasingly polarizing visions for the future of the Albina district.  On the one 
hand, Mayor Terry Schrunk, Ira Keller, and the PDC envisioned a top-down policy of 
urban renewal that sought to revive blighted neighborhoods and to increase the value and 
livability of the city through the policies of urban planners.  On the other hand, grassroots 
resistance to the PDC's vision of the Model Cities program represented an opposing view 
with varying degrees.  While many within the African American community, though 
wary of the PDC's history of destruction and neglect, were willing to engage with the 
Model Cities program by participating in the Citizen Planning Board, others were not so 
willing.  Instead, many younger African Americans in their teens and twenties who had 
grown up knowing nothing but the damaging legacy of urban renewal were more 
skeptical of the City and willing to embrace radical tactics to defend what they perceived 
to be threats to the black community.  Acting as the face of this extreme opposition, the 
Portland Black Panther Party emerged in 1969 and 1970 as a fighting antithesis to the 
city's power structure.  Their adversarial vision for Albina's development began at the 
grassroots level by attempting to address socioeconomic conditions and regain 
community control over neighborhoods.  As a result, the BPP carved out social spaces of 
sanctuary within Albina, and attempted to combat discrimination and police brutality in 
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their neighborhood.  These efforts, however, were just the beginning.  As the 1970s 
progressed, the Portland Panthers would help spearhead the fight against the PDC's most 
damaging urban renewal proposal of the 1970s—the Emanuel Hospital Urban Renewal 
Project. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
LOSING THE BATTLE: 
EMANUEL HOSPITAL, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FALL OF THE 
PORTLAND PANTHERS, 1970-1973 
 
 In the fall of 1970, the City of Portland's Model Cities program was still in the 
midst of searching for a permanent program director to replace Reverend Paul Schulze.  
After sifting through numerous applications, one individual stood out: Charles Jordan.  
Born in Longview, Texas, and raised in Palm Springs, California, Jordan was by all 
measures the definition of a well-rounded candidate.  After graduating from high school 
in 1956, several schools offered Jordan scholarships to play basketball.  At 6-foot-7, he 
had been an all-star in a variety of sports at Palm Springs High School and had the 
potential to be a dominant athlete for numerous universities on the basketball court.  
Ultimately, however, Jordan decided to attend Gonzaga University in eastern 
Washington, where he earned Bachelor of Science degrees in the fields of Education, 
Sociology, and Philosophy in 1961.  During the 1960s, Jordan also served two years as an 
officer in the U.S. Army and later completed some graduate work in Education and 
Public Administration at various universities in the Los Angeles area before working in 
various administrative posts with the City of Palm Springs.  By every measure, Jordan 
was an incredible applicant.  But there was one specific thing his application neglected to 
mention—he was black. 
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 In response to growing anger and increasing radical resistance among blacks to 
the PDC and Model Cities by 1970, Mayor Schrunk had recruited Jordan to apply for the 
position.  Although the mayor knew who Jordan was, most of the twenty-seven members 
of the CPB in charge of selecting the new head had no idea he was an African American.  
Many of the council's older white members were actually shocked to discover that a 
black man had such an impressive résumé when he arrived for his first interview.  
Nevertheless, the council was excited by the prospect of having such a highly qualified 
African American in charge of the project, which they assumed would please the city's 
discontented and distrustful black population. 
 African Americans in Portland saw things a bit differently.  Many, including 
members of the more radical and militant organizations like the Black Panther Party and 
a smaller yet somewhat independent offshoot of the Panthers known as the Black Berets, 
were not keen on the idea of the city government bringing in an outsider when there were 
plenty of qualified African Americans in positions of leadership already in the city.  Just 
prior to Jordan's final interview with the citizens' board, Black Berets—under the 
leadership of R.L. Anderson, a large, stern-faced man with penchant for confrontation—
challenged Jordan on his way into the interview and made it clear that they were not just 
looking for "a man with a black face" to head the program.  Instead, they wanted 
someone who would defend the interests of their community.  After the interview, when 
Jordan had left the room and the board had closed the doors to discuss his candidacy, 
Anderson and his small group of cadres kicked in the door, shouted at the members of the 
board, and expressed their dissatisfaction with the selection process.  Anderson, in 
particular, demanded that the board hire someone who already lived in Portland.  
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Terrified of Anderson, many of the board's members fled the room without listening, 
leading the Black Berets to leave the building frustrated and unsatisfied with the board's 
decisions.
1
 
 Ultimately, Charles Jordan was selected as the new head of Portland's Model 
Cities program in late 1970, a position that he held until 1973.  During that period, the 
leadership of the Model Cities program worked harder to incorporate the voice of the 
black community in city politics and urban planning than any of the City of Portland's 
previous urban renewal projects.  In fact, R.L. Anderson, the man who once confronted 
Jordan, eventually became one of his greatest supporters and, for a time, was even a 
valuable member of the program.  The city's political leadership, however, still refused to 
give in or compromise on some of their most profitable plans.  In particular, the PDC 
reserved its most contentious project from the jurisdiction and oversight of the Model 
Cities program: the renovation and expansion of the Emanuel Hospital. 
 This project, which chose to demolish hundreds of African American homes and 
businesses in the Eliot neighborhood without their input, became the focal point of the 
Portland Black Panther Party's battle against the city government, the police, and the 
PDC.  But the Portland Panther's were no match for the goliath-like strength of the PDC 
and Portland's political leadership.  In the end, the Emanuel Hospital Urban Renewal 
Project, along with a concentrated effort by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
local law enforcement, undermined and destroyed the Portland BPP by the late 1970s 
and, in doing so, brought an end to the city's most prominent radical voice within Albina's 
black community.  But even as the Panthers and their vision of neighborhood planning 
                                                             
1 The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present (Portland: Bureau of 
Planning, 1993), 131. 
88 
 
that emphasized community control and socioeconomic uplift were in the midst of 
decline, so too was the PDC's monopoly over urban renewal projects.  Out of the demise 
of these two extreme visions, a new, broadly based, moderate middle path emerged 
through Model Cities that would influence the shape of citizen participation in city 
politics and urban planning policies since the 1970s. 
  
 Even as Portland's African American community was increasingly able to find its 
voice in the city's political and urban planning process through the Model Cities program, 
the city government and the PDC continued to find political loopholes when the desires 
of blacks in Albina clashed with the City of Portland's vision and economic plans for the 
region.  Nowhere was this sentiment clearer than with the PDC's decision to remove the 
highly unpopular Emanuel Hospital renovation and expansion from oversight of the 
Model Cities program in order to bypass the will of the black community in Northeast 
Portland.  In order to remain technologically state-of-the-art and large enough to meet the 
needs of Portland's growing population, city planners and hospital executives had been 
looking to expand the hospital's campus, located in the heart of the Eliot neighborhood 
just north of the Rose Quarter in the Albina district, since the proposed Central Albina 
Plan in 1962.
2
  With the creation of the Model Cities program, proponents of expansion 
saw a new opportunity to develop the hospital.  In 1967, the PDC proposed the Emanuel 
Hospital Urban Renewal Project as a component of the Model Cities program (See 
Appendix C: Figure 4.1).  Under the condition that Emanuel Hospital and the PDC 
compensate displaced individuals for their property and that the two entities work closely 
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with the local community, the CPB approved the project early in the summer of 1968.  
Over the next two years, the hospital completed a new medical building as well as an 
extended care facility and had plans for further expansions to the medical buildings, 
including a large lecture hall, a senior citizen's residence, employee apartments, a laundry 
facility, and expanded parking.
3
  As a result, by the time of Charles Jordan's arrival in 
Portland in late 1970, the project was already well underway. 
 Shortly after becoming director of the Model Cities program, Jordan received a 
letter from HUD informing him that they would terminate funding for Model Cities 
unless the program demonstrated a clear direction with regard to planning and resolved 
internal conflicts with the PDC, including a dispute over whether or not to continue the 
Emanuel Hospital expansion.  As a result, during his first months as program director, 
Jordan carefully navigated between the PDC and the CPB, its working committees, and 
Northeast Portland's black community.  Following numerous public meetings and 
discussions with the residents of Albina, Jordan and the CPB looked for ways to make 
Model Cities work better for the community and drafted a number of specific planning 
proposals and revisions.
4
  In particular, the CPB's Comprehensive Development Plan for 
the Model Cities District from 1971, which was the product of Jordan's early months of 
leadership, noted that since the early proposals for the Emanuel Hospital expansion in 
1966 and 1967, the social and political environment of the Eliot neighborhood had 
changed sharply in opposition to the hospital.  "Many people, particularly the elderly, 
                                                             
3 Portland Development Commission, "Timetable," Emanuel Hospital Application, Emanuel Hospital 
Records, A2010-003, box 1, folder 1, PARC, Portland; Portland Development Commission, Final Project 
Report Application for Loan and Grant: Emanuel Hospital Project,  Emanuel Hospital Application, 
Emanuel Hospital Records, A2010-003, box 1, PARC, Portland 
 
4 "Citizen critics note lack of benefits from Model Cities programs funds," Oregonian, March 28, 1971; 
History of Portland's African American Community, 131-132. 
90 
 
want to remain," the report stated, "Rehabilitation and rebuilding of the Eliot 
neighborhood for residential purposes is consistent with a broad community goal of 
improving the variety and quality of housing opportunities."
5
  Consequently, Jordan, the 
CPB, and the citizens of the Eliot neighborhood and Northeast Portland encouraged the 
PDC to significantly alter or abandon the hospital renovation. 
 The PDC, however, had already invested too much in the Emanuel Hospital 
project and was not about to throw away almost four years of investments.  Therefore, in 
an attempt to resolve the conflicts within the Model Cities program that were blocking 
the approval of funding, the PDC quietly removed the Emanuel Hospital Urban Renewal 
Project from the Model Cities program during a vote at a session of the CPB.  Despite 
growing opposition to the project within the Eliot neighborhood and throughout Albina, 
the CPB's quick and somewhat misleading vote during one sparsely attended public 
meeting, which few people in the community knew about in advance, reserved the project 
from the Model Cities planning.  In doing so, the PDC made the hospital expansion its 
own separate project outside of the CPB and black community's control.
6
  However, with 
the cooperation of several other organizations, including the Emanuel Displaced Persons 
Association, the Model Cities CPB pressured the PDC and Emanuel Hospital to work 
closely with residents of the Eliot neighborhood.  Specifically, in April 1971, the CPB 
signed an agreement with the PDC, Emanuel Hospital, and various local organizations 
aimed at resolving and preventing problems stemming from displacement, including 
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increased poverty and homelessness.
7
  Still, the overall treatment of the displaced, many 
of whom were undercompensated or simply denied benefits to save city and federal 
funds, as well as the PDC's ongoing disconnect with the residents of Albina throughout 
the early 1970s continued to build tensions between the city government and the 
neighborhoods of Northeast Portland.
8
 
 Despite the continuation of the Emanuel Hospital Urban Renewal Project, the 
Model Cities program under the Jordan's two years of leadership became a productive 
and ultimately beneficial endeavor for many of Albina's neighborhoods.  With the 
formation of the Neighborhood Development Plan (NDP) by the CPB in 1970, the 
citizens of Northeast Portland completed numerous neighborhood improvement projects 
under Jordan's guidance.  Through the use of Model Cities federal loans and grants, city 
workers and local citizens planted more than 600 trees, expanded local parks by seven 
acres, improved five miles of streets that had fallen below standards, and rehabilitated 
nearly 2,000 housing units—especially in the area around Emanuel Hospital in order to 
accommodate displaced residents.  In addition, each of the eight neighborhoods 
developed their own specific policy plans for community revitalization and planning 
through the NDP, but the city government and the PDC never adopted any of these 
plans.
9
  
 As Jordan and the CPB backed away from the PDC-dominated vision for Model 
Cities in the early 1970s and increased their focus on community revitalization, some 
black radicals gradually became more open to the community-led efforts of the program.  
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However, the integration of ex-radicals into the fold came neither easily nor with 
widespread approval of the city or federal government.  After becoming involved in the 
Model Cities program as the chair of law and justice committee, R.L. Anderson worked 
with the city's Police Bureau Community Relations Program to ensure closer 
communication and involvement between the neighborhoods of Albina and the Portland 
Police Department.
10
  A few months later, on February 18, 1971, Anderson was elected to 
a short and troublesome tenure as treasurer of the Portland Metropolitan Steering 
Committee (PMSC).
11
  Established by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in the 
late 1960s as a part of President Johnson's War on Poverty, the PMSC acted as the OEO's 
policy formation and implementation body for Portland.  However, shortly after joining 
the committee, Anderson became a divisive political figure and a major source of 
controversy for the committee's future.  With his background as the leader of the Black 
Berets, an organization that he dissolved before seeking the position as the PMSC's 
treasurer, the local media, specifically the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal, portrayed 
Anderson as a "black militant."  Moreover, his criminal record, which included recent 
arrests and convictions for "assault with a deadly weapon" and "illegal possession of an 
firearm," as well as a long history of other charges, created problems for Anderson .
12
  
Most importantly, the OEO required that all members on the committee secure surety 
bonding in the amount of $25,000, but the OEO's regular bonding company refused to 
back Anderson because of his criminal background.  Without Anderson's bonding as 
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treasurer, the PMSC would not have access its $6.2 million of annual federal poverty 
funds.
13
  Ultimately, Anderson's inability to secure the bond led him to resign on March 
31, less than two months after his election to treasurer, in order free up federal funds for 
the PMSC.
14
 
 While many blacks in Northeast Portland, including radical activists, began to 
engage the city's political leadership and urban planning apparatus to enact reforms 
through the Model Cities' CPB, other radical elements of the black community, like the 
Black Panthers, continued to publicly criticize planning projects in Albina and push for 
neighborhood programs focusing on socioeconomic problems.  The Panthers' public 
presence served as a constant reminder to the PDC and the rest of the city government of 
the perilous alternatives to ignoring the voice of the black community, especially after the 
riots of Northeast Portland in the summers of 1967 and 1969.  Since the organization's 
emergence in late 1969, the Portland BPP had resisted the Model Cities program, which 
they viewed as yet another example of the city's costly and devastating urban renewal 
projects in Northeast Portland.  Small numbers of Panthers attended early Model Cities 
meetings and sessions of the citizens' board, handing out literature that railed against the 
behavior of the city government, the police, and the PDC.  On one particular single-page 
goldenrod flyer distributed at a public meeting in September 1969, the Panthers 
exclaimed, "once again the police department and city government have disregarded the 
rights and the will of the people."  Likening the social, economic, and spatial 
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discrimination of African Americans in Albina to a slave plantation, they encouraged 
blacks to refuse to participate in the program, stating, "The people of Albina have no 
business showing up at these meetings, because when you're on a slave plantation there's 
only the slaves and the masters and they know who the slaves are."
15
  While the Panther's 
refusal to engage with Model Cities was not universal among all or even a majority of the 
Albina's black residents, the existence and persistence of their organization exemplified 
an extreme end of the continuum of anger towards the city government and PDC.  Still, 
with the growing representation and power of neighborhood activists in Model Cities, the 
Panthers also represented an increasingly isolated and fading vision for the future of 
community politics in Albina. 
 By the early 1970s, Jordan's leadership had won over much of the African 
American community, but the PDC's decision to withhold the Emanuel Hospital Urban 
Renewal Project from Model Cities gave the Portland BPP a specific high profile target 
on which to focus their attacks against the city's frequently undemocratic urban planning 
process.  Shortly after the decision to isolate the Emanuel Hospital expansion from Model 
Cities in mid-1971, Kent Ford and the Panthers turned their focus to gaining employment 
for poor blacks in the project or stopping the renewal project altogether.  In an interview 
with the Portland Community College Bridge, Ford explained, "I would like to see the 
people downtown stop trying to make a political thing out of everything.  I'd like to like 
to see them really come down to the community level . . . so that [their projects] are 
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meaningful for the people they should be serving."
16
  To Ford and other Panthers, the 
Emanuel Hospital project represented a continuation of the very ideology and policies 
that had destroyed much of their community since the 1950s and contributed to more than 
a century of social, economic, and spatial discrimination. 
 In response to the PDC's continuation of the Emanuel Hospital renovations, a 
coalition of black community activists, including militant leaders like Kent Ford and 
members of mainstream groups like the NAACP and Urban League, organized the Black 
Community Survival Committee in May 1972.  The group's primary purpose was to hold 
a large rally in Irving Park during the summer of 1972 to raise public awareness of the 
project's detrimental impact on Northeast Portland and to demonstrate the community's 
united opposition.  On the weekend of July 1 and 2, the group held a two-day rally in 
Irving Park called the Black Community Survival Conference, complete with live music, 
guest speakers, free food, and tests for sickle-cell anemia.  Speakers included Tom 
Wilson, a veteran of the Model Cities program who was running for state representative, 
radical leaders like Kent Ford and R.L. Anderson, local ministers like Reverend Sam 
Johnson, various welfare and health clinic organizers, and faculty members and students 
from PSU.
17
  According to police reports, by Sunday afternoon, roughly 600 to 800 
people had gathered in the park, leading to new concerns among the police that the event 
could quickly get out of hand.
18
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 Frightened by the memory of the riot sparked in Irving Park five years earlier, the 
police heavily monitored the progress of the Black Community Survival Conference in 
the days and weeks leading up to, during, and after the rally.  In late May, the Portland 
police began a close surveillance of Tom Wilson and his home, where the rally's planners 
met, as well as Kent Ford and R.L. Anderson.  In effect, police suspected that the rally 
could serve as a launching point for a movement to elect "radical" politicians or endorse 
"radical activities" in Northeast Portland.  According to a report filed by Deputy Chief 
Robert Steele, the police initially speculated the event would "attempt to drift away from 
the BLACK PANTHER PARTY philosophies to a new [ideology] which will be a 
political power movement."
19
  The supposed nature of this "new" political philosophy is 
unclear from police reports; however, later reports from late June further emphasized the 
previous assumptions by the police about Panther motives, stating, "KENT FORD'S 
activities will be an attempt to use this meeting to sway feelings against the police and to 
keep the police out of the black community."
20
  As a result, patrolling officers were 
instructed to maintain an active yet covert presence in Irving Park during the rally.  
However, with no major incidences to report over the two days and the crowd dwindling 
to fewer than forty people by late Sunday night, most of whom were involved in cleanup, 
police realized that their fears of riots and violence had been overstated.
21
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 The following year, the Panthers and other members of the black community 
stepped up their efforts to block the continuation of the project by organizing a picket line 
outside of Emanuel Hospital on March 21, 1973.  Although the Black Community 
Survival Committee had ceased to exist in name by the end of the summer in 1972, the 
loose network of individuals and organizations opposed to the Emanuel Hospital project 
persisted, this time under the name of The Left Out Ones, Inc.—a reference to the 
predominately black population displaced by the project.  Led by local activist Nate 
Proby with the support of Wilson and Ford, the group attacked the Emanuel Hospital 
project for its unwillingness to hire and train members of the local community for new 
construction and hospital jobs.  In addition, they chastised the hospital and PDC 
leadership for their broken promises in funding the construction of new low-income 
housing for the displaced.  In the week leading up to the demonstration, supporters posted 
and distributed flyers demanding that Emanuel Hospital develop, "in cooperation with 
various community groups, a plan to recruit minority students for their school for nurses."  
Likewise, they proclaimed the hospital "needs to keep the promises it has made to the 
community it has so drastically changed and to the people it has removed from their 
homes."
22
  Without the substantive inclusion of African Americans in the project, they 
believed, the Emanuel Hospital expansion would be nothing more than yet another 
destructive urban renewal plan for the people of Albina. 
 On the morning of the demonstration, roughly forty individuals, including Ford 
and other members of the BPP, gathered outside of Emanuel Hospital forming a picket 
line and expressing their opposition to the implementation of the project.  Carrying signs 
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reading, "Emanuel has no respect for Black and Poor People," and "STOP the 
Destruction Until You Hire Black People," protesters voiced their demands for jobs at the 
hospital and an end to the demolition of their homes and businesses.  Intricately 
connecting the opportunity for jobs within their own community to the legacy of poverty, 
displacement, and discrimination, the demonstrators made it clear to Emanuel Hospital 
and the PDC that they saw this urban renewal project as another element in the perpetual 
cycle of poverty and discrimination in Northeast Portland. 
 Police patrolled the area around the hospital to ensure that everything was under 
control.  But if the police expected violence, they were disappointed.  The crowd in front 
of Emanuel picketed peacefully for hours and then adjourned in the late afternoon.
23
  
Despite their efforts to gain the public's attention, however, the combined resources and 
strategies of the Portland Panthers along with other black leadership and organizations 
ultimately had no effect in stopping the removal and destruction of black people's homes 
and businesses at the expense of the hospital's expansion. 
 That same spring, the expansion project struck a serious blow to the Portland 
Panthers use of space in Albina for social programs, particularly the Fred Hampton 
Memorial Health Clinic.  When the Panthers first leased the building on Russell Avenue 
in 1969, they were well aware that the city planned to demolish the building for Emanuel 
Hospital.
24
  Regardless of this fact, Ford and the Panthers selected the building for two 
reasons.  First, it was an inexpensive location and the hospital and the PDC had assured 
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them that they would be given time to vacate the premises when, and if, the building was 
to be destroyed.  Second, and most importantly, by selecting a location within the 
expansion zone, the Panthers were once again expressing their defiance against the city's 
power structure and defending their vision for the black community's use of space.  
When, in 1971, Emanuel Hospital and the PDC notified the BPP that they had to move 
their clinic, the Panthers agreed, but they demanded the same compensation that everyone 
else in the area had received.  After a long period of intense negotiations, the PDC and 
the Panthers came to an agreement in 1973, when the PDC offered the Panthers a nearby 
building on Williams Avenue where they could operate, rent free, for five years.
25
   
 Shortly after reaching an agreement with the BPP, the PDC filed a notice for 
immediate eviction from the Russell Avenue building and forced the Panthers to relocate 
the clinic by May 1, 1973.  The Panthers felt duped.  They described the new building as 
"just a shell, four walls and a roof that leaks.  The only thing inside is a wall down the 
middle."
26
  Moreover, the BPP quickly realized that, despite insinuations that the PDC 
would help cover the cost of some renovations, city planners claimed that the hospital 
project had no money to spare.  Feeling that they had been tricked, the BPP posted a 
notice in the window of the clinic describing the PDC's deception and encouraging the 
community to protest Emanuel Hospital and the PDC's behavior.  "We want Emanuel to 
live up to its responsibilities in this community," the Panthers' flyer contended.  "After 
all, we do aid Emanuel in treating people who are unable to pay for medical attention."
27
 
                                                             
25 "Fred Hampton Medical Health Clinic," Black Panther Party Police Records, Police Historical and 
Archival Intelligence Records, A2004-005, box 5, folder 5, PARC, Portland. 
 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 Ibid. 
100 
 
 After months of trying to find a way to keep the clinic, Ford arrived at the clinic 
on the morning of May 1 with a moving truck and boxes only to find that the Multnomah 
County Sheriff and officials from the PDC were already there.  They had broken into the 
clinic and were forcibly removing medical supplies, files, and equipment.  During the 
process, the PDC and police ruined more than $1,000 worth of vaccines and other 
medicines that required refrigeration.  Outraged, Kent Ford shouted at Benjamin C. 
Webb, the PDC relocation chief who was at the scene.  But the damage had been done.  
After loading the truck with their belongings, Ford drove away with a feeling of 
devastation and defeat.  Although the Panthers eventually began to operate the clinic at 
their new location, the loss of their previously existing offices and medical supplies made 
it difficult for them to rebuild and renovate the new clinic from scratch or operate at the 
level they had prior to eviction.
28
 
 Furthermore, after to losing their clinic in 1973, the FBI and the Portland police 
engaged in what can only be described as a covert war to subvert and destroy the Portland 
Black Panther Party during the 1970s.  On a national scale, the FBI, under the 
directorship of J. Edgar Hoover and his successors, sought to eradicate the BPP through a 
system of surveillance, infiltration, subversion, and cooptation known as the Counter 
Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO).  Hoover viewed the BPP and similar radical and 
New Left organizations as subversive threats to the United States' national security.  
According to Hoover, the BPP was "the most violence-prone of all the extremist groups," 
and they needed to be eliminated in order to protect the social and political stability of the 
United States.  Specifically concerned that BPP chapters were brainwashing and 
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indoctrinating young and poor blacks in their local communities, he described programs 
like the free children's breakfast and health clinics as the most dangerous and subversive 
element of the Panthers on American society.
29
  Even though the Portland BPP was small 
in comparison to other branches of the organization, the FBI targeted it along with all 
other chapters.  In a 2008 interview, Kent Ford noted that whenever the leadership of 
local chapters met one another, they always had bizarre experiences to share about the 
FBI.  "Each chapter in the United States . . . had one thing in common," Ford recalled, 
"we all had the same stories about the COINTELPRO operations."
30
  In the late 1970s, 
when many FBI documents and memos on COINTELPRO became public, Bill Keller of 
the Oregonian revealed the extent of the FBI's actions in Portland.  According to Keller, 
throughout 1970 and 1971, the FBI sent anonymous letters to doctors and dentists 
throughout Portland attempting to dissuade them from volunteering at or providing 
medical resources to the Panthers' clinics, much like the Portland police had done in 1969 
and 1970 with local businesses that had supported the breakfast program.  Likewise, they 
attempted to work with a few local doctors to convince the Multnomah County Medical 
Society to set up rival clinics in Albina to compete with the health and dental clinics, but 
these plans never developed or gained support.
31
 
 In addition to the FBI's efforts to subvert and co-opt the Portland Panthers' clinics, 
the FBI and Portland police kept detailed files and close surveillance on the Portland 
Panther leadership, most notably Kent Ford and Percy Hampton.  FBI agents and 
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investigators sat outside the homes of Panthers, harassed their friends, families, and 
employers, and infiltrated their meetings.  Even group members with no criminal history 
became the targets of surveillance.
32
  Percy Hampton, who along with his sister, Patty 
Hampton, was one of the Portland BPP's earliest and most involved members, stated that 
on multiple occasions two white men in suits and ties had come to the home of his 
mother and asked her, "Do you know that your children are involved in the Black Panther 
Party?  You need to protect them from this because they're headed in the wrong 
direction."  Furthermore, according to Hampton, after framing their argument against the 
Panthers in terms of the organization being a danger to her children, the officers then 
attempted to get whatever information about the Portland BPP that they could gather 
from his mother.
33
 
 In another instance, Oscar Johnson, who had a clean police record and served as 
assistant to the organization's administer of information, Floyd Cruze, recalled two 
members of the FBI coming to his place of work and trying to get him fired from his job.  
Then, one day, after returning home from work, he saw two white men in suits sitting in a 
car outside of his home.  Slightly annoyed, he approached the vehicle.  According to 
Johnson, "I knocked on the window and said, 'Hey, you guys want anything?'  And the 
guys just drove off. . . . I wasn't doing anything illegal; I just wanted to help my 
community."  They later approached him on several occasions and offered to take him to 
lunch, where they attempted to get information about the Portland BPP and offered him a 
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job as an inside informant.
34
  Ultimately, as Ford, Hampton, Johnson, and other members 
of the organization noted, the daily run-ins with the FBI and the police during the early 
1970s made it difficult to go about their busy schedules of running the breakfast program, 
selling newspapers, operating the clinics, and working at whatever jobs they had to earn 
enough money to get by financially.
35
 
 Meanwhile, at the same time as the Emanuel Hospital project and the FBI's 
COINTELPRO efforts of the early 1970s, the national Black Panther Party centered in 
Oakland was in the midst of infighting and decline.
36
  Even as early as 1971, BPP 
chapters across the country began experiencing a sharp drop off in membership numbers 
from the previous year, and chapters in New York City, New Orleans, Seattle, and a few 
other major cities seemingly disappeared overnight as the headquarters in Oakland turned 
their attention to local politics.  That same year, the Justice Department estimated that 
there were only 1,000 registered members of the Black Panther Party nationally, down 
from the roughly 2,000 to 5,000 members in the late 1960s.
37
  After being imprisoned for 
four years for his supposed involvement in the riots at the Democratic National 
Convention in Chicago during the summer of 1968, BPP co-founder Bobby Seale was 
released from prison in 1973.  That year, he launched an unsuccessful campaign for 
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Mayor of Oakland, only to have a major dispute with Huey Newton that resulted in a 
fight and Seale's resignation from the BPP.  Shortly thereafter, in 1974, Newton fled to 
Cuba following his release in a criminal case concerning the murder of a prostitute.  He 
did not return until 1977, when he was put on trial again for two counts of assault.  
Likewise, Eldridge Cleaver fled to Algeria to avoid criminal charges stemming from the 
assault of a police officer in 1968, but he returned in 1975 following a religious 
conversion and pled guilty to the charges against him.
38
  In Newton, Seale, and Cleaver's 
absence, Elaine Brown became the first woman chair of the BPP in 1973, and she 
switched the party's focus from national resistance to community development and local 
electoral politics in Oakland.  In doing so, Brown fundamentally helped shift the scope 
and national reach of the organization to focus more on local issues rather than a national 
agenda.
39
  As a result, many branches of the BPP, like the Portland Panthers, continued to 
persist, but they did so with diminishing influence and increasingly smaller numbers.  By 
1980, when the few remaining Portland BPP members officially disbanded their fledgling 
organization and closed their last remaining clinic, the national Black Panther Party was 
practically nonexistent.
40
 
 Following the failure to stop the expansion of Emanuel Hospital, the eviction and 
loss of the Fred Hampton Memorial Clinic, and the intensive efforts by the FBI and local 
law enforcement to crush the organization, the decline of the Portland Black Panther 
Party after 1973 was unavoidable.  In a city where the demographics had never favored 
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the emergence of a BPP chapter to begin with, the Portland BPP became increasingly 
irrelevant to the Albina district's voice in urban politics and city planning.  After 1973, 
the Portland Panther's visibility further declined as the local newspapers abruptly ceased 
all coverage of the organization due to lack of major news and public interest.
41
  
However, although their public presence disappeared rapidly, Ford and other Panthers 
continued to find ways to operate the free children's breakfast program and clinics, both 
of which ultimately transitioned to new leadership.  Local public schools became more 
involved with providing free breakfast programs to economically disadvantaged students, 
while the OHSU took up the mantle of the Panthers and continued providing free health 
and dental clinics to people without health insurance in Northeast Portland.
42
  Ultimately, 
Portland's small and relatively short-lived yet active Black Panther Party, which stood as 
a radical, forceful antithesis to the PDC's vision for Albina, slipped silently into 
irrelevance and obscurity. 
 
 In the end, it would seem that the efforts by the federal government, along with 
the city's own power structure, defeated the Black Panther Party in Portland.  Not only 
were the Portland Panthers unsuccessful in halting the expansion of Emanuel Hospital in 
the Eliot neighborhood, but that very same expansion project ultimately destroyed one of 
the Portland Panther's most valuable spaces: the Fred Hampton Memorial Health Clinic.  
Moreover, intensive efforts by the FBI and Portland police subverted the organization.  
Still, while the Portland BPP may have lost their battle with the FBI, the Portland police, 
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and the PDC, the war they fought and many of the ideas they stood for did not cease with 
their decline.  With the arrival of Charles Jordan as head of the Model Cities program, 
African Americans began to have a greater voice and involvement in city politics and 
urban planning than they had ever had before.  Even as the BPP's size and influence 
deteriorated sharply in Portland after 1973, a much more powerful alternative that 
appealed to many Portlanders was rising in its place.  Although the Panthers were gone, 
their vision of a community-led approach to politics, urban development, and social 
programs would sweep into every corner of the city by the mid-1970s, tear down the 
city's old political power structure, and usher in an entire new generation of political 
leadership that has defined Portland for decades. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
WINNING THE WAR? 
THE TRIUMPH OF COMMUNITY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF BLACK 
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN PORLTAND, 1970-1979 
 
 On the evening of Tuesday, May 23, 1972, Commissioner Neil Goldschmidt, a 
charming thirty-one year-old man with a bright, partially gap-toothed smile and slightly 
receding head of light curly hair became the 45th Mayor of Portland, the city's youngest 
mayor in more than one-hundred years, and the youngest mayor of a major US city at the 
time.  Capturing 57 percent of the vote in a field of fifteen candidates in the primary 
election, Goldschmidt's overwhelming majority clinched the election and ensured that a 
runoff election in November would not take place.
1
  Born and raised in Eugene, Oregon, 
Goldschmidt graduated from the University of Oregon with a degree in Political Science 
in 1963.  Shortly thereafter, he traveled to the South during the summer of 1964, where 
he volunteered to work as part of the Mississippi Freedom Project registering black 
voters.  After briefly returning to Oregon to recruit more students to assist in voter 
registration efforts, Goldschmidt enrolled at the University of California, Berkeley Law 
School.  Earning his degree in 1967, Goldschmidt worked as a legal aid until his election 
to Portland City Council at the age of thirty.
2
  A lifelong advocate of civil rights and 
community activism, Goldschmidt quickly emerged at the front of a growing generation 
                                                             
1 John Painter, Jr., "Goldschmidt takes top city post: New mayor tallies 57% of total vote," Oregonian, May 
24, 1972. 
 
2 Jewell Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 1851-2001 (Corvallis: Oregon State University 
Press, 2003), 397. 
108 
 
of new, younger political leadership in Portland.  During his almost seven-year tenure as 
Mayor of Portland between 1973 and 1979, Goldschmidt restructured the city 
government, specifically with regard to urban planning, transportation, and police, as he 
attempted to resolve the issues of neighborhood disinvestment and unrest that emerged 
from Portland's political leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 Combined with the previous emergence of black community leadership during 
Model Cities in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Goldschmidt's emphasis on opening 
avenues for community control over planning and development helped the African 
American community in Albina direct the future of their neighborhoods.  Furthermore, 
this period also witnessed the emergence of black electoral power on the state and local 
level as African Americans became state senators and city council members for the first 
time in Portland's history.  Although political leaders and community activists in the 
1970s attempted to address the same legacies of social, political, economic, and spatial 
discrimination that organizations like the Black Panther Party had sought to improve, a 
decade of opportunities and advancements for some blacks did not easily wash away the 
stain of the long history of inequity and exclusion.  For as many successes as African 
Americans achieved under Neil Goldschmidt's mayorship, issues of socioeconomic 
inequality, education, and misguided planning projects—even those carried out under 
black leadership—continued to plague the black community in Northeast Portland. 
 
Neil Goldschmidt and the Triumph of Community Politics 
 Beginning with the Albina district of Northeast Portland during the early Model 
Cities period of the mid-to-late 1960s, neighborhood activist organizations began to 
109 
 
spring up all over the city by the early 1970s to challenge what historian Carl Abbott 
described as the PDC's "ingrained disdain of accountability to the majority of citizens."
3
  
As a direct reaction to the Model Cities program and local Albina residents' success in 
gaining control over the direction of that program, neighborhood organizations emerged 
quickly in Southeast and Northwest Portland by 1969 in response to proposed urban 
renewal and freeway construction plans by the PDC.
4
  Capitalizing off this rapidly 
expanding neighborhood movement, Neil Goldschmidt, a former community organizer 
himself, was able to build a coalition of neighborhood activists throughout the city.  
Under the leadership of Goldschmidt, at first as a city commissioner and later as mayor, 
Portland entered a new era of neighborhood-led urban planning that focused on 
restructuring the city government's urban planning hierarchy, developing solutions to the 
city's growing transportation concerns, and reorganizing the City's Police Department. 
 A former lawyer, advocate for youth programs, and head of the Albina Legal Aid 
office specializing in employment and housing discrimination cases, Goldschmidt was 
first overwhelmingly elected to the Portland City Council in 1970, where he served as a 
commissioner from 1971 to 1973.  Prior to his arrival, older politicians and elite members 
of Portland's business community had dominated the city council, which had continued to 
operate as a council of commissioners selected under an at-large voting process since the 
early 1900s.  After joining the council on January 1, 1971, Goldschmidt became the 
youngest person ever to serve as a city commissioner, and boldly told members of the 
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media, "I'm not cut from the same mold as some members of the council 10 years ago."
5
  
During his tenure on the council, Goldschmidt became a champion of neighborhood 
activists and an opponent of the PDC's negligent policies.  Between 1971 and 1972, 
Goldschmidt became to only council member to vote against large, community opposed 
urban renewal projects south of downtown, in Southeast Portland along the Willamette 
River, as well as in the Buckman and Lair Hill neighborhoods.
6
  With his reputation as 
the voice of community organizations, Goldschmidt pushed for greater influence within 
the City of Portland's urban planning power structure.  In February 1972, after careful 
lobbying, Goldschmidt successfully convinced Mayor Schrunk to move the Model Cities 
program under his jurisdiction of human resources and antipoverty programs in order to 
improve coordination, program management, and use of funds.
7
   
 Furthermore, on March 5, two weeks of receiving control over Model Cities, 
Goldschmidt announced his candidacy for Mayor of Portland in front of a crowd of more 
than 800 supporters at the Westminster Presbyterian Church.  Promising that he was 
willing to "speak out, to treat no community problem as too small or insignificant to 
dignify a personal response, to help citizens to help me do the job they want done," 
Goldschmidt immediately struck a chord with neighborhood activists and who had 
become increasingly disillusioned with city politics and the PDC's urban planning.
8
  
Shortly thereafter, Mayor Schrunk announced that, due to declining health, he would 
retire at the end of the year rather than seek an unprecedented fifth term as Portland's 
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mayor.  As a result, Portlanders would undoubtedly have to elect their first new mayor 
since 1956.  The election of a new mayor also meant the possibility of a new vision for 
urban planning.  The following month, after fifteen other Portlanders declared their 
candidacy, Schrunk endorsed sixty-one year-old retired industrialist and favorite of 
Portland's business community, R.W. DeWesse, to be his successor.
9
  Goldschmidt, 
however, appealed to a rapidly emerging electorate of civic activists.  On Sunday, May 7, 
the Oregonian publicly endorsed Goldschmidt for mayor, stating that he was 
"understanding and empathetic with the problems of youth, the poor, [and] the minorities, 
among whom he worked for several years."  Moreover, joining with the growing chorus 
of civic activists throughout Portland, especially in Albina, the newspapers' editors noted 
his support among local inner-city communities, stating, "Upgrading the neighborhoods 
and removal of the barriers between people and their governments have priority in 
Goldschmidt's plans—and he is a planner, both for his city and his future."10 
 Despite spending more money than any other candidate, having the support of 
Portland's business community, and being endorsed by Mayor Schrunk, R.W. DeWesse 
only managed to garner roughly one-third of the total votes, while Neil Goldschmidt rode 
his community activist coalition to a comfortable electoral victory and the highest 
position of power in the city.
11
  In addition to winning 460 of the city's 500 precincts, 
Goldschmidt won a near-unanimous victory in downtown and all of the surrounding 
neighborhoods, including Albina and greater Northeast Portland.
12
  With this strong 
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mandate among core residents of the city, Goldschmidt embarked on an almost decade-
long process of revolutionizing Portland's urban planning power structure and city 
governance. 
 During his first term as mayor, Goldschmidt focused his attention on a number of 
issues confronting the future of the city, but three areas in particular stand out.  First, and 
most important, Goldschmidt set about reforming the City's high-minded though often 
misguided urban planning apparatus that had almost entirely excluded the voices of 
Portland's residents.  In particular, he sought a new urban planning hierarchy that would 
focus on downtown revitalization and start at the grassroots with neighborhood 
organizations.  Second, closely related to his vision for urban planning and the revival of 
downtown, Goldschmidt addressed Portland's infrastructure and transportation needs in 
an effort to create a city that was centered less on automobiles and suburbs and more on 
public transportation and the city's core.  When combined, these two goals helped initiate 
several of the most successful community revolts against proposed freeway constructions 
anywhere in the country.  Finally, addressing a specific concern among many 
neighborhoods like Albina, he made changes within the Portland Police Department to 
make the organization more accountable to the public and work more closely with local 
communities. 
 The primary focus of Goldschmidt's first term as Mayor of Portland was 
reconfiguring the city government's urban planning structure.  After Mayor Schrunk's 
assumption of power in the mid-1950s, the PDC eclipsed other disparate agencies like 
HAP, the Planning Commission, and the Planning Bureau.  In consolidating power, the 
PDC had essentially dominated the direction and focus of all urban planning in Portland 
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for nearly a decade and a half.  However, immediately after becoming mayor, 
Goldschmidt reorganized the council's control over planning bureaus and requested the 
resignation of the leadership of the PDC, HAP, and Planning Commission.
13
  Then, 
following a weekend retreat with city council members and local planners in April 1973, 
Goldschmidt laid out a working proposal for a new Office of Planning and Development 
(OPD) to oversee all other branches of urban planning.
14
  The OPD, an umbrella agency 
that Goldschmidt had supported since he was a commissioner, consolidated and 
reapportioned power among all of the city's previous existing planning and development 
branches and lessened the PDC's previous unchecked power.  All of these agencies had to 
have their planning and development plans reviewed and approved by the OPD, which 
was given the task of making sure plans were compatible with local neighborhood 
organizations as well as general citywide plans.  In addition to creating the OPD, 
Goldschmidt reorganized the Planning Commission into a reorganized Bureau of 
Planning with the task of creating urban development plans that the PDC would then 
carry out.  Goldschmidt also carefully stacked both the OPD and Planning Bureau's 
leadership with political allies and neighborhood activists that had propelled him into 
office, thereby effectively limiting the PDC's power from above and below.
15
 
 Closely connected to issues of urban planning and citizen participation, the 
second major area of focus of Goldschmidt's plans for reshaping Portland involved 
changes to the city's infrastructure and public transportation.  Drawing on concerns over 
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increased traffic, air pollution, suburban sprawl, and neighborhood destruction during 
freeway construction, Goldschmidt favored improving and expanding public 
transportation in order to preserve neighborhoods while also attracting commerce 
downtown.  In theory, he believed preventing the expansion of freeways would slow the 
development of Portland suburbs by inflating housing prices and increase the necessity of 
making the city's core livable.
16
  In a June 1973 interview on NBC's Meet the Press with 
mayors attending the US Conference of Mayors as well as panelists from national 
newspapers, Goldschmidt explained his efforts to revive inner city housing, businesses, 
and public transportation as well as his unwillingness to expand freeways and the 
suburbs.  Attacking Goldschmidt's vision for a less automobile-centered future for 
Portland, conservative columnist Robert Novak of the Chicago Sun-Times inquired, "Has 
there been the experience that if you don't build new freeways, the old freeways just get 
more and more crowded and you can't force the people off the freeways by not building 
them?"  "Yes," Goldschmidt responded, "they will get crowded, our current freeway 
system, if we don't build new ones, unless we develop an incentive for people to be on 
another system and to make it convenient to do so."
17
  As incentives, Goldschmidt sought 
more affordable public transportation, including a fare-free zone downtown for Portland's 
Tri-Met bus system and an expansion of service routes.  Moreover, he proposed a gas tax 
as a source of state revenue as well as a disincentive for using automobiles.
18
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 Though frequently challenged by his conservative rivals on the city council, 
particularly Commissioner Francis Ivancie, Goldschmidt's restructuring of the city's 
urban planning apparatus to include community input as well as his efforts to take 
infrastructure and transportation in a radically new direction led to three of the most 
significant and successful citizen movements in the United States by the mid-1970s.  
First, in 1968, the City of Portland created the Southeast Uplift program, which local 
community members of southeast neighborhoods initially proposed based on some of the 
perceived early success of the Model Cities program in Albina.  After gaining approval 
from the city council, however, the PDC once again became the lead planning and policy 
development branch of the program.  Following the lead of black citizens in Northeast 
Portland, the predominately-white population in Southeast Portland organized quickly 
and applied pressure on the city government and the PDC during the early months of the 
program to help direct future projects.
19
  In particular, the planned construction of the Mt. 
Hood Freeway through Southeast Portland over the objections of local residents triggered 
an angry backlash in the early 1970s.  The proposed five-mile route, which the state and 
the PDC initiated plans for in 1955, would have destroyed more than 1700 homes and 
apartments, affecting six distinct neighborhoods.
20
  Responding to the desires of the 
southeastern neighborhoods, Goldschmidt and the city council voted four-to-one to 
abandon the proposed highway in 1974.  Instead, the council diverted previously 
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earmarked funds for the project toward public transportation and the installation of a 
mass transit light rail line, known as MAX, along the preexisting I-84 route.
21
 
 At the same time that citizens in Southeast Portland were challenging the Mt. 
Hood Freeway, citizens of Northwest Portland were locked in a similar struggle over the 
construction of a new Interstate route, I-505.  Local organizers in the Northwest District 
Association (NWDA), formed by the PDC in May 1969, quickly followed the lead of 
Model Cities and Southeast Uplift organizers, took control of the organization, and spent 
much of their first two years attempting to alter the proposed route along lines that best 
suited local neighborhoods.  However, following a suspect and misleading environmental 
impact study by the state highway department, the NWDA and other groups in Northwest 
Portland sued to stop construction of the interstate route in 1971.  After a drawn out 
litigation process, the city council abandoned the proposed I-505 route in May 1974, 
much as they had with the Mt. Hood Freeway, and similarly shifted the funds toward 
public transportation.
22
 
 Finally, also in 1974, the push towards the a revitalization of Portland's core along 
with the creation of a less automobile-centric city culminated in the dismantling of 
Harbor Drive along the west side of the Willamette River near downtown to construct a 
waterfront park.  Under the leadership of the mayor and Governor Tom McCall, who 
shared much of Goldschmidt's visions for downtown revitalization and citizen 
participation, the state reclaimed the land after more than a century of debate over proper 
access and ownership.  Like the rejection of the Mt. Hood Freeway and I-505, the 
destruction or Harbor Drive and the creation of Tom McCall Waterfront Park further 
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emphasized Goldschmidt's commitment to making a livable inner city, stopping suburban 
sprawl, and finding new opportunities to expand public transportation.  In response to this 
decision, in 1975—well before the opening of the first portion of the park in 1978—the 
Environmental Protection Agency labeled Portland, perhaps a bit prematurely, as the 
"most livable" city in America.  In turn, this sentiment began to build Portland's modern 
reputation as a city with commitments to community activism, public transportation, and 
environmental protection.
23
 
 In addition to addressing issues of urban planning, community development, and 
transportation, Goldschmidt focused on a third issue that had long been important to 
many African American activists, including the Portland Black Panther Party, during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s: the Portland Police Department.  Recognizing the legacy of 
confrontations between white police officers and young African Americans in Portland 
and other major US cities throughout the late 1960s, he placed a greater emphasis on 
addressing social conditions in communities with higher crime rates rather than funneling 
more money into an inefficient centralized police system.  After receiving control of 
Model Cities as commissioner in 1972, Goldschmidt received criticisms from HUD over 
the ineffectiveness of the program's Police Community Relations branch.  While he 
defended the overall work of the Model Cities program, Goldschmidt recognized 
shortcomings within the program and the Portland Police Department in particular.
24
  
Shortly thereafter, the mayor-elect announced intentions to make changes within the 
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department.  In his first year as mayor, he started at the very top with the resignation of 
Police Chief Donald McNamara in August 1973.  Following a major reorganization that 
year, including the dissolution of the Police Community Relations unit in favor of a 
decentralized self-investigation system that responded to local residents, Goldschmidt 
hoped that the newly structured department would reduce crime and work closely with 
the needs of neighborhoods.
25
  Although his approach drew criticisms from within the 
police department, Bruce Baker, Goldschmidt's newly appointed chief of police, noted 
that crime progressively decreased throughout the mid-1970s.  Between 1974 and 1975 
alone, robbery and burglary rates dipped four percent, while automobile theft dropped off 
by more than ten percent.
26
  
 In the same 1973 interview on Meet the Press where he challenged Goldschmidt's 
transportation policy, Robert Novak also testily commented on Goldschmidt's stance on 
police.  "You not only don't like freeways," Novak snidely remarked, "you don't like too 
many policemen either. . . . How do you account for your theory that you are going to 
fight crime by not adding policemen?"  In response, Goldschmidt emphasized that his 
platform was not "against policemen," noted that data collected by the city showed that 
60 percent of burglaries in Portland were committed by individuals under the age of 
eighteen, and suggested that funds spent on expanding police might be put to better use in 
education or delinquency prevention programs.
27
  Ignoring Goldschmidt's response, 
Novak shifted his tactic, bluntly stating, "Mayor Goldschmidt, you have a very, very 
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small black population in Portland.  Would you perhaps suggest that in cities where there 
are racial tensions that your ideas about the police not being all that helpful in combating 
crime might not be as applicable?"  Goldschmidt paused and was momentarily surprised 
that Novak had boldly broken all guise of subtly coding racialized language on the issue 
of law and order.  "I don't think it is a racial issue," Goldschmidt replied coolly; "I feel 
very strongly that the City of Portland shouldn't be in a position of following the mistakes 
that other communities have made.  I think we can learn some lessons in other 
communities, and I think we can—by the work we are trying to do now—help some other 
communities as well."
28
  Sensing Novak was about to launch into a lengthy debate with 
Goldschmidt, moderator Bill Monroe of NBC turned the focus to another panelist and 
mayor, but the exchange reflected Goldschmidt's firm commitment to creating a social 
environment and police force that would foster a healthier relationship between city 
government and local communities. 
 Throughout his first term as Mayor of Portland, Goldschmidt also took direct 
action to root out corruption within the police force.  Following a series of thefts by a 
reservist police officer, James Wesley Liming, in 1975, Goldschmidt criticized the police 
for lack of supervision, pushed for greater cooperation between officers, and called for 
less "isolation on the beat."  Moreover, when the subsequent investigation revealed that a 
number of police had been receiving gifts from Liming and lying to investigators, 
Goldschmidt personally dismissed the officers from the police force.
29
  Ultimately, 
Goldschmidt was uncompromising in his belief that an effective Portland Police 
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Department was only useful in as much as it was trusted by and honest with the 
communities it sought to serve and protect. 
 By the end of his first term in 1976, Goldschmidt continued to hold the support 
neighborhood activists, and his successful efforts to revitalize downtown housing and 
commerce had won him favor among wealthier, more conservative neighborhoods that 
had opposed him in 1972.  As a result, when Commissioner Francis Ivancie, a 
conservative with the support of the police unions, some local businesses, and former 
allies of Terry Schrunk, challenged him for mayor in the 1976 election, Goldschmidt 
easily won the majority of voters in the May primary.  Once again avoiding a general 
election runoff in November, Goldschmidt was elected to a second term with a strong 
public consensus.
30
  Ivancie, the former protégé of Mayor Schrunk and planning 
commissioner on the city council from 1967 to 1972, had run a confident campaign on a 
platform that assumed most Portlanders were not pleased with Goldschmidt's radical 
restructuring of Portland politics.  His resounding defeat sent a signal to other critics that 
Goldschmidt's vision for the city's future, not the old PDC-centered approach, had broad 
public support.  With the backing of neighborhood organizations and a strong mandate to 
pursue his transformative approach to city governance, Goldschmidt continued his 
community-centered, restructured approach to urban planning throughout the late 1970s 
until his departure in 1979.
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African Americans and Portland Politics in the 1970s 
 During the period of Goldschmidt's leadership throughout the 1970s, African 
Americans in Portland made their greatest gains in the field of politics, urban planning, 
and community development during the twentieth century.  A longtime advocate of civil 
rights, Mayor Goldschmidt was a vocal proponent for addressing the issues of Portland's 
black community.  "We have serious racial problems in Portland," Goldschmidt told 
Early Deane of the Oregonian.  "There are people who suffer from discrimination all the 
time.  It's contaminating, contagious.  In the city government, we must learn to be the 
peace-making faction."
31
  As a result, Goldschmidt, more than any of Portland's mayors 
before or since, did more to encourage and increase the presence of African Americans in 
city politics and urban planning.  In particular, the ascendance of Charles Jordan, 
Executive Director of Model Cities, to the city council marked a significant turning point 
for black political representation.  However, while blacks genuinely found a growing 
voice within city politics for the first time, a decade of increased representation and 
community involvement did not and could not erase the legacy of discrimination and 
spatial exclusion. 
 Although widely supported by neighborhood organizations throughout Portland, 
including Albina, many black leaders, particularly in the PMSC, were still initially 
hesitant or resistant to trust Goldschmidt and his proposed plans.  Immediately after being 
given control of Model Cities in 1972, Commissioner Goldschmidt proposed 
consolidating organizations like the Model Cities CPB and the PMSC into a single 
Bureau of Human Resources.  Though committed to promoting antipoverty programs and 
a community-centered focus to urban planning, he argued for a centralized, streamlined 
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approach under a new bureau to improve efficiency.  Cleveland Gilcrease, Executive 
Director of the PMSC, viciously attacked the proposal as an attempt to strip the PMSC of 
its power, emasculate the poor, and institutionalize community action rather than 
allowing for the development of grassroots movements.  While a portion of the black 
community in Albina agreed with Gilcrease, others were more receptive.  After some 
initial concerns and discussions with the mayor-elect, Charles Jordan along with the 
leadership of the Model Cities CPB came out in support of the new bureau and 
consolidation by late August.  Still concerned with the allocation of poverty funds as well 
as the eventual execution and leadership of the Bureau of Human Resources, Jordan and 
community leaders in Model Cities believed the new bureau would give them a 
permanent voice within the city's power structure.
32
 
 Likewise, while Portland's neighborhood activists frequently praised 
Goldschmidt's policies on police, the black community in Albina also expressed concerns 
with new policies and a perceived lack of action in some cases.  For example, during the 
1976 campaign, Goldschmidt proposed easing regulations on shotguns for the police 
department, a move that drew sharp criticisms from both African Americans concerned 
with the long history of police brutality and police seeking even greater firearm 
deregulations.
33
  Seizing on an opportunity to divide Goldschmidt from African 
American supporters in Albina, far left mayoral candidate Cliff Walker further 
capitalized on the issue to accuse Goldschmidt of not investigating the deaths of five 
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African Americans during a police altercation a few months prior.
34
  Nevertheless, the 
majority of the black population in Albina still voted overwhelmingly to reelect 
Goldschmidt in the 1976 primary, namely because of his commitment to giving African 
Americans a voice in Portland's political arena. 
 Despite reservations and concerns held by many African Americans, Mayor 
Goldschmidt took major steps to increase the presence of Portland's black community in 
politics.  In a move that would have opened up the first opportunity to strengthen the 
political power of the Albina district, he supported revising the city charter and the 
makeup of the city council to be more representative of local neighborhoods.  Under a 
plan proposed in 1973, Goldschmidt advocated a restructuring of the charter that had 
existed since 1903 by offering a merger between the City of Portland and the greater 
surrounding area of Multnomah County.
35
  Had the consolidation charter passed, it would 
have significantly strengthened the power of the mayor.  Moreover, replacing the entirely 
at-large election of city council members, a new eleven-member council would have been 
established, with eight of the members elected by local districts and three other 
commissioners elected at-large.  For the first time in the history of Portland, African 
Americans had a significant chance of having a consistent voice on the city council 
through district elections.  However, through the combined opposition of conservative 
commissioners Ivancie and Mildred Schwab, businesses and the Chamber of Commerce, 
as well as police and fire unions—all of whom portrayed the move as a power grab by the 
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new mayor—the proposed Portland-Multnomah County consolidation charter failed in 
the 1974 primary election by a margin of 71 percent to 29 percent.
36
 
 While the defeat of the consolidation charter initially dashed the hopes of blacks 
in Albina, that election year still proved to be pivotal for the emergence of elected 
African American leadership in Portland and the state of Oregon.  Earlier that year, 
Portland City Council member Lloyd Anderson announced his resignation.  In his place, 
Goldschmidt endorsed Charles Jordan to fill the vacancy on the council.  In late 1973, 
shortly before recommending him to serve as commissioner, Goldschmidt had also 
tapped Jordan to head the City's new Bureau of Human Resources, a move that was 
widely supported among neighborhood activists who admired Jordan's work with Model 
Cities.  By Model Cities' final year in 1974, when Goldschmidt incorporated it into his 
larger vision for community-led planning under the new Bureau of Human Resources, 
Jordan had successfully managed to make the program into a receptive and useful 
institution for Albina residents.  In Model Cities' final yearly action plan for 1973-1974, 
the report noted, "Political consciousness among . . . residents is at a higher level than 
ever before, as demonstrated by increased voter registration and participation in local 
public affairs."  Moreover, the report emphasized that more than 30 percent of the 
Albina's black population had attended or participated in Model Cities organizational 
meetings, working committees, or the CPB over the previous years.
37
 
 Nevertheless, the final Model Cities action plan also outlined concerning social 
and economic trends with regard to Albina's commercial potential as well as black 
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employment and education.  According to the report, the continued destruction and 
rebuilding of black business centers had left a harsh legacy of economic inequity.  
Population decline, insufficient purchasing power of local residents, physical decay of the 
region, lack of off-street parking, poor street layouts, mixed-use areas of industrial and 
residential, and "visual clutter" in the form of trash and worn out signs all combined, the 
report suggested, to limit the potential for increased commercial success within various 
Albina neighborhoods.  Likewise, the action plan noted a surprising decline in black 
education levels and the number of black teachers in public schools.  Inversely, 
residential segregation continued to shift the demographics of local schools towards 
higher black populations.  For example, seven out of eight elementary schools in the 
region had more than 50 percent black enrollment during the 1972-1973 school year 
compared to only five schools during the 1966-1967 year.  Two of those schools, Boise 
and Humboldt, still had roughly 90 percent black enrollment.  Moreover, black teachers 
represented more than one-fifth of the faculty in only three schools of these schools, and 
no school's faculty was more than one-quarter black.  Finally, the action plan also noted 
that unemployment and poverty rates for blacks were two times higher than for whites 
living in the same area.  As a result, it is not surprising that 45.7 percent of residents 
within the Model Cities boundaries felt that "their problems are not understood" by the 
Portland City Council.
38
 
 Despite continuing problems of education and employment, as well as popular 
opinions that the Portland City Council still did not understand Albina's problems, Jordan 
remained very popular among Albina's residents and other community activists, leading 
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to his ten-year role as a Portland City Council commissioner.  After receiving approval 
from the other commissioners in the spring of 1974, Jordan became the first African 
American to serve on the city council.  A few months later, Jordan came in first place 
with 35 percent of the vote in the May primary and later won the runoff election 
November to become the first African American ever elected to the city council by the 
people of Portland.  In a surprising move, Goldschmidt quickly transferred two important 
bureaus under the direction of Commissioner Jordan.  First, Goldschmidt appointed 
Jordan to the position of police commissioner on the council, giving him authority over 
all of the police departments in the city.  For the first time in Portland's history, an 
African American was in charge of the very police that had, only a few years prior, 
helped instigate the Albina riots of 1967 and 1969.  Although instances of racial profiling 
and discrimination continued in Northeast Portland under Jordan's leadership, the 
appointment of a black commissioner marked an important starting point for a more 
representative and responsive police force.  Early on in Jordan's tenure as commissioner, 
the Portland Police hired more black police officers, including Carmen Sylvester, the 
city's first African American woman police officer.
39
 
 In addition to his role as police commissioner, Goldschmidt also assigned Jordan 
to head the newly created Office of Neighborhood Associations (ONA).  Within 
Goldschmidt's OPD-centered urban planning and development structure, the ONA acted 
as an arm of the Planning Commission.  Specifically, the ONA assisted the Planning 
Commission by working with neighborhood activists and organizations, like the CPB in 
Albina, the NWDA, and similar groups in throughout Portland, to facilitate localized 
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planning and input.  Between 1974 and the end of 1979, the number of neighborhood 
associations skyrocketed from 30, most of which had been formed within the previous 
five years, to more than 60.  Under Jordan's guidance and oversight, the ONA worked 
with all of these organizations throughout the 1970s to help construct, review, and amend 
projects and polices developed by the Planning Commission.
40
 
 Although Jordan played an integral role in the creation of Goldschmidt's new 
urban planning structure and neighborhood outreach, the two did not always get along.  
Between 1976 and 1978, Jordan became increasingly frustrated with the mayor's 
selections for members of the PDC.  On January 12, 1978, after Goldschmidt appointed 
Jerry Jones to the PDC's redevelopment and planning agency board, Jordan publicly 
lambasted the decision.  According to Jordan, for nearly three years Goldschmidt ignored 
all of his proposed PDC candidates and never placed a resident of Northeast Portland on 
the commission.  "There are a lot of people being relocated from that area," Jordan 
contended, "and we need someone on the Portland Development Commission who is 
sensitive to that issue."  However, Goldschmidt retorted that it would have been 
impossible to have every neighborhood represented on the PDC.
41
  Consequently, 
although Goldschmidt had taken major steps to increase the political voice of Portland's 
various neighborhoods, the residents of Albina—apart from Jordan—still lacked 
representation within the PDC and the higher echelons of urban planning. 
 Charles Jordan's service on the Portland City Council between 1974 and 1984, 
when he left Portland to administer public parks in Austin, Texas, was not the only major 
step forward for increasing a black voice in city and state electoral politics.  Reminiscent 
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of the influential and politically active couple E.D. Cannady and Beatrice Morrow 
Cannady in the 1920s and 1930s, Bill and Gladys McCoy also climbed into positions of 
state and local political leadership.  In 1968, McCoy launched an unsuccessful bid for 
city council in Portland.  That year, Goldschmidt entered the realm of Portland politics as 
a campaign aide to McCoy, and the experience helped build the logistical foundation and 
networking for Goldschmidt's own run for city council in 1970.
42
  In 1974, the same year 
that Jordan became Commissioner, McCoy became the first African American ever 
elected to the Oregon State Senate after winning the election to represent the legislative 
seat for North and Northeast Portland.  Serving in that position from 1974 until his death 
in 1996, Bill McCoy pushed the state finally to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment as his 
first symbolic legislative act, became a major advocate for senior citizens and individuals 
with disabilities, and was overwhelmingly re-elected to the position for more than twenty 
years.
43
  Gladys McCoy became equally prominent within Oregon politics.  In 1970, 
Gladys McCoy was elected to serve on the Portland School Board, a position that she 
held until 1979, when she became the first African American elected to the Multnomah 
County Board of Commissioners.  Seven years later, in 1986, voters elected her to chair 
the council, where she remained until her death in 1993.
44
 
 Despite a small but emerging visibility in state and local politics, as well as a 
growing voice in local planning policies, this newfound influence had both positive and 
negative results on the development of the black community in Albina.  By the mid-
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1970s, the PDC abandoned much of its proposed expansion of Emmanuel Hospital due to 
the loss of federal funds, but only after the city demolished significant portions of homes 
and businesses to the south and east of the hospital.  Eventually, the city replaced the 
areas with public parks, but for many locals the razing of the center of black business 
along Russell and Union marked a devastating turning point for the economic future of 
the African American community in Albina.
45
  In order to address the decline of black-
owned businesses, local residents and the city government during the final year of Model 
Cities created and implemented the Union Avenue Redevelopment Plan to improve the 
neighborhood and attract business.  However, the project resulted in unexpected and 
further damaging changes.  Part of the redevelopment involved the construction of a 
landscaped meridian strip down the center of Union Avenue to decrease traffic accidents, 
but its construction removed on-street parking and had the unintended deleterious effect 
of further discouraging the patronization of local businesses.
46
  As a result, even under 
the guidance of black community leaders, revitalization projects produced unforeseen 
negative results.  Still, at the very least, African Americans could now take partial 
responsibility for both the failures and successes of their attempts to change their 
surrounding urban space.  
 Ultimately, the black freedom struggle in Portland during the 1970s made major 
progress with regard to political representation and involvement in urban planning; 
however, political freedom and inclusion did not necessarily translate into immediate 
success.  While the rise of individuals like Charles Jordan, Bill McCoy, and Gladys 
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McCoy marked an important turning point, their political successes were not 
representative of socioeconomic conditions of the broader black community in Northeast 
Portland.  Goldschmidt, both supported yet partially distrusted by African Americans in 
Portland, was only successful as far as he was able to bring community movements into 
the mainstream of city politics.  He did not resolve the legacy of discrimination and 
exclusion by any means, but his vision for the future of Portland politics opened a brief 
window for genuine progress towards racial justice. 
 Neil Goldschmidt's revolutionary tenure as Mayor of Portland came to an abrupt 
end in August 1979, when he resigned to serve as Secretary of Transportation for 
President Jimmy Carter.  Following his departure, a month-long power struggle ensued 
among city council members.  Francis Ivancie, who had aspired to the office since the 
departure of Terry Schrunk, had the backing of fellow conservative councilmember 
Mildred Schwab.  On the other side, Connie McCready, a close ally of Goldschmidt, 
supported Charles Jordan.  Deadlocked two-to-two for more than a month, Schwab 
proposed a compromise candidate: Jordan's city council predecessor, Lloyd Anderson.  
Jordan and McCready seemed receptive to the idea; however, before meeting with 
Anderson, Ivancie pulled a clever maneuver and chose instead to back his liberal political 
rival on the council, Connie McCready, as mayor.  Jordan immediately put his support 
behind her and, with support from Jordan, Ivancie, and herself, Connie McCready 
became the 46th Mayor of Portland.
47
  However, the move was little more than a political 
ruse.  Forced to choose between Anderson and McCready, Ivancie believed that 
Anderson was far too popular to defeat in 1980 and thought that McCready would be less 
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well liked in an election.  His gamble paid off.  Though appealing to the same groups as 
Goldschmidt, McCready lacked the popularity and charisma of her predecessor.  
Combined with the decline of Portland's decade-long economic boom in late 1979 and 
early 1980, Ivancie was able to consolidate support from local business leaders and 
working-class whites to defeat McCready in the May primary of 1980.
48
 
 Nevertheless, the citywide neighborhood movement that began with the CPB 
wresting control of the Model Cities program from the PDC in the late 1960s brought 
together a brief but powerful coalition of neighborhood organizations in the 1970s.  
During Goldschmidt's two terms as mayor, Portland's city government, urban planning 
and transportation structure, and police force changed dramatically.  While his reforms 
were far from what radically transformative organizations like those that the Portland 
Black Panther Party's had envisioned, Goldschmidt's political revolution in Portland 
during the 1970s nevertheless aimed to address the concerns over neighborhood control, 
community uplift,  and issues of poverty, discrimination, and spatial restrictions.  
Goldschmidt, a lifelong civil rights advocate, was able to draw on the power of 
neighborhood groups to reform the city's politics and urban planning apparatus.  
However, while it is true that neither Goldschmidt nor the citizens of Portland created 
this community activist movement out of thin air, African Americans' participation 
Model Cities during the mid-to-late 1960s triggered the growing national movement on a 
local level early on and found a receptive and quickly changing political environment in 
Portland.  As a result, by the close of the 1970s, the City of Portland had done much to 
address the legacy of political and spatial exclusion as well as racial discrimination that 
had plagued the city's power structure throughout the twentieth century.  Still, this brief 
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moment of progress was neither permanent nor universal among Portland's black 
population as the decades since the triumph of community activism and the ascendancy 
of Neil Goldschmidt continued to reveal the lasting socioeconomic legacy of 
discrimination and exclusion.
133 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION: 
LEGACIES OF THE PORTLAND PANTHERS 
 
 In November 2003, Judge Robert E. Jones, the same judge Kent Ford had stood 
before on several occasions during the 1960s and 1970s, sentenced Patrice Lumumba 
Ford, Kent's son, to eighteen years in a maximum-security federal prison.  The sentence 
was the result of an investigation prompted by the United States' rapidly expanding 
surveillance and counterterrorism powers under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.  
Lumumba, a Muslim convert named after the famous Congolese independence leader 
during the 1950s, stood accused of planning to travel to Afghanistan and fight alongside 
the Taliban against US soldiers.  Arrested as a part of a series of raids across the United 
States in Detroit, Seattle, Portland, and New York on October 4, 2002, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft appeared before the nation on television and described the raids as "a 
defining day in America's war against terrorism."
1
  Along with six other American 
Muslims referred to by the media as the "Portland Seven," Lumumba claimed that he and 
the others he knew had only planned to travel to China and then Pakistan to assist in the 
refugee crisis coming out of Afghanistan.  Never publicly admitting to any wrongdoing, 
one-by-one the seven men agreed to deals that gave them prison sentences ranging from 
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eight to eighteen years rather than going to trial and risking life sentences.  Lumumba, the 
last to compromise, received the most severe sentence.
2
 
 Since Lumumba's sentencing, Kent Ford has committed his life to fighting for his 
son's freedom.  In November 2004, Ford distributed hundreds of "Free Lumumba" 
leaflets at a major Eid al-fitr festival, the celebration of the end of Ramadan, at Memorial 
Coliseum.  Although not a Muslim, he moved among a crowd of more than 3,000 
members of Portland's Islamic community and attempted to raise awareness about his 
son's imprisonment.  "It's the only thing I know how to do," Ford told freelance reporter 
Martha Gies, "the struggle's the only thing I ever did know."  For his actions, in an 
overwhelming sardonic punishment given the place's history, police served Kent Ford 
with a citation that banned him from the premises for 90 days.
3
 
 The investigation, arrest, and sentencing of Patrice Lumumba Ford reinforces the 
legacy of Portland's long and continued history of discrimination, political and 
socioeconomic inequalities, and distrust between, on the one hand, the power of the 
federal, state, and city government and, on the other hand, what remains of Northeast 
Portland's black community today.  Since the 1980s, socioeconomic and political 
opportunities for the African American community in Albina have not made as many 
strides as neighborhood organizers in the 1970s had hoped.  In fact, the last three decades 
witnessed a continuation of neglect and disinvestment that further eroded the basis of the 
community and left a legacy of bitterness and poverty among many of the city's African 
Americans.  Although the 1970s brought political advancements as well as increased 
homeownership and economic improvement for some blacks, financial disinvestment in 
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the area under the mayorship of Francis Ivancie brought those gains to a halt.  By the 
1980s, when the last remnants of the Portland BPP's social programs ended, economic 
stagnation, declining population and home prices, the introduction of crack cocaine, and 
gang warfare combined to wreck havoc on the black community and the Albina District.  
By 1990, the black population of Albina dropped from 49 percent to 38 percent over the 
course of a decade.  Following new city-led revitalization efforts in the early 1990s, 
however, property values and demographics in Albina began to shift dramatically.  
Reclamation, revitalization, and gentrification increased white homeownership and led to 
a gradual and ongoing black exodus from Albina and even Portland itself.  In 2000, less 
than one-third of the city's total black population lives in Albina, and blacks now 
represent a smaller proportion of the city's population than whites, Latinos, and Asian 
Americans.  Furthermore, over the past decade, for the first time since the ghettoization 
of Albina, none of the district's neighborhoods contains a majority of nonwhite residents 
yet racially segregated schools in the area remain a major concern.
4
  As a result, this 
modern process of gentrification and revitalization has come at the expense of the city's 
black community, much as it did in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 Percy Hampton, one of the Portland BPP's founding members, left the 
organization in 1973, but he, like Kent Ford, never left Northeast Portland.  In 2011, he 
gave an interview to Anna Griffin of the Oregonian to discuss recent acts of vandalism 
and violence directed at the Portland police by black teenagers.  Disenchanted by what he 
views as random acts of violence with no genuine or substantive program for social 
change, Hampton described the youth, stating, "These kids . . . they're just looking for an 
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excuse to break stuff."
5
  Echoing Robert Self's analysis of the connection between the 
history or urban space and political struggles, Hampton continued, "We were talking 
about holding the government accountable for poverty, for the lack of affordable health 
care, for the way urban renewal was eating away at the black parts of town, and 
especially for the fact that the cops weren't being held accountable for violence. . . . We 
talked about specific things that helped people here."
6
 
 The story of Portland's Black Panther Party inextricably links the long history of 
black social and political struggles in Portland to the city's history of metropolitan 
planning throughout the twentieth century.  Systematically excluded from city politics 
since the early 1900s, confined to the Albina district, and forced to relocate for urban 
renewal projects that leveled black homes and businesses, the African American 
community in Northeast Portland fought back in a variety of ways in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.  Essentially barred from avenues of political representation and the right to 
determine the future of their own neighborhoods and communities, blacks in Albina 
developed alternative forms of political experimentation.  These new and creative 
sociopolitical movements ranged from demanding greater input and consultation with 
urban planners, as demonstrated with the Model Cities CPB and the PMSC, to openly 
hostile opposition to city government and a demand for complete control over their own 
community, like the Black Panther Party and other black power groups.  Consequently, 
the history of the relatively short-lived Portland Black Panther Party represented an 
                                                             
5 Anna Griffin, "Onetime Portland Black Panther Percy Hampton reflects on the movement, issues that 
remain today," OregonLive, February 19, 2011. Accessed June 22, 2011 from 
http://www.oregonlive.com/O/index.ssf/2011/02/onetime_portland_black_panther.html 
 
6 Italics added for emphasis; Anna Griffin, "Onetime Portland Black Panther Percy Hampton reflects on the 
movement, issues that remain today," Oregonian, February 19, 2011. 
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important moment of uncertainty for the black freedom struggle as well as for the future 
of Portland's politics and urban planning.  Although the Portland Panther's dream of 
complete community control was ultimately dashed, they played a pivotal role in 
pressuring the city government and the PDC to listen to moderate voices within the 
African American community, and later other Portland neighborhoods and communities, 
demanding urban planning reform. 
 Through this understanding of the significance of the Black Panther Party in the 
history of civil rights and metropolitan space, a number of historical misconceptions 
about Portland and black power organizations become clear.  Specifically, this study 
draws three significant conclusions about the long civil rights movement in the West and 
Pacific Northwest, the complex and localized nature of the Black Panther Party during 
the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the legacy of citizen participation and urban planning in 
Portland.  First, it helps to paint a more complete picture of the long civil rights 
movement in the United States, particularly in the urban American West.  Frequently 
ignored because of its relatively small black population, a more detailed study of Portland 
contributes a missing piece in the broader chronological and geographical understanding 
of the black freedom struggle in the urban West.  With its unique size, location, and 
demographics, Portland reveals as interesting and distinct a narrative of civil rights in the 
West as do studies of Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Francisco, Oakland, and Seattle.  In 
particular, the element of consistent yet ever-changing interracial coalitions between 
blacks and white liberals in Portland since the early 1900s, even among the seemingly 
most radical black power political organizations, makes the city's civil rights struggle an 
interesting case study.  Although whites worked with civil rights and radical 
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organizations across America, the sustainability of civil rights efforts in Portland were 
predicated consistently on crucial coalitions with whites. 
 Second, this distinctive micro study leads to a more detailed understanding of the 
localized efforts of national social and political protest movements, like the Portland 
Black Panther Party.  The Portland chapter of the BPP reemphasizes the findings of 
recent studies that the national organization was not as monolithic or hierarchical as 
historians popularly portrayed it.  Although the headquarters of the BPP in Oakland 
dictated the organization's platform and ideological basis, the leadership of the chapters 
formed policies and protests on a localized level that responded to immediate issues, 
especially after the national leadership began to erode in the late 1960s.  In addition to 
responding to specific urban planning and government policies in Albina, one unique 
feature about the Portland Panthers, compared to dominant Black Panther narratives, was 
Ford and other leaders' receptiveness to soliciting and accepting the help of local whites.  
Again, this support was common nationwide, but in Portland, where the black population 
never constituted as large a percentage of the population as other major West Coast cities, 
it was crucial.  For an organization like the BPP to exist and build viable, successful 
social programs, the group's leadership had to work more closely with sympathetic white 
allies, such as local businesses, OHSU doctors, dentists, and medical assistances, PSU 
faculty and students, and others.  Although it is possible that Portland represents an 
outlying or unrepresentative case study, further studies of BPP chapters in cities with 
smaller black populations or more racially diverse neighborhood demographics, like 
Portland, may reveal a continuum of interaction with local white liberals.  Consequently, 
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the history of the Portland BPP hints at a more complex and distinctly localized picture of 
the Black Panthers nationally. 
 Finally, and most importantly, this study demonstrate that historians, sociologists, 
political scientists, and urban planners have overly idealized and mythologized popular 
perceptions of Portland as a model city for urban planning and citizen participation in 
recent decades.  There is undoubtedly truth to the idea that the roots of Portland's 
community and neighborhood activism, inner city and public transportation 
revitalization, and environmental protection developed and evolved during the conflicts 
of the 1960s and 1970s that this study addresses.  However, professional scholars, urban 
planners, and Portlanders frequently romanticize the city's commitment to those ideals.  
Instead, the history of Portland's black community in Albina reveals a population of 
citizens that the city government and white citizens excluded from politics in the early 
twentieth century, confined into a conceptually spatialized ghetto after World War II, and 
granted a minimal role in the city's political revolution during the 1970s.  As a result, 
what remains of Portland's black community today is a group that did not equally share in 
benefits of the triumph of neighborhood activism. 
 The legacy of political, socioeconomic, and spatialized racial discrimination in the 
urban West, as well as the rest of the United States, remains at the core of questions 
surrounding problems facing community organizers and urban planners.  Only one 
generation removed from the tumultuous years that gave birth to Portland's new urban 
politics, those who hold the city up as a model for urban planning and citizen 
participation would do well to remember its complex, deeply rooted, and destructive 
historical legacy of exclusion toward the black citizens of Albina.  While Portland's 
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modern reputation is justifiable, it is important to see both the successes and 
shortcomings of our model cities.  To acknowledge only the successes of Portland's urban 
planning model belies the still unresolved planning problems and historical struggles the 
city faced in the late 1960s and early 1970s that triggered the new urban politics and 
planning of Portland.  Mayor Goldschmidt himself came to power on a platform of 
learning from and avoiding the failures of other urban communities. 
 The claim that local neighborhoods and communities knew how to develop, 
regulate, and uplift their neighborhoods better than high-minded and misguided urban 
planners was a crucial part of the struggles of Albina's African American community in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  More importantly, it was central to the movement that mobilized 
Portland's political revolution in the 1970s and built the foundation for a city that 
politicians and urban planners hold in such high regard today.  Perhaps the greatest 
contradiction of that period is the community that helped trigger the neighborhood 
activist movement in Portland during the late 1960s and 1970s still has farthest to go to 
overcome the legacy of racial discrimination, political exclusion, and spatial segregation.  
For Kent Ford, the imprisonment of his son as an enemy of the state is a daily reminder 
of that tragic and paradoxical legacy.
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
AME   African Methodist Episcopal 
ANIP   Albina Neighborhood Improvement Project 
BPP   Black Panther Party 
C-CAP  Church-Community Action Program 
COINTELPRO Counter Intelligence Program (FBI) 
CPB   Citizens Planning Board (Model Cities) 
FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigation 
HAP   Housing Authority of Portland 
HUD   Department of Housing and Urban Development 
KKK   Ku Klux Klan 
NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People 
NCCF   National Committee to Combat Fascism 
NDP   Neighborhood Development Plan 
NWDA  Northwest Development Association 
OEO   Office of Economic Opportunity 
OHS   Oregon Historical Society 
OHSU   Oregon Health and Science University 
ONA   Office of Neighborhood Associations 
OPD   Office of Planning and Development 
PARC   City of Portland Archives and Records Center 
PDC   Portland Development Commission 
PMSC   Portland Metropolitan Steering Committee 
PSC   Portland State College 
PSU   Portland State University (formerly PSC) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
PORTLAND POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS, 1900-1970 
 
TABLE 2.1: 
Population of Racial Groups in West Coast Cities, 1900-1920 
 
City 1900 1910 1920 
Portland       
-White 80,614 198,952 252,961 
-Black 775 1,045 1,556 
-Chinese 7,841 5,699 1,846 
-Japanese 1,189 1,461 1,715 
Seattle 
  
  
-White 79,815 227,753 302,580 
-Black 406 2,296 2,894 
-Chinese 438 924 1,351 
-Japanese 2,990 6,127 7,874 
San Francisco 
  
  
-White 325,378 400,014 490,022 
-Black 1,654 1,642 2,414 
-Chinese 13,954 10,582 7,744 
-Japanese 1,781 4,518 5,358 
Oakland 
  
  
-White 64,788 141,956 204,004 
-Black 1,026 3,055 5,489 
-Chinese 950 3,609 3,821 
-Japanese 194 1,520 2,709 
Los Angeles 
  
  
-White 98,082 305,307 546,864 
-Black 2,131 7,599 15,579 
-Chinese 2,111 1,954 2,062 
-Japanese 150 4,238 11,618 
 
Source: William Toll, "Black Families and Migration to a Multiracial Society: Portland, 
Oregon, 1900-1924," Journal of American Ethnic History 17.3 (Spring 1998): 42. 
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TABLE 2.2: 
Population of Portland, 1930-1970 
 
  1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 
Total 301,815 305,394 373,628 372,676 382,619 
White (%) 296,177 (98) 299,707 (98) 360,388 (96) 353,757 (94) 352, 636 (92) 
Black (%) 1,559 (>1) 1,931 (>1) 9,529 (3) 15,637 (4) 21,572 (6) 
Other "Non-
White" (%) 
4,079 (1) 3,756 (1) 3,711 (1) 5,282 (1) 8,411 (2) 
 
Source: Stuart J. McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line: Civil Rights and Racial 
Ideology in Portland, Oregon, 1944-1965" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1998), 
398. 
 
 
TABLE 2.3: 
Population of Vanport, 1943-1945 
 
  Total White (%) Black (%) 
January 30, 1943 6,016 4,840 (80.5) 1,176 (19.5) 
June 30, 1943 25,088 22,932 (91.5) 2,156 (8.5) 
January 30, 1944 31,093 28,160 (90.5) 2,159 (6.9) 
June 30, 1944 27,082 23,232 (85.8) 3,818 (14.1) 
November 1, 1944 32,622 26,656 (81.7) 5,808 (17.8) 
May 1, 1945 30,842 24,525 (79.5) 6,317 (20.4) 
 
Source: Portland City Club, The Negro in Portland, 1945. 
 
 
TABLE 2.4: 
Population of Williams Avenue and the Albina District, 1940-1960 
 
  1940 1950 1960 
Total 26,438 28,589 22,816 
White (%) 24,999 (95) 23,215 (81) 11,013 (48) 
Black (%) 1,161 (5) 5,064 (18) 11,431 (50) 
Other "Non-White" (%) 278 (1) 310 (1) 372 (2) 
 
Source: Stuart J. McElderry, "The Problem of the Color Line: Civil Rights and Racial 
Ideology in Portland, Oregon, 1944-1965" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1998), 
399. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
MAPS OF PORTLAND, 1890-1970 
 
FIGURE 2.1: 
African American Population Centers in Portland, 1890 
 
 
Source: Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History 
(Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995). 
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FIGURE 2.2: 
African American Population Centers in Portland, 1930 
 
 
Source: Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History 
(Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995). 
  
146 
 
FIGURE 2.3: 
African American Population Centers in Portland, 1945 
 
 
Source: Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History 
(Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995). 
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FIGURE 2.4: 
African American Population Centers in Portland, 1955 
 
Source: Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History 
(Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995). 
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FIGURE 2.5: 
Central Albina Study Area, 1962 
 
Source: The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present 
(Portland: Bureau of Planning, 1993), 112. 
 
  
149 
 
FIGURE 2.6: 
Albina Neighborhood Improvement Project, 1961 
 
Source: The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present 
(Portland: Bureau of Planning, 1993), 116.  
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FIGURE 2.7: 
African American Population Centers in Portland, 1965 
 
 
Source: Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History 
(Portland: Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995). 
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FIGURE 3.1: 
Proposed Model Cities Boundary 
 
 
 
Source: Emanuel Hospital Application, Emanuel Hospital Records, A2010-003, box 1, 
folder 1, PARC, Portland. 
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FIGURE 4.1: 
Proposed Plan for Emanuel Hospital, 1969 
 
 
 
Source: Emanuel Hospital Application, Emanuel Hospital Records, A2010-003, box 1, 
folder 1, PARC, Portland.
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
BLACK PANTHER PARTY TEN-POINT PLATFORM AND PROGRAM
1
 
 
October 1966 
 
1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community. 
We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.  
 
2. We want full employment for our people. We believe that the federal government is 
responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We 
believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the 
means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community 
so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a 
high standard of living.  
 
3. We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our Black Community. We 
believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue 
debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years 
ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the 
payment as currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans 
are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans 
murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over 
twenty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we 
make.  
 
4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings. We believe that if the 
white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing 
and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government 
aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.  
 
5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent 
American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role 
in the present-day society. We believe in an educational system that will give to our 
people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position 
in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.  
 
6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service. We believe that Black 
people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government 
that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, 
like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We 
                                                             
1 Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, "Ten-Point Platform and Program" (Oakland, 1966), accessed 
January 9, 2012, http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111bppp.html. 
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will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist 
military, by whatever means necessary.  
 
7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people.  We 
believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-
defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police 
oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm 
themselves for self defense.  
 
8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons 
and jails.  We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and 
prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.  
 
9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of 
their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the 
Constitution of the United States.  We believe that the courts should follow the United 
States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person 
from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and 
racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black 
community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by 
all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black 
community.  
 
10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our 
major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held 
throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to 
participate for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their 
national destiny.  When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one 
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to 
assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws 
of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind 
requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.  
 
We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal; that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, 
whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the 
people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on 
such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely 
to effect their safety and happiness.  Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long 
established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly, all 
experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to supper, while evils are 
sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are 
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accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariable the 
same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it 
is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future 
security.  
 
 
156 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
 
BOOKS AND ARTICLES 
 
Abbott, Carl. Greater Portland: Urban Landscape in the Pacific Northwest. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. 
 
Abbott, Carl. Portland: Planning, Politics and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983. 
 
Boykoff, Jules, and Martha Gies. "'We're going to defend ourselves': The Portland 
Chapter of the Black Panther Party and the Local Media Response." Oregon 
Historical Quarterly 111.3 (Fall 2010): 278-311. 
 
Cha-Jua, Sundiata, and Clarence Lang. "The Long Movement as Vampire: Temporal and 
Spatial Fallacies in Recent Black Freedom Studies." The Journal of African 
American History 92.2 (Spring 2007): 265-288. 
 
Cornerstones of Community: Buildings of Portland's African American History. Portland: 
Bosco-Milligan Foundation, 1995. 
 
Fackler, Eliot. "Protesting Portland's Freeways: Highway Engineering and Citizen 
Activism in the Interstate Era."  MA thesis, University of Oregon, 2009. 
 
Gibson, Karen J. "Bleeding Albina: A History of Community Disinvestment, 1940-
2000." Transforming Anthropology 15.1 (2007): 3-25. 
 
Gies, Martha. "A Father's Story." Portland Monthly, March 2005. 
 
Gies, Martha. "Radical Treatment." Reed Magazine online, Winter 2009.  Accessed June 
22, 2011 from 
http://web.reed.edu/reed_magazine/winter2009/features/radical_treatment/index.h
tml. 
 
Gilmore, Glenda Elizabeth, Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 2008). 
 
Griffin, Anna. "Onetime Portland Black Panther Percy Hampton reflects on the 
movement, issues that remain today." OregonLive, February 19, 2011. Accessed 
June 22, 2011 from 
http://www.oregonlive.com/O/index.ssf/2011/02/onetime_portland_black_panther
.html. 
 
Hall, Jacquelyn Dowd. "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the 
Past." The Journal of American History 91.4 (March 2005): 1233-1263. 
157 
 
 
The History of Portland's African American Community, 1805 to the Present. Portland: 
Bureau of Planning, 1993. 
 
Jefferies, Judson, ed. Comrades: A Local History of the Black Panther Party. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007. 
 
Jefferies, Judson, ed. On the Ground: The Black Panther Party in Communities across 
America. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010. 
 
Joseph, Peniel E. Waiting 'Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in 
America. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2006. 
 
Kim, Claire Jean. "The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans." Politics and Society 
27.1 (March 1999): 105-138 
 
Kurashige, Scott. The Shifting Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in the 
Making of Multiethnic Los Angeles. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
Lansing, Jewel. Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 1851-2001. Corvallis: Oregon 
State University Press, 2003. 
 
Lazerow, Jama, and Yohuru Williams. In Search of the Black Panther Party: New 
Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement. Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006. 
 
May, Glenn A. Sonny Montes and Mexican American Activism in Oregon. Corvallis: 
Oregon State University Press, 2011. 
 
McElderry, Stuart J. "The Problem of the Color Line: Civil Rights and Racial Ideology in 
Portland, Oregon, 1944-1965." PhD diss., University of Oregon, 1998. 
 
McLagan, Elizabeth. A Peculiar Paradise: A History of Blacks in Oregon, 1788-1940. 
Portland: The Oregon Black History Project—Georgian Press, 1980. 
 
Millner, Darrell. On the Road to Equality: The Urban League of Portland, A 50 Year 
Retrospective. Portland: Urban League of Portland, 1995. 
 
Nelson, Alondra. Body and Soul: The Black Panther Party and the Fight against Medical 
Discrimination. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 
 
Ozawa, Connie P. The Portland Edge: Challenges and Successes in Growing 
Communities. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2004. 
 
Self, Robert O. American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 
158 
 
 
Sugrue, Thomas J. Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the 
North (New York: Random House, 2008). 
 
Toll, William. "Black Families and Migration to a Multiracial Society: Portland, Oregon, 
1900-1924." Journal of American Ethnic History 17.3 (Spring 1998): 38-70. 
 
Taylor, Quintard. "The Civil Rights Movement in the American West: Black Protest in 
Seattle, 1960-1970." The Journal of Negro History 80.1 (Winter 1995): 1-14. 
 
Taylor, Quintard. The Forging of a Black Community: Seattle's Central District from 
1870 through the Civil Rights Era. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994. 
 
Whitaker, Matthew C. Race Work: The Rise of Civil Rights in the Urban West. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2007. 
 
Williams, Clay. "The Portland Black Panthers: Building the Local African-American 
Community from the Ground Up." BA thesis, University of Portland, 2008. 
 
 
INTERVIEWS, INSTITUTIONAL PUBLICATIONS, GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 
 
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. "Ten-Point Platform and Program." Oakland: 
1966. Accessed January 9, 2012. 
http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111bppp.html. 
 
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966. Pub. L. No. 89-754 
(1966). 
 
Ford, Kent, Percy Hampton, et al. "Portland Black Panther Party." KBOO Community 
Radio. Portland, February 24, 2008. 
 
Goldschmidt, Neil, interviewed by Robert Novak. Meet the Press. National Broadcasting 
Company, San Francisco. June 17, 1973. 
 
Little, William A. and James E. Weiss. Blacks in Oregon: A Statistical and Historical 
Report. Portland State University Black Studies Center and Center for Population 
Research and Census.  Portland: Portland State University, 1978. 
 
Office of the Mayor. Portland Model Cities Third Year Action Plan Extension—FY 
73/74. Portland: City of Portland, April 13, 1973. 
 
Portland Development Commission. Central Albina Study. Portland: City of Portland, 
1962. 
 
 
159 
 
MANUSCRIPTS, ARCHIVES, AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS 
 
Emanuel Hospital Project Records, A2010-003. City of Portland Archives and Records 
Center, Portland, OR. 
 
Portland National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
Archive Collection, Branch Records: 1938-1981. University of Oregon Library, 
Eugene, OR. 
 
Portland Police Investigative Files. Black Community Survival Committee Police 
Records. Police Historical and Archival Intelligence Records, A-2004-005. City 
of Portland Archives and Records Center, Portland, OR. 
 
Portland Police Investigative Files, Black Panther Party Police Records. Police Historical 
and Archival Intelligence Records, A-2004-005. City of Portland Archives and 
Records Center, Portland, OR. 
 
Stella Maris House Manuscript Collection, 1940-1973. The Oregon Historical Society 
Library, Portland, OR. 
 
 
NEWSPAPERS 
 
The Berkeley Tribe 
 
The Militant 
 
The Oregonian 
 
The Oregon Journal 
 
Portland Community College Bridge 
 
The Register-Guard 
 
